47 resultados para Adaptive Governance
Resumo:
This paper presents a first approach of Evaluation Engine Architecture (EEA) as proposal to support adaptive integral assessment, in the context of a virtual learning environment. The goal of our research is design an evaluation engine tool to assist in the whole assessment process within the A2UN@ project, linking that tool with the other key elements of a learning design (learning task, learning resources and learning support). The teachers would define the relation between knowledge, competencies, activities, resources and type of assessment. Providing this relation is possible obtain more accurate estimations of student's knowledge for adaptive evaluations and future recommendations. The process is supported by usage of educational standards and specifications and for an integral user modelling
Resumo:
This paper estimates the effect of judicial institutions on governance at the local level in Brazil. Our estimation strategy exploits a unique institutional feature of state judiciary branches which assigns prosecutors and judges to the most populous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. As a result of this assignment mechanism there are counties with nearly identical populations, some with and some without local judicial presence, which we exploit to impute counterfactual outcomes. Conditional on observable county characteristics, offenses per civil servant are about 35% lower in counties that have a local seat of the state judiciary. The lower incidence of infractions stems mostly from fewer violations of financial management regulations by local administrators, fewer instances of problems in project execution and project managment, fewer cases of non-existent or ineffective civil society oversight and fewer cases of improper handling of remittances to local residents.
Resumo:
In this work I study the stability of the dynamics generated by adaptivelearning processes in intertemporal economies with lagged variables. Iprove that determinacy of the steady state is a necessary condition for the convergence of the learning dynamics and I show that the reciprocal is not true characterizing the economies where convergence holds. In the case of existence of cycles I show that there is not, in general, a relationship between determinacy and convergence of the learning process to the cycle. I also analyze the expectational stability of these equilibria.
Resumo:
We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firm in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population in order to attract customers. Due to the minimal information provided, the players do not have a well--specified model of their environment. Our main objective is to characterize the adaptive behavior of the players in such a situation.
Resumo:
We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In thisprocedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities thatare proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies(these measures are updated every period). It is shown that our adaptiveprocedure guaranties that with probability one, the sample distributionsof play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game. Tocompute these regret measures, a player needs to know his payoff functionand the history of play. We also offer a variation where every playerknows only his own realized payoff history (but not his payoff function).
Resumo:
The Generalized Assignment Problem consists in assigning a setof tasks to a set of agents with minimum cost. Each agent hasa limited amount of a single resource and each task must beassigned to one and only one agent, requiring a certain amountof the resource of the agent. We present new metaheuristics forthe generalized assignment problem based on hybrid approaches.One metaheuristic is a MAX-MIN Ant System (MMAS), an improvedversion of the Ant System, which was recently proposed byStutzle and Hoos to combinatorial optimization problems, and itcan be seen has an adaptive sampling algorithm that takes inconsideration the experience gathered in earlier iterations ofthe algorithm. Moreover, the latter heuristic is combined withlocal search and tabu search heuristics to improve the search.A greedy randomized adaptive search heuristic (GRASP) is alsoproposed. Several neighborhoods are studied, including one basedon ejection chains that produces good moves withoutincreasing the computational effort. We present computationalresults of the comparative performance, followed by concludingremarks and ideas on future research in generalized assignmentrelated problems.
Resumo:
Many experiments have shown that human subjects do not necessarily behave in line with game theoretic assumptions and solution concepts. The reasons for this non-conformity are multiple. In this paper we study the argument whether a deviation from game theory is because subjects are rational, but doubt that others are rational as well, compared to the argument that subjects, in general, are boundedly rational themselves. To distinguish these two hypotheses, we study behavior in repeated 2-person and many-person Beauty-Contest-Games which are strategically different from one another. We analyze four different treatments and observe that convergence toward equilibrium is driven by learning through the information about the other player s choice and adaptation rather than self-initiated rational reasoning.
Resumo:
Given $n$ independent replicates of a jointly distributed pair $(X,Y)\in {\cal R}^d \times {\cal R}$, we wish to select from a fixed sequence of model classes ${\cal F}_1, {\cal F}_2, \ldots$ a deterministic prediction rule $f: {\cal R}^d \to {\cal R}$ whose risk is small. We investigate the possibility of empirically assessingthe {\em complexity} of each model class, that is, the actual difficulty of the estimation problem within each class. The estimated complexities are in turn used to define an adaptive model selection procedure, which is based on complexity penalized empirical risk.The available data are divided into two parts. The first is used to form an empirical cover of each model class, and the second is used to select a candidate rule from each cover based on empirical risk. The covering radii are determined empirically to optimize a tight upper bound on the estimation error. An estimate is chosen from the list of candidates in order to minimize the sum of class complexity and empirical risk. A distinguishing feature of the approach is that the complexity of each model class is assessed empirically, based on the size of its empirical cover.Finite sample performance bounds are established for the estimates, and these bounds are applied to several non-parametric estimation problems. The estimates are shown to achieve a favorable tradeoff between approximation and estimation error, and to perform as well as if the distribution-dependent complexities of the model classes were known beforehand. In addition, it is shown that the estimate can be consistent,and even possess near optimal rates of convergence, when each model class has an infinite VC or pseudo dimension.For regression estimation with squared loss we modify our estimate to achieve a faster rate of convergence.
Resumo:
This paper studies the equilibrating process of several implementationmechanisms using naive adaptive dynamics. We show that the dynamics convergeand are stable, for the canonical mechanism of implementation in Nash equilibrium.In this way we cast some doubt on the criticism of ``complexity'' commonlyused against this mechanism. For mechanisms that use more refined equilibrium concepts,the dynamics converge but are not stable. Some papers in the literatureon implementation with refined equilibrium concepts have claimed that themechanisms they propose are ``simple'' and implement ``everything'' (incontrast with the canonical mechanism). The fact that some of these ``simple''mechanisms have unstable equilibria suggests that these statements shouldbe interpreted with some caution.
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By integrating the agency and stakeholder perspectives, this study aims to provide a systematic understanding of the firm- and institutional-level corporate governance factors that affect corporate social performance (CSP). We analyze a large global panel dataset and reveal that CSP is positively associated with board independence, but negatively with ownership concentration. These results underscore the idea that the benefits of CSP do not flow to shareholders to the same extent as the costs and that the allocation of resources to CSP is lower when shareholders are powerful. Furthermore, these findings indicate that independent directors should be understood as agents in their own right, not only focused on defending shareholder interests. We also find that CSP is negatively related to investor protection and shareholder-oriented environments, while it is positively related to egalitarian environments. Finally, we jointly analyze firm-level drivers and institutional contexts.
Resumo:
Low-cost tin oxide gas sensors are inherently nonspecific. In addition, they have several undesirable characteristics such as slow response, nonlinearities, and long-term drifts. This paper shows that the combination of a gas-sensor array together with self-organizing maps (SOM's) permit success in gas classification problems. The system is able to determine the gas present in an atmosphere with error rates lower than 3%. Correction of the sensor's drift with an adaptive SOM has also been investigated
Resumo:
Climate change may pose challenges and opportunities to viticulture, and much research has focused in studying the likely impacts on grapes and wine production in different regions worldwide. This study assesses the vulnerability and adaptive capacity of the viticulture sector under changing climate conditions, based on a case study in El Penedès region, Catalonia. Farm assets, livelihood strategies, farmer-market interactions and climate changes perceptions are analysed through semi-structured interviews with different types of wineries and growers. Both types of actors are equally exposed to biophysical stressors but unevenly affected by socioeconomic changes. While wineries are vulnerable because of the current economic crisis and the lack of diversification of their work, which may affect their income or production, growers are mainly affected by the low prices of their products and the lack of fix contracts. These socioeconomic stressors strongly condition their capacity to adapt to climate change, meaning that growers prioritize their immediate income problems, rather than future socioeconomic or climate threats. Therefore, growers undertake reactive adaptation to climate changing conditions, mainly based on ancient knowledge, whilst wineries combine both reactive and anticipatory adaptation practices. These circumstances should be addressed in order to allow better anticipatory adaptation to be implemented, thus avoiding future climate threats.
Resumo:
Helping behavior is any intentional behavior that benefits another living being or group (Hogg & Vaughan, 2010). People tend to underestimate the probability that others will comply with their direct requests for help (Flynn & Lake, 2008). This implies that when they need help, they will assess the probability of getting it (De Paulo, 1982, cited in Flynn & Lake, 2008) and then they will tend to estimate one that is actually lower than the real chance, so they may not even consider worth asking for it. Existing explanations for this phenomenon attribute it to a mistaken cost computation by the help seeker, who will emphasize the instrumental cost of “saying yes”, ignoring that the potential helper also needs to take into account the social cost of saying “no”. And the truth is that, especially in face-to-face interactions, the discomfort caused by refusing to help can be very high. In short, help seekers tend to fail to realize that it might be more costly to refuse to comply with a help request rather than accepting. A similar effect has been observed when estimating trustworthiness of people. Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2010) showed that people also tend to underestimate it. This bias is reduced when, instead of asymmetric feedback (getting feedback only when deciding to trust the other person), symmetric feedback (always given) was provided. This cause could as well be applicable to help seeking as people only receive feedback when they actually make their request but not otherwise. Fazio, Shook, and Eiser (2004) studied something that could be reinforcing these outcomes: Learning asymmetries. By means of a computer game called BeanFest, they showed that people learn better about negatively valenced objects (beans in this case) than about positively valenced ones. This learning asymmetry esteemed from “information gain being contingent on approach behavior” (p. 293), which could be identified with what Fetchenhauer and Dunning mention as ‘asymmetric feedback’, and hence also with help requests. Fazio et al. also found a generalization asymmetry in favor of negative attitudes versus positive ones. They attributed it to a negativity bias that “weights resemblance to a known negative more heavily than resemblance to a positive” (p. 300). Applied to help seeking scenarios, this would mean that when facing an unknown situation, people would tend to generalize and infer that is more likely that they get a negative rather than a positive outcome from it, so, along with what it was said before, people will be more inclined to think that they will get a “no” when requesting help. Denrell and Le Mens (2011) present a different perspective when trying to explain judgment biases in general. They deviate from the classical inappropriate information processing (depicted among other by Fiske & Taylor, 2007, and Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and explain this in terms of ‘adaptive sampling’. Adaptive sampling is a sampling mechanism in which the selection of sample items is conditioned by the values of the variable of interest previously observed (Thompson, 2011). Sampling adaptively allows individuals to safeguard themselves from experiences they went through once and turned out to lay negative outcomes. However, it also prevents them from giving a second chance to those experiences to get an updated outcome that could maybe turn into a positive one, a more positive one, or just one that regresses to the mean, whatever direction that implies. That, as Denrell and Le Mens (2011) explained, makes sense: If you go to a restaurant, and you did not like the food, you do not choose that restaurant again. This is what we think could be happening when asking for help: When we get a “no”, we stop asking. And here, we want to provide a complementary explanation for the underestimation of the probability that others comply with our direct help requests based on adaptive sampling. First, we will develop and explain a model that represents the theory. Later on, we will test it empirically by means of experiments, and will elaborate on the analysis of its results.