A note on discrete claims problems

In this note, we consider claims problems with indivisible goods. Specifically, by applying recursively the P-rights lower bound (Jiménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil (2008)), we ensure the fulfillment of Weak Order Preservation, considered by many authors as a minimal requirement of fairness. Moreover, we retrieve the Discrete Constrained Equal Losses and the Discrete Constrained Equal Awards rules (Herrero and Martíınez (2008)). Finally, by the recursive double imposition of a lower and an upper bound, we obtain the average between them. Keywords: Claims problems, Indivisibilities, Order Preservation, Constrained Egalitarian rules, Midpoint. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

From bargaining solutions to claims rules: a proportional approach

Is it important to negotiate on proportions rather than on numbers? To answer this question, we analyze the behavior of well-known bargaining solutions and the claims rules they induce when they are applied to a "proportionally transformed" bargaining set SP -so-called bargaining-in-proportions set. The idea of applying bargaining solutions to claims problems was already developed in Dagan and Volij (1993). They apply the bargaining solutions over a bargaining set that is the one de ned by the claims and the endowment. A comparison among our results and theirs is provided. Keywords: Bargaining problem, Claims problem, Proportional, Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, Nash bargaining solution. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.

Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design specification in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspecification. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design specification and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project s design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design s specification level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design specification and shows that the sponsor s optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design specification so as to make significant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspecification occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Competition and cost overruns in procurement

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in theinitial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speciffication in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspeciffication. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speciffication and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design's speciffication level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design speciffication and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design speciffication so as to make signifficant cost overrunslikely. Since no such misspeciffication occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Sallie Chisholm (1947): Recipient of the 2013 Ramon Margalef Prize in Ecology.

The Ramon Margalez Prize in Ecology is awarded annually by the Goverment of Catalonia to recognize people who have distinghished themselves in the field of ecological science. Among the events that are held in connection with the award-giving ceremony, the University of Barcelona hosts a seminar by the awardee followed by a roundtable discussion.

An experience beyond continuous assessment activities: virtual tour to the medieval medicinal plant garden of the Pedralbes monastery

[eng] The group of teaching innovation in the area of Botany (GIBAF), University of Barcelona (UB), is raised each year to design new accreditation activities under continuous evaluation framework. We present the experience carried out during the academic year 2008-09 in the course of Pharmaceutical Botany. The aim has been to involve students for a semester in the authorship of a tutored project immediately useful and of easy permanence, beyond its assessment proving usefulness. The Medicinal Plants Garden of the Monastery of Pedralbes has been used as a resource and a collaboration agreement has been signed between the UB faculty and the Institute of Culture of Barcelona. The students have developed the work using the Moodle platform CampusvirtualUB into five stages which included preparation of files by students that have been modified in some steps following the various feedbacks from teachers. At the beginning of the activity, students were provided with a complete schedule of activities, the schedule for its implementation, and a total of 18 forced-use library resources. Finally, through Google sites, a website has been implemented, allowing for a virtual tour of the garden, documenting by referenced literature 50 medicinal plants for their nomenclature, botanical description, distribution, uses historical, current and future) and toxicity. The result of the activity was presented at a public ceremony in the Monastery of Pedralbes and is available at: http://sites.google.com/site/jardimedievalpedralbes/ [spa] El grupo de innovación docente integrado por profesores del área de Botánica (GIBAF) de la Universidad de Barcelona (UB) se plantea cada curso el diseño de nuevas actividades acreditativas en el marco de la evaluación continuada. Se presenta la experiencia llevada a cabo durante el curso 2008-09 en la asignatura Botánica Farmacéutica. El objetivo ha sido implicar durante un semestre a los estudiantes en la autoría de un proyecto tutorizado de inmediata utilidad y clara perdurabilidad, más allá de su utilidad acreditativa. Como recurso se ha utilizado el Jardín de Plantas Medicinales del Monasterio de Pedralbes y se ha firmado un convenio de colaboración docente entre la UB y el Instituto de Cultura de Barcelona. Los estudiantes han realizado el trabajo utilizando la plataforma Moodle del Campus virtual de la UB en cinco etapas que han incluido la confección de unas fichas que se han ido modificando en función de las diversas retroacciones de los profesores. Al inicio de la actividad, se facilitó a los estudiantes el cronograma completo de la actividad, la pauta para su realización, así como un total de 18 recursos bibliográficos de uso obligado. Finalmente, a través de GoogleSites, se ha realizado una web que permite realizar un paseo virtual por el jardín, documentando de forma referenciada para las 50 plantas medicinales su nomenclatura, descripción botánica, distribución, usos (históricos, actuales y futuros) y toxicidad. El resultado de la actividad fue presentado en un acto público en el Monasterio de Pedralbes y puede consultarse en: http://sites.google.com/site/jardimedievalpedralbes/

Rationing problems with payoff thresholds

An extension of the standard rationing model is introduced. Agents are not only identi fied by their respective claims over some amount of a scarce resource, but also by some payoff thresholds. These thresholds introduce exogenous differences among agents (full or partial priority, past allocations, past debts, ...) that may influence the final distribution. Within this framework we provide generalizations of the constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule. We show that these generalized rules are dual from each other. We characterize the generalization of the equal awards rule by using the properties of consistency, path-independence and compensated exemption. Finally, we use the duality between rules to characterize the generalization of the equal losses solution.

Enjoying cooperative games: The R package GameTheory

This paper focuses on cooperative games with transferable utility. We propose the computation of two solutions, the Shapley value for n agents and the nucleolus with a maximum of four agents. The current approach is also focused on conflicting claims problems, a particular case of coalitional games. We provide the computation of the most well-known and used claims solutions: the proportional, the constrained equal awards, the constrained equal losses, the Talmud and the random arrival rules. Keywords: Cooperative game, Shapley value, nucleolus, claims problem, claims rule, bankruptcy.

Selecting Scientific Papers for Publication via Citation Auctions

The scientific community has been suffering from peer review for decades. This process (also called refereeing) subjects an author's scientific work or ideas to the scrutiny of one or more experts in the field. Publishers use it to select and screen manuscript submissions, and funding agencies use it to award research funds. The goal is to get authors to meet their discipline's standards and thus achieve scientific objectivity. Publications and awards that haven't undergone peer review are often regarded with suspicion by scholars and professionals in many fields. However, peer review, although universally used, has many drawbacks. We propose replacing peer review with an auction-based approach: the better the submitted paper, the more scientific currency the author likely bid to have it published. If the bid correctly reflects the paper's quality, the author is rewarded in this new scientific currency; otherwise, the author loses this currency. We argue that citations are an appropriate currency for all scientists. We believe that citation auctions encourage scientists to better control their submissions' quality. It also inspire them to prepare more exciting talks for accepted papers and to invite discussion of their results at congresses and conferences and among their colleagues. In the long run, citation auctions could have the power to greatly improve scientific research