Contracting with free software communities

Industry and large Agencies needs ¿agile¿ programming resources, to reinforce their own development staff and take advantage of innovative approaches produced by ¿fresh minds¿ all over the world. At the same time they may be reluctant to engage in classical software development call for tenders and contracts. Such contracts are often ¿trusted¿ by large ICT firms, which will deliver according to their own rigid frameworks (often based on alliances with proprietary software vendors), may propose comfortable quality assurances, but will cover their (real) risks and liability with high contingency costs and will charge for any change request in case the original specifications have not fixed all possible issues. Introducing FLOSS in business implies a new contracting philosophy, based on incentives rather than penalties and liability. Based on 2011 experience with a large Space Agency, Patrice-Emmanuel Schmitz pictures the needed legal instruments for a novel approach.

Moral Hazard in Repeated Procurement of Services

This paper analyzes repeated procurement of services as a four-stage game divided into two periods. In each period there is (1) a contest stage à la Tullock in which the principal selects an agent and (2) a service stage in which the selected agent provides a service. Since this service effort is non-verifiable, the principal faces a moral hazard problem at the service stages. This work considers how the principal should design the period-two contest to mitigate the moral hazard problem in the period-one service stage and to maximize total service and contest efforts. It is shown that the principal must take account of the agent's past service effort in the period-two contest success function. The results indicate that the optimal way to introduce this `bias' is to choose a certain degree of complementarity between past service and current contest efforts. This result shows that contests with `additive bias' (`multiplicative bias') are optimal in incentive problems when effort cost is low (high). Furthermore, it is shown that the severity of the moral hazard problem increases with the cost of service effort (compared to the cost of contest effort) and the number of agents. Finally, the results are extended to more general contest success functions. JEL classification: C72; D82 Key words: Biased contests; Moral Hazard; Repeated Game; Incentives.

Technical Progress, Sorting, and Early Retirement

[cat] El progrés tecnològic afecta a la jubilació anticipada a través de dues forces oposades. Per una banda, augmenta el salari real i, per tant, crea incentius per posposar la jubilació. Per altra banda, causa l’erosió de les habilitats dels treballadors, el qual augmenta la probabilitat de jubilació anticipada. En aquest article reexaminem l’efecte del progrés tecnològic en la jubilació anticipada tenint en compte que, al principi de la vida laboral, els individus es distribueixen en diferents sectors segons la seva habilitat. Obtenim dos resultats principals: 1) per petits (grans) canvis tecnològics, l’efecte salari (erosió) domina, i 2) els individus més capaços resisteixen millor l’efecte erosió.

Technical Progress, Sorting, and Early Retirement

[cat] El progrés tecnològic afecta a la jubilació anticipada a través de dues forces oposades. Per una banda, augmenta el salari real i, per tant, crea incentius per posposar la jubilació. Per altra banda, causa l’erosió de les habilitats dels treballadors, el qual augmenta la probabilitat de jubilació anticipada. En aquest article reexaminem l’efecte del progrés tecnològic en la jubilació anticipada tenint en compte que, al principi de la vida laboral, els individus es distribueixen en diferents sectors segons la seva habilitat. Obtenim dos resultats principals: 1) per petits (grans) canvis tecnològics, l’efecte salari (erosió) domina, i 2) els individus més capaços resisteixen millor l’efecte erosió.

La crisis en las políticas de empleo. La modélica Dinamarca y la situación en España

[spa] A través de las siguientes páginas nos adentraremos en la diferencia abismal de dos sistemas de protección del empleo, España y Dinamarca, producto de una concepción y evolución distinta del Estado del bienestar surgido tras la Gran Depresión de los años 30 y la II Guerra Mundial. Las políticas de empleo danesas gozan de una gran estabilidad y eficacia desde la década de 1990. España, por el contrario, tiene una amalgama de políticas desordenada y caótica que pone su acento en los incentivos a la contratación. Mirarse en el espejo danés, de vez en cuando, es una buena idea.

Universal Service Policies in Europe & Latam: Evidence on Bridging the Divide in Rural Areas

Broadband access is a key factor for economic and social development. However, providing broadband to rural areas is not attractive to private telecommunications operators due its low or zero investment return. To deal with broadband provision in rural areas, different governance systems based on private and public cooperation have appeared. This paper not only identifies and defines public and private cooperation models but also assesses their impact on overcoming the digital divide in rural areas. The results show that public ownership infrastructure under private management policy has had positive effects on reducing the broadband digital divide and being applied to areas with higher digital divide; subsides to private operators providers only positive effects on reducing broadband digital divide; but public infrastructure with public management programs did not. The results, obtained using quasi-experimental methods, suggest the importance of incentives and control mechanisms in broadband universal service provision plans.

Elders and the ITCs use to communicate with children and grandchildren

Past research in using ICTs (Information and Communication Technologies) in interpersonal communication showed that age plays an important role. There is a general assumption that the elderly are left behind regarding the adoption and the use of ICTs. Furthermore, elders tend to use ICTs mainly for instrumental purposes and the use is rather non-sophisticated. When elders are using ICTs to maintain their social network, similar patterns could be found: They start using internet, or intensify its use, when their children move abroad while they might decrease using the tool if the motivation ends. In this research we explore elders' incentives to go online and use internet services to communicate; the type of agencies they use to communicate with children and grandchildren abroad; and the situations that make them stop using the ICTs or even reject internet mediated communications. We base our discussion on the empirical evidence the two authors gathered in different cities and countries: Barcelona, Romania, Toronto, Los Angeles, Montevideo and Lima, through semi-structured interviews and observation, with people aged 60 years old and over. The results show that the ability for using ICT tools in an autonomous way is a better explanation than age. In this, we distinguish between assisted users and autonomous users. We found that oldest seniors and those seniors who are less socially active are more likely to be assisted users than those who are socially or professionally active. For them communication with their children and grandchildren abroad follows no agency or it is mediated by significant others from their local social network, who are able to use ICTs and select specific information to share, in the second step, with the elder. For some younger participants the use of ICTs is rather situational and imposed by their children or grandchildren, who installed the tool in the first place and assisted them in using it. Finally, other elders describe a proficient and independent use of ICTs so they use the devices and services the way they want to.We discuss the implications of the patterns in using ICTs, for elders' social life and their relationships with children and grandchildren. First, we emphasis the fact that those elders rejecting the ICTs or being unskilled in using them to communicate might be left out from their family circle, particularly when children are abroad -they would experience more isolation. Second, we underline the fact that when children and grandchildren are the ones that control the ICTs used by their parents and grandparents, they are controlling also the information flow and this will redefine the power relations between elders and their younger relatives.

Desenvolupament d'una aplicació Android per gestionar rutes de Bicing

En aquest projecte es presenta el desenvolupament d'un sistema integrat per facilitar i incentivar l'ús dels serveis de bicicletes públiques. Seguint una arquitectura client/servidor, l'aplicació és capaç de proporcionar les millors rutes en bicicleta que connectin dos punts de la ciutat. A més, l'aplicació agrega informació que les empreses gestores dels serveis públics d'aquest mitjà de transport posen a disposició dels seus clients. Tot i que de moment l'aplicació es centra en el servei de Bicing de la ciutat de Barcelona, no es descarta la seva ampliació a altres ciutats del món.

Testing the FTPL across government tiers

Control on regional government budgets is important in a monetary union as lower tiers of government have fewer incentives to consolidate debt. According to the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level; unsustainable non-Ricardian fiscal policies eventually force monetary policy to adjust. Hence, uncoordinated and non-regulated regional fiscal policies would therefore threaten price stability for the monetary union as a whole. However, the union central bank is not without defense. A federal government that internalises the spillover effect of non-Ricardian fiscal policies on the price level can offset non-Ricardian regional fiscal policies. A federal government, which taxes and transfers resources between regions, may compensate for unsustainable regional fiscal policies so as to keep fiscal policy Ricardian on aggregate. Following Canzoneri et al. (2001), we test the validity of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level for both federal and regional governments in Germany. We find evidence of a spillover effect of unsustainable policies on the price level for other Länder. However, the German federal government offsets this effect on the price level by running Ricardian policies. These results have implications for the regulation of fiscal policies in the EMU.

Efficiency and Equity in Learning Communities and schools

Traditionally, school efficiency has been measured as a function of educational production. In the last two decades, however, studies in the economics of education have indicated that more is required to improve school efficiency: researchers must explore how significant changes in school organization affect the performance of at-risk students. In this paper we introduce Henry Levin’s adoption of the X-efficiency approach to education and we describe the efficient and cost-effective characteristics of one Learning Communities Project School that significantly improved its student outcomes and enrollment numbersand reduced its absenteeism rate to zero. The organizational change that facilitatedthese improvements defined specific issues to address. Students’ school success became the focus of the school project, which also offered specific incentives, selected teachers, involved parents and community members in decisions, and used the most efficient technologies and methods. This case analysis reveals new two elements—family training and community involvement—that were not explicit parts of Levin’s adaptation. The case of the Antonio Machado Public School should attract the attention of both social scientists and policy makers

Some Notes and Comments on the Efficient use of Information in Repeated Games with Poisson Signals

In the present paper we characterize the optimal use of Poisson signals to establish incentives in the "bad" and "good" news models of Abreu et al. [1]. In the former, for small time intervals the signals' quality is high and we observe a "selective" use of information; otherwise there is a "mass" use. In the latter, for small time intervals the signals' quality is low and we observe a "fine" use of information; otherwise there is a "non-selective" use. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Public Monitoring, Infor- mation Characteristics.

In Google we trust?

In a micro-founded model, we derive novel incentives for a monopoly search engine to distort its organic and its sponsored results on searches for online content and offline products. Distorting organic results towards content publishers with less effective display advertising and/or distorting sponsored results towards higher margin merchants (by underweighting consumer relevance in search auctions) increase per capita revenues but lower participation. The interplay of these incentives determines search bias and welfare. We also characterize how the welfare consequences of integration into display advertising, as intermediary or publisher, depend on asymmetries, monopolization and targeting.