The agreement between ipsative and normative questionnaires using compositional data analysis techniques

The main instrument used in psychological measurement is the self-report questionnaire. One of its majordrawbacks however is its susceptibility to response biases. A known strategy to control these biases hasbeen the use of so-called ipsative items. Ipsative items are items that require the respondent to makebetween-scale comparisons within each item. The selected option determines to which scale the weight ofthe answer is attributed. Consequently in questionnaires only consisting of ipsative items everyrespondent is allotted an equal amount, i.e. the total score, that each can distribute differently over thescales. Therefore this type of response format yields data that can be considered compositional from itsinception.Methodological oriented psychologists have heavily criticized this type of item format, since the resultingdata is also marked by the associated unfavourable statistical properties. Nevertheless, clinicians havekept using these questionnaires to their satisfaction. This investigation therefore aims to evaluate bothpositions and addresses the similarities and differences between the two data collection methods. Theultimate objective is to formulate a guideline when to use which type of item format.The comparison is based on data obtained with both an ipsative and normative version of threepsychological questionnaires, which were administered to 502 first-year students in psychology accordingto a balanced within-subjects design. Previous research only compared the direct ipsative scale scoreswith the derived ipsative scale scores. The use of compositional data analysis techniques also enables oneto compare derived normative score ratios with direct normative score ratios. The addition of the secondcomparison not only offers the advantage of a better-balanced research strategy. In principle it also allowsfor parametric testing in the evaluation

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Substrate and depth preferences of macroinvertebrates along a transect in a Pyrenean high mountain lake (Estanh Redo, NE Spain)

Se estudia la composiciÛn y estructura de la comunidad de macroinvertebrados a lo largo de un transecto en profundidad en el lago Redó (Pirineos). Este estudio se enmarca dentro del proyecto de ámbito europeo MOLAR (Mountain Lake Research). Un equipo de buceadores muestreo dos tipos de substrato, piedras y fondos blandos, cada 2 m desde los 2 a los 20 m de profundidad. En la parte m·s profunda del lago las muestras se tomaron con draga Ekman (tres rÈplicas). Todas las muestras se tomaron el mismo día, el 15 de Julio de 1997. Los resultados, mediante un análisis de autocorrelación de Mantel, muestran que no existe un gradiente continuo en la sustituciÛn de unas especies por otras en la comunidad sobre substrato rocoso, sino que se distinguen dos discontinuidades claras, una a los 4 metros y otra a los 14 metros. La primera separa las especies propias de la zona litoral respecto a las de la zona sublitoral, mientras que la segunda coincide con la parte inferior de la termoclina, una zona siempre mas frÌa, con menos luz y con mayor acumulación de material fino sobre los sustratos duros a la vez que desaparece la cobertura algal que cubrÌa las piedras hasta esta profundidad. Respecto al sustrato existen especies que claramente prefieren el sustrato blando (oligoquetos, o los quironÛmidos Micropsectra radialis y Pseudodiamesa nivosa), mientras que otras eran más abundantes o exclusivas de los sustratos duros (Radix peregra, Plectrocnemia laetabilis, Psectrocladius octomaculatus). Estos resultados seran muy útiles para la interpretaciÛn de los datos paleolimnolÛgicos de los cores que actualmente se est·n estudiando en el lago.

Why the EU does not Have an Independent Competition Agency: French Interests and Transaction Costs in Early European Integration

A major achievement of new institutionalism in economics and political science is the formalisation of the idea that certain policies are more efficient when administered by a politically independent organisation. Based on this insight, several policy actors and scholars criticise the European Community for relying too much on a multi-task, collegial, and politicised organisation, the European Commission. This raises important questions, some constitutional (who should be able to change the corresponding procedural rules?) and some political-economic (is Europe truly committed to free and competitive markets?). Though acknowledging the relevance of legal and normative arguments, this paper contributes to the debate with a positive political-scientific perspective. Based on the view that institutional equilibria raise the question of equilibrium institutions, it shows that collegiality was (a) an equilibrium institution during the Paris negotiations of 1950-51; and (b) an institutional equilibrium for the following 50 years. The conclusion points to some recent changes in the way that European competition policy is implemented, and discusses how these affect the “constitutional” principle of collegial European governance.

Work values, endogenous sentiments and redistribution

We examine the interactions between individual behavior, sentiments and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution. Agents have moral "work values". Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social preferences. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are determined simultaneously. The equilibria feature different degrees of "social cohesion" and redistribution depending on pre-tax income inequality. In clustered equilibria the poor are held partly responsible for their low income since they work less than the moral standard and hence redistribution is low. The paper proposes a novel explanation for the emergence of different sentiments and social contracts across countries. The predictions appear broadly in line with well-documented differences between the United States and Europe.

Social perceptions of floods and flood management in a Mediterranean area (Costa Brava, Spain)

Taking as an example three study cases in the Costa Brava area, this paper examines the social perceptionof floods through surveys, interviews and Focus Group sessions. Perception is then related to vulnerability, flood management, and citizen’s preferences regarding alternatives to curb flood losses in the future. The study concludes that flood awareness and the willingness to take actions regarding this hazard are clearly related to the degree of social involvement with the affairs of the local community. Furthermore, participatory settings such as Focus Group sessions appear to enable a better environment for assessing and implementing flood management options that attempt to modify human activities rather than modify natural processes as has been frequently the case in the past

Altruism, uncertain lifetime and the distribution of wealth

This paper studies the dynamics of the distribution of wealth in ageneral equilibrium framework. It considers an overlapping generationsmodel with production and altruistic preferences in which individualsface an uncertain lifetime and annuity markets do not exist. Thispaper focuses on the role that accidental bequests, voluntary bequests,and non--negativity constraints on bequests play in the dynamics of thedistribution of wealth. It is proved that the equilibrium interestrate is lower than the one that satisfies the modified goldenrule. In this economy, a social security system not only plays aninsurance role, but also prevents capital overaccumulation. In fact,this paper shows that a pay--as--you--go social security systemdecentralizes the social planner solution as a competitive equilibrium.

Consistency and the Walrasian allocations correspondence

We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence, in classesof exchange economies with smooth and convex preferences, by means of consistency requirements and other axioms. We present three characterizationresults; all of which require consistency, converse consistency and standard axioms. Two characterizations hold also on domains with a finite number ofpotential agents, one of them requires envy freeness (with respect to trades) and the other--core selection; a third characterization, that requires coreselection, applies only to a variable number of agents domain, but is validalso when the domain includes only a small variety of preferences.

Corruption and the Hadleyburg effect

We study the dynamics of corruption relying on two fundamental observations:(a) Given agents detected as corrupt are typically fired and replaced, the historical levels of corruption have an impact on current corruption throughthe distribution of corruption costs of old agents; (b) Institutions negatively affected by their agents' corrupt activities are likely to respond optimally to it thereby decreasing the payoff from being corrupt. We model this situation by considering an agent who is supposed to monitor acontractor's delivery of a product or service and can manipulate hisreports thus allowing the contractor to deliver lower quality in exchange for a bribe. Given the two generations of agents overlapping at any particular date, the administration sets an optimal level of quality in eachperiod. We find that (i) A unique steady state level of corruption exists;(ii) Regardless of the initial distribution, apart from an initial period,equilibrium sequences are decreasing and converge to the steady state, aresult we term the "Hadleyburg effect". We use these findings to study thedynamic response of corruption to both temporary and permanent shocks to theprofitability of corruption and we find that the "Hadleyburg effect" hasimportant positive and normative implications.

National Identity and the Preference for State Opting-Out in the Basque Country

We argue that preferences for secession are the expression of a common unobserved mechanisms determining national identity. This paper examines the hypothesis of independence of both preferences for secession (independent Euskadi) and Basque national identity in the light of Akerloff and Kranton (2000). We deal with psychological determinants of individuals' national identity formation as well as those that influence the propensity of individuals to support the secession of their perceived ¿imagined community¿ or nation.. We undertake econometric survey analysis for the Basque Country using a bivariate probit model and publicly available data from the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research. Our results provide robust evidence of a common determination of national identity and political preferences for the secession of the Basque Country consistently with Akerloff and Kranton model.

Integer filling facfor phases and isospin in vertical diatomic artificial molecules

Integer filling factor phases of many-electron vertically coupled diatomic artificial quantum dot molecules are investigated for different values of the interdot coupling. The experimental results are analyzed within local-spin density functional theory for which we have determined a simple lateral confining potential law that can be scaled for the different coupling regimes, and Hartree-Fock theory. Maximum density droplets composed of electrons in both bonding and antibonding or just bonding states are revealed, and interesting isospin-flip physics appears for weak interdot coupling when the systematic depopulation of antibonding states leads to changes in isospin.

Difussion in a titled periodic potential: Enhancement, universality, and scaling

An exact analytical expression for the effective diffusion coefficient of an overdamped Brownian particle in a tilted periodic potential is derived for arbitrary potentials and arbitrary strengths of the thermal noise. Near the critical tilt (threshold of deterministic running solutions) a scaling behavior for weak thermal noise is revealed and various universality classes are identified. In comparison with the bare (potential-free) thermal diffusion, the effective diffusion coefficient in a critically tilted periodic potential may be, in principle, arbitrarily enhanced. For a realistic experimental setup, an enhancement by 14 orders of magnitude is predicted so that thermal diffusion should be observable on a macroscopic scale at room temperature.

National Identity and the Preference for State Opting-Out in the Basque Country

We argue that preferences for secession are the expression of a common unobserved mechanisms determining national identity. This paper examines the hypothesis of independence of both preferences for secession (independent Euskadi) and Basque national identity in the light of Akerloff and Kranton (2000). We deal with psychological determinants of individuals' national identity formation as well as those that influence the propensity of individuals to support the secession of their perceived ¿imagined community¿ or nation.. We undertake econometric survey analysis for the Basque Country using a bivariate probit model and publicly available data from the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research. Our results provide robust evidence of a common determination of national identity and political preferences for the secession of the Basque Country consistently with Akerloff and Kranton model.

Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods

We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which implies individual rationality) exists. For two-agent exchange markets with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for separable preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. For exchange markets with separable preferences and more than two agents no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and transfer-proofness.