Mediation incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.

Consumption externalities, habit formation, and equilibrium efficiency

We analyze the welfare properties of the competitive equilibrium in a capital accumulation model where individual preferences are subjected to both habit formation and consumption spillovers. We also discuss how consumption externalities and habits interact to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium. Finally, we characterize optimal tax policies aimed to restore efficient decentralized paths.

Growth, habit formation, and catching-up\ with the Joneses

When habits are introduced multiplicatively in a capital accumulation model, the consumers' objective function might fail to be concave. In this paper we provide conditions aimed at guaranteeing the existence of interior solutions to the consumers' problem. We also characterize the equilibrium path of two growth models with multiplicative habits: the internal habit formation model, where individual habits coincide with own past consumption, and the external habit formation (or catching-up with the Joneses) model, where habits arise from the average past consumption in the economy. We show that the introduction of external habits makes the equilibrium path inefficient during the transition towards the balanced growth path. We characterize in this context the optimal tax policy.

Income taxation with habit formation and consumption externalities

We analyze the dynamic behavior and the welfare properties of the equilibrium path of a growth model where both habits and consumption externalities affect the utility of consumers. We discuss the effects of flat rate income taxes and characterize the optimal income taxation policy. We show that, when consumption externalities and habit adjusted consumption are not perfect substitutes, a counter-cyclical income tax rate allows the competitive equilibrium to replicate the efficient path. Our analysis highlights the crucial role played by complementarities between externalities and habits in order to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium.

Allocative and productive efficiency in REE with asymetric information

We characterize the divergence between informational and economic efficiency in a rational expectations competitive market with asymmetric information about the costs of production. We find that prices may contain too much or too little information with respect to incentive efficient allocations depending on whether the main role of the price is, respectively, the traditional as index of scarcity or informational. Only when REE degenerate to Cournot equilibria the market solution does not show llocative inefficiency. With multidimensional uncertainty we find that the REE price does not have in general the incentive efficient information mix: It pays to sacrifice allocative efficiency at the REE to improve productive efficiency.

Selecting negotiation processes with Health Care

We address the question of how a third-party payer (e.g. an insurer) decides what providers to contract with. Three different mechanisms are studied and their properties compared. A first mechanism consists in the third-party payer setting up a bargaining procedure with both providers jointly and simultaneously. A second mechanism envisages the outcome of the same simultaneous bargaining but independently with every provider. Finally, the last mechanism is of different nature. It is the so-called "any willing provider" where the third-party payer announces a contract and every provider freely decides to sign it or not. The main finding is that the decision of the third-party payer depends on the surplus to be shared. When it is relatively high the third-party payer prefers the any willing provider system. When, on the contrary, the surplus is relatively low, the third-party payer will select one of the other two systems accor ing to how bargaining power is distributed.

Negotiation advantages of professional associations in health care

In several instances, third-party payers negotiate prices of health care services with providers. We show that a third-party payer may prefer to deal with a professional association than with the sub-set constituted by the more efficient providers, and then apply the same price to all providers. The reason for it is the increase in the bargaining position of providers. The more efficient providers are also the ones with higher profits in the event of negotiation failure. This allows them to ext act a higher surplus from the third-party payer.

Not all university degrees yield the same return: private and social returns to higher education for males in Spain

In this paper we use micro data from the Spanish Family Expenditure Survey for 1990 to estimate, for the first time, the private and social rates of return of different university degrees in Spain. We compute internal rates of return and include investment on higher education financed by the public purse to estimate social rates of return. Our main finding is that, as presumed, there is large heterogeneity in rates of return amongst different university

Recent trends in Spanish income distribution: a robust picture of falling income inequality

Income distribution in Spain has experienced a substantial improvement towards equalisation during the second half of the seventies and the eighties; a period during which most OECD countries experienced the opposite trend. In spite of the many recent papers on the Spanish income distribution, the period covered by those stops in 1990. The aim of this paper is to extent the analysis to 1996 employing the same methodology and the same data set (ECPF). Our results not only corroborate the (decreasing inequality) trend found by others during the second half of the eighties, but also suggest that this trend extends over the first half of the nineties. We also show that our main conclusions are robust to changes in the equivalence scale, to changes in the definition of income and to potential data contamination. Finally, we analyse some of the causes which may be driving the overall picture of income inequality using two decomposition techniques. From this analyses three variables emerge as the major responsible factors for the observed improvement in the income distribution: education, household composition and socioeconomic situation of the household head.

Capital humano y desigualdad en España: 1985-1996

En el período 1985-1996 la desigualdad de la renta en España se redujo de forma notable, en claro contraste con lo sucedido en otros países avanzados. En este trabajo se profundiza en el impacto que sobre esta reducción en la desigualdad ha ejercido la redistribución del stock de capital humano, uno de los factores que aparecen como más relevantes para explicar tanto la distribución de la renta como sus modificaciones. Las conclusiones obtenidas sugieren que aproximadamente un tercio de la reducción en la desigualdad que se ha producido entre los dos años extremos contemplados (1985 frente a 1996) se debe al comportamiento del capital humano. Otros factores tales como el tamaño de la familia o la participación de ambos cónyuges en el mercado de trabajo, han actuado en el mismo sentido. Finalmente, un elevado porcentaje de mejora en la distribución permanece por explicar y deberá ser objeto de investigaciones futuras.

Employment and public capital in spain

This paper analyses the e¤ects on employment of increasing the stock of public capital. To this end, we derive a wage equation so that wages are endogenized. This allows us to show that, by means of a higher elasticity of labour demand with respect to wages, a rise in public capital increases employment. The estimation of a structural model for the Spanish private sector tests and con…rms empirically this relationship. The results show that an increase in public capital has a significant and positive direct influence on employment, and indirect e¤ects derived from lower wages and higher economic growth. Finally, we undertake a simulation exercise to assess the long run efects on employment and economic growth of increasing public capital.

Subjective income expectations, canonical models and income risk

Expectations are central to behaviour. Despite the existence of subjective expectations data, the standard approach is to ignore these, to hypothecate a model of behaviour and to infer expectations from realisations. In the context of income models, we reveal the informational gain obtained from using both a canonical model and subjective expectations data. We propose a test for this informational gain, and illustrate our approach with an application to the problem of measuring income risk.

Unemployment, growth and fiscal policy: new insights on the hysteresis hypothesis

We develop a growth model with unemployment due to imperfections in the labor market. In this model, wage inertia and balanced budget rules cause a complementarity between capital and employment capable of explaining the existence of multiple equilibrium paths. Hysteresis is viewed as the result of a selection between these diferent equilibrium paths. We use this model to argue that, in contrast to the US, those fiscal policies followed by most of the European countries after the shocks of the 1970’s may have played a central role in generating hysteresis.

Caracterización de la privación y de la pobreza en Catalunya

Este trabajo contribuye a la escasa literatura sobre la evaluación multidimensional del nivel de bienestar de los individuos más desfavorecidos de nuestra sociedad. Se distingue claramente entre pobreza monetaria y privación multidimensional, para proceder entonces a su cuantificación y caracterización empleando una base de datos nueva (PaD) para Cataluña y utilizando, por vez primera, una metodología que nos permite considerar de forma conjunta la pobreza y la privación. Nuestros resultados empíricos deberían informar a la política social. Aportamos evidencia nueva sobre viejas y nuevas relaciones entre situaciones de desventaja económica y características de los individuos, algunas de las cuales invitan a reconsiderar viejas concepciones. This paper contributes to the scarce literature on the multidimensional assessment of the well-being of the worse off individuals. We document and characterise monetary poverty and multidimensional deprivation using a new database (PaD) for Catalonia. The econometric methodology we employ allows for a join analysis of poverty and deprivation, which has not been seen before. Our empirical findings should be informative for social policy. We provide new evidence on old and new relations between situations of economic disadvantage and individual characteristics, some of which invite to reconsider old conceptions.