565 resultados para 2005-09-BS
Resumo:
I consider a general specification of criminals' objective functionand argue that, when the general non-expected utility theory issubstituted for the traditional expected utility theory, thehigh-fine-low-probability result (Becker, 1968) only holds underspecific and strong restrictions.
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We see that the price of an european call option in a stochastic volatilityframework can be decomposed in the sum of four terms, which identifythe main features of the market that affect to option prices: the expectedfuture volatility, the correlation between the volatility and the noisedriving the stock prices, the market price of volatility risk and thedifference of the expected future volatility at different times. We alsostudy some applications of this decomposition.
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Professional services require certain organizational patterns in order to avoid information asymmetries and external effects. These same patterns are used within production structures involving various degrees of monopoly. However, competitive restraints are justified today only when substantial external effects are clearly present, whereas information asymmetries hardly justify such restraints because reputational investments have become widespread in the economy and are relatively efficient in overcoming such asymmetries. As a consequence, innovation in the production of externalities can make competitive constraints unnecessary.
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In this paper we perform a mathematical analyse of profits and losses indirect and full costing. They are compared in different situations, mainlythe utilisation of productive capacity and the existence of beginninginventories. Direct costing was conceived as a system of cost accountingwhich would show profits as a function of sales. In full costing profitsdepend on available combinations of sales, production, costs of beginninginventories, etc., and information displayed in financial statements displayappears incongruent. Differences in profits with full and direct costingincrease when full costing allocates fixed costs according to normalproduction, in some cases differences, and financial statements would showmore incongruent performance. It is concluded about the importance thatprofit and loss statement expresses profits in both costing systems.
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I study the optimal project choice when the principal relies on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation. The principal has to choose between a safe project generating a fixed revenue and a risky project generating an uncertain revenue. The agent has private information about the production cost under each project but also about the signal regarding the profitability of the risky project. If the signal favoring the adoption of the risky project is goods news to the agent, integrating production and project evaluation tasks does not generate any loss compared to the benchmark in which the principal herself receives the signal. By contrast, if it is bad news, task integration creates an endogenous reservation utility which is type-dependent and thereby generates countervailing incentives, which can make a bias toward either project optimal. Our results can offer an explanation for why good firms can go bad and a rationale for the separation of day-to-day operating decisions from long-term strategic decisions stressed by Williamson.
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We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetricgame -which we interpret as a borrowerlender relation-, study itsevolutionary dynamics in a random matching set-up, and tests itspredictions. The model provides conditions for the existence ofcredit markets and credit cycles. The theoretical predictions seemto be good approximations of the experimental results.
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The degree of connection between tax and financial reporting is regarded as a key factor in the study of international accounting differences. The position for Spain is briefly outlined in previous research but without examination of any specific accounting issues except, in outline only, depreciation and the tax-free revaluation of assets from 1977 to 1983. The absence of a detailed study of the major tax/accounting linkages for Spain is of particular importance because the relationship is regarded as having changed dramatically in the early 1990s, from a position of tax dominance. In order to measure the links between tax and financial reporting, we adopt the methodology of Lamb et al. (1998) by assessing major accounting topics using a five-case classification shown as Table 1. We refute the proposition that suggests that the link between tax/accounting has been reduced substantially.
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Many political economic theories use and emphasize the process of votingin their explanation of the growth of Social Security, governmentspending, and other public policies. But is there an empirical connectionbetween democracy and Social Security program size or design? Using somenew international data sets to produce both country-panel econometricestimates as well as case studies of South American and southern Europeancountries, we find that Social Security policy varies according toeconomic and demographic factors, but that very different politicalhistories can result in the same Social Security policy. We find littlepartial effect of democracy on the size of Social Security budgets, onhow those budgets are allocated, or how economic and demographic factorsaffect Social Security. If there is any observed difference, democraciesspend a little less of their GDP on Social Security, grow their budgetsa bit more slowly, and cap their payroll tax more often, than doeconomically and demographically similar nondemocracies. Democracies andnondemocracies are equally likely to have benefit formulas inducingretirement and, conditional on GDP per capita, equally likely to induceretirement with a retirement test vs. an earnings test.
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The paper contrasts empirically the results of alternative methods for estimating thevalue and the depreciation of mineral resources. The historical data of Mexico andVenezuela, covering the period 1920s-1980s, is used to contrast the results of severalmethods. These are the present value, the net price method, the user cost method andthe imputed income method. The paper establishes that the net price and the user costare not competing methods as such, but alternative adjustments to different scenariosof closed and open economies. The results prove that the biases of the methods, ascommonly described in the theoretical literature, only hold under the most restrictedscenario of constant rents over time. It is argued that the difference between what isexpected to happen and what actually did happen is for the most part due to a missingvariable, namely technological change. This is an important caveat to therecommendations made based on these models.
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A `next' operator, s, is built on the set R1=(0,1]-{ 1-1/e} defining a partial order that, with the help of the axiom of choice, can be extended to a total order in R1. Besides, the orbits {sn(a)}nare all dense in R1 and are constituted by elements of the samearithmetical character: if a is an algebraic irrational of degreek all the elements in a's orbit are algebraic of degree k; if a istranscendental, all are transcendental. Moreover, the asymptoticdistribution function of the sequence formed by the elements in anyof the half-orbits is a continuous, strictly increasing, singularfunction very similar to the well-known Minkowski's ?(×) function.
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As part of a process of democratization, many countries spanning Europe, Latin Amertica, Africa, and Asia are reorganizing their governments bydevolving fiscal responsibility and authority to newly empowered regionaland local governments. Although decentralization in each country proceedsdifferently, a common element tends to be an initially heavy relianceon central government grants to fund regional spending. We develop atheoretical model of regional borrowing decisions in which the incentivesfor regional borrowing depend crucially on how the regions expect thefederal system of finance to evolve. We examine the implications of themodel using data on Spanish regions for the period 1984-1995 and findevidence that regions may be borrowing inefficiently in response toincentives imbedded in the Spanish system of fiscal decentralization.
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It is difficult to justify tax incentives within the existing economicsliterature on tax competition. We develop a model in which communitiesare interested in attracting firms not only for their own capital butalso for the concentration externalities, a form of agglomerationeconomies, their location bestows on existing firms. We find that itis efficient in this case for communities to offer tax incentives,defined as a tax rate below the benefit tax level, to firms. We presentthe recent relocation of the Boeing Corporation's headquarters fromSeattle to Chicago as a case study.
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This study reports on the analysis of annual reports from 14- listed companies in Spainover a five-year period, from 1998 to 2002. Companies in the sample are selected on thebasis of their knowledge-based assets and incentives to report on Intellectual Capital.The empirical analysis is twofold:1) Firstly, we analyse the value of intellectual capital using a value-based approach,through the difference between market and book value over the period considered. Results show that there is a general decrease in the 'hidden value' of these companies, probably due to the general trend in stock markets.2) Secondly, we carry out a content-based analysis of the complete annual reports of the companies over the five year period. Preliminary findings seem to suggest that although the level of disclosure has increased over time, this is mainly in the form of narrative. Overall, the level of disclosure of intellectual capital remains low.
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This paper generalizes the original random matching model of money byKiyotaki and Wright (1989) (KW) in two aspects: first, the economy ischaracterized by an arbitrary distribution of agents who specialize in producing aparticular consumption good; and second, these agents have preferences suchthat they want to consume any good with some probability. The resultsdepend crucially on the size of the fraction of producers of each goodand the probability with which different agents want to consume eachgood. KW and other related models are shown to be parameterizations ofthis more general one.
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Traditional economic wisdom says that free entry in a market will drive profits down to zero. This conclusion is usually drawn under the assumption of perfect information. We assumethat a priori there exists imperfect information about theprofitability of the market, but that potential entrants maylearn the demand curve perfectly at negligible cost byengaging in market research. Even if in equilibrium firmslearn the demand perfectly, profits may be strictly positivebecause of insufficient entry. The mere fact that it will notbecome common knowledge that every entrant has perfectinformation about demand causes this surprising result. Belief means doubt. Knowing means certainty. Introduction to the Kabalah.