The Design and efficiency of loyalty rewards

The goal of this paper is to reexamine the optimal design and efficiency of loyalty rewards in markets for final consumption goods. While the literature has emphasized the role of loyalty rewards as endogenous switching costs (which distort the efficient allocation of consumers), in this paper I analyze the ability of alternative designs to foster consumer participation and increase total surplus. First, the efficiency of loyalty rewards depend on their specific design. A commitment to the price of repeat purchases can involve substantial efficiency gains by reducing price-cost margins. However, discount policies imply higher future regular prices and are likely to reduce total surplus. Second, firms may prefer to set up inefficient rewards (discounts), especially in those circumstances where a commitment to the price of repeat purchases triggers Coasian dynamics.

Lessons of peace in Aceh: administrative decentralization and political freedom as a strategy of pacification in Aceh

This working paper shows the evolution of the Aceh conflict until its peaceful resolution in 2005. The key factors in the success of this peace process have been the confluence of several factors related to the internal and external dynamics of the country, including the new political leadership, the decreasing role of the military power, the international support and the meeting of the objectives of both groups, and so on. The end of the conflict in Aceh shows that the administrative decentralization and the promotion of the political participation of the main actors involved have made possible the development of a solid alternative to the arms strategy of conflict resolution used for years in Indonesia.

Accounting conservatism and firm investment efficiency

Conservatism, through the timelier recognition of losses in the income statement, is expected to increase firm investment efficiency through three main channels: (1) by decreasing the adverse effect of information asymmetries between outside equity holders and managers, facilitating the monitoring of managerial investment decisions; (2) by increasing managerial incentives to abandon poorly performing projects earlier and to undertake fewer negative net present-value investments; and (3) by facilitating the access to external financing at lower cost. Using a large US sample for the period 1990-2007 we find a negative association between conservatism and measures of over- and under- investment, and a positive association between conservatism and future profitability. This is consistent with firms reporting more conservative numbers investing more efficiently and in more profitable projects. Our results add to a growing stream of literature suggesting that eliminating conservatism from accounting regulatory frameworks may lead to undesirable economic consequences.

Origins and efficiency of the electric industry regulation in Spain, 1910-1936

The aim of this paper is to discover the origins of utility regulation in Spain, and to analyse, from a microeconomic perspective, its characteristics and the impact of regulation on consumers and utilities. Madrid and the Madrilenian utilities are taken as a case study. The electric industry in the period studied was a natural monopoly2. Each of the three phases of production, generation, transmission and distribution, had natural monopoly characteristics. Therefore, the most efficient form to generate, transmit and distribute electricity was the monopoly because one firm can produce a quantity at a lower cost than the sum of costs incurred by two or more firms. A problem arises because when a firm is the single provider it can charge prices above the marginal cost, at monopoly prices. When a monopolist reduces the quantity produced, price increases, causing the consumer to demand less than the economic efficiency level, incurring a loss of consumer surplus. The loss of the consumer surplus is not completely gained by the monopolist, causing a loss of social surplus, a deadweight loss. The main objective of regulation is going to be to reduce to a minimum the deadweight loss. Regulation is also needed because when the monopolist fixes prices at marginal cost equal marginal revenue there would be an incentive for firms to enter the market creating inefficiency. The Madrilenian industry has been chosen because of the availability of statistical information on costs and production. The complex industry structure and the atomised demand add interest to the analysis. This study will also provide some light on the tariff regulation of the period which has been poorly studied and will complement the literature on the US electric utilities regulation where a different type of regulation was implemented.

Evaluation of subsidies programs to sell green cars: Impact on prices, quantities and efficiency

During the recent period of economic crisis, many countries have introduced scrappage schemes to boost the sale and production of vehicles, particularly of vehicles designed to pollute less. In this paper, we analyze the impact of a particular scheme in Spain (Plan2000E) on vehicle prices and sales figures as well as on the reduction of polluting emissions from vehicles on the road. We considered the introduction of this scheme an exogenous policy change and because we could distinguish a control group (non-subsidized vehicles) and a treatment group (subsidized vehicles), before and after the introduction of the Plan, we were able to carry out our analysis as a quasi-natural experiment. Our study reveals that manufacturers increased vehicle prices by the same amount they were granted through the Plan (1,000 €). In terms of sales, econometric estimations revealed an increase of almost 5% as a result of the implementation of the Plan. With regard to environmental efficiency, we compared the costs (inverted quantity of money) and the benefits of the program (reductions in polluting emissions and additional fiscal revenues) and found that the Plan would only be beneficial if it boosted demand by at least 30%.

Production of OER, a Quest for Efficiency

In most initiatives to publish Open Educational Resources (OER), the production of OER is the activity with the highest costs. Based on literature and personal experiences a list of relevant characteristics of production processes for OER are determined. Three cases are compared with each other on these characteristics. Most influence on costs are human costs and the type of OER created.

E-government and Public Services : a Case Study of the Inter-administrative Portal CAT365. Research report (sythesis document)

Aquest estudi analitza els usos de les TIC a l'administració autonòmica catalana. De forma més específica, l'estudi se centra en la interacció entre l'ús d'un vessant concret de les TIC, la xarxa Internet, per part de l'administració pública, i determinats aspectes centrals d'aquest tipus d'institucions: la seva organització i estructura internes, la provisió de serveis públics o la relació amb altres agents socials. Hem analitzat, doncs, el fenomen del govern electrònic en el marc particular de la Generalitat de Catalunya, estudiant-ne el grau de desenvolupament i penetració, les seves característiques més remarcables i els problemes més importants que s'hi plantegen. El projecte de recerca es concreta en un estudi de cas sobre un projecte d'innovació específic però de gran abast, que es trobava en el moment de realització de l'estudi en la seva primera fase d'implementació: el projecte Administració Oberta de Catalunya (AOC). Concretament ens hem centrat en el vessant d'aquesta iniciativa pública que es concretava en la creació d'un portal interadministratiu a Internet, el portal www.cat365.net, destinat a proveir electrònicament serveis públics de totes les administracions que operen a Catalunya. L'estudi analitza les transformacions internes de l'administració que s'hi poden trobar associades i els elements que les condicionen, tant positivament com negativa. Igualment, intentem analitzem el que aquestes transformacions poden suposar per a la relació entre els ciutadans i les institucions públiques.

The efficiency of direct payments versus tax reductions under uncertainty

This paper analyzes the optimal behavior of farmers in the presence of direct payments and uncertainty. In an empirical analysis for Switzerland, it confirms previously obtained theoretical results and determines the magnitude of the theoretical predicted effects. The results show that direct payments increase agricultural production between 3.7% to 4.8%. Alternatively to direct payments, the production effect of tax reductions is evaluated in order to determine its magnitude. The empirical analysis corroborates the theoretical results of the literature and demonstrates that tax reductions are also distorting, but to a substantially lesser degree if losses are not offset. However, tax reductions, independently whether losses are offset or not, lead to higher government spending than pure direct payments

Interplay of spectral efficiency, power and doppler spectrum for reference-signal-assisted wireless communication

Expressions relating spectral efficiency, power, and Doppler spectrum, are derived for Rayleigh-faded wireless channels with Gaussian signal transmission. No side information on the state of the channel is assumed at the receiver. Rather, periodic reference signals are postulated in accordance with the functioning of most wireless systems. The analysis relies on a well-established lower bound, generally tight and asymptotically exact at low SNR. In contrast with most previous studies, which relied on block-fading channel models, a continuous-fading model is adopted. This embeds the Doppler spectrum directly in the derived expressions, imbuing them with practical significance. Closed-form relationships are obtained for the popular Clarke-Jakes spectrum and informative expansions, valid for arbitrary spectra, are found for the low- and high-power regimes. While the paper focuses on scalar channels, the extension to multiantenna settings is also discussed.

Spectral efficiency in reference-signal-assisted low-power wireless communication

Expressions relating spectral efficiency, power and Doppler spectrum are derived for low-power Rayleighfaded wireless channels with proper complex signaling. Noside information on the state of the channel is assumed at the receiver. Rather, periodic reference signals are postulated inaccordance with the functioning of most wireless systems. In contrast with most previous studies, which relied on block-fading channel models, a continuous-fading model is adopted. This embeds the Doppler spectrum directly in thederived expressions thereby imbuing them with practical significance.

Efficiency-based evaluation of aligners for industrial applications

This paper presents a novel efficiencybased evaluation of sentence and word aligners. This assessment is critical in order to make a reliable use in industrial scenarios. The evaluation shows that the resourcesrequired by aligners differ rather broadly. Subsequently, we establish limitation mechanisms on a set of aligners deployed as web services. These results, paired with the quality expected from the aligners, allow providers to choose the most appropriate aligner according to the task at hand.

Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.

Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.

Communication, Coordination, and Efficiency in Evolutionary One-population Models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuring efficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.