La incapacidad de amar en A pair of blue eyes de Thomas Hardy

A Pair of Blue Eyes ha estat considerada tradicionalment como el primer exemple de pessimisme i fatalisme en les novel·les de Hardy. Aquest treball pretén mostrar que la novel·la no segueix aquest patró, sinó que en base al model aristotèlic de catarsis, mostra l’ error que suposa seguir falsos models amorosos.

Charge transfer in DNA: hole charge is confined to a single base pair due to solvation effects

We include solvation effects in tight-binding Hamiltonians for hole states in DNA. The corresponding linear-response parameters are derived from accurate estimates of solvation energy calculated for several hole charge distributions in DNA stacks. Two models are considered: (A) the correction to a diagonal Hamiltonian matrix element depends only on the charge localized on the corresponding site and (B) in addition to this term, the reaction field due to adjacent base pairs is accounted for. We show that both schemes give very similar results. The effects of the polar medium on the hole distribution in DNA are studied. We conclude that the effects of polar surroundings essentially suppress charge delocalization in DNA, and hole states in (GC)n sequences are localized on individual guanines

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

Signatures of CP violation in the presence of multiple b-pair production at hadron colliders

We calculate the production of two b-quark pairs in hadron collisions. Sources of multiple pairs are multiple interactions and higher order perturbative QCD mechanisms. We subsequently investigate the competing effects of multiple b-pair production on measurements of CP violation: (i) the increase in event rate with multiple b-pair cross sections which may reach values of the order of 1 b in the presence of multiple interactions and (ii) the dilution of b versus b tagging efficiency because of the presence of events with four B mesons. The impact of multiple B-meson production is small unless the cross section for producing a single pair exceeds 1 mb. We show that even for larger values of the cross section the competing effects (i) and (ii) roughly compensate so that there is no loss in the precision with which CP-violating CKM angles can be determined.

Pair production by and electric field in (1+1)-dimensional de Sitter space

We use the method of Bogolubov transformations to compute the rate of pair production by an electric field in (1+1)-dimensional de Sitter space. The results are in agreement with those obtained previously using the instanton methods. This is true even when the size of the instanton is comparable to the size of the de Sitter horizon.

Pair Creation of Black Holes Joined by Cosmic Strings

We argue that production of charged black hole pairs joined by a cosmic string in the presence of a magnetic field can be analyzed using the Ernst metric. The effect of the cosmic string is to pull the black holes towards each other, opposing to the background field. An estimation of the production rate using the Euclidean action shows that the process is suppressed as compared to the formation of black holes without strings.

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

Minimal requirements for parameters to be used for the development of predictive models for microbial source tracking. The example of the pair somatic coliphages and phages infecting Bacteroides

Several methods and approaches for measuring parameters to determine fecal sources of pollution in water have been developed in recent years. No single microbial or chemical parameter has proved sufficient to determine the source of fecal pollution. Combinations of parameters involving at least one discriminating indicator and one universal fecal indicator offer the most promising solutions for qualitative and quantitative analyses. The universal (nondiscriminating) fecal indicator provides quantitative information regarding the fecal load. The discriminating indicator contributes to the identification of a specific source. The relative values of the parameters derived from both kinds of indicators could provide information regarding the contribution to the total fecal load from each origin. It is also essential that both parameters characteristically persist in the environment for similar periods. Numerical analysis, such as inductive learning methods, could be used to select the most suitable and the lowest number of parameters to develop predictive models. These combinations of parameters provide information on factors affecting the models, such as dilution, specific types of animal source, persistence of microbial tracers, and complex mixtures from different sources. The combined use of the enumeration of somatic coliphages and the enumeration of Bacteroides-phages using different host specific strains (one from humans and another from pigs), both selected using the suggested approach, provides a feasible model for quantitative and qualitative analyses of fecal source identification.

Minimal requirements for parameters to be used for the development of predictive models for microbial source tracking. The example of the pair somatic coliphages and phages infecting Bacteroides

Several methods and approaches for measuring parameters to determine fecal sources of pollution in water have been developed in recent years. No single microbial or chemical parameter has proved sufficient to determine the source of fecal pollution. Combinations of parameters involving at least one discriminating indicator and one universal fecal indicator offer the most promising solutions for qualitative and quantitative analyses. The universal (nondiscriminating) fecal indicator provides quantitative information regarding the fecal load. The discriminating indicator contributes to the identification of a specific source. The relative values of the parameters derived from both kinds of indicators could provide information regarding the contribution to the total fecal load from each origin. It is also essential that both parameters characteristically persist in the environment for similar periods. Numerical analysis, such as inductive learning methods, could be used to select the most suitable and the lowest number of parameters to develop predictive models. These combinations of parameters provide information on factors affecting the models, such as dilution, specific types of animal source, persistence of microbial tracers, and complex mixtures from different sources. The combined use of the enumeration of somatic coliphages and the enumeration of Bacteroides-phages using different host specific strains (one from humans and another from pigs), both selected using the suggested approach, provides a feasible model for quantitative and qualitative analyses of fecal source identification.

Combinatorial and metric properties of Thompson's group T

We discuss metric and combinatorial properties of Thompson's group T, such as the normal forms for elements and uniqueness of tree pair diagrams. We relate these properties to those of Thompson's group F when possible, and highlight combinatorial differences between the two groups. We define a set of unique normal forms for elements of T arising from minimal factorizations of elements into convenient pieces. We show that the number of carets in a reduced representative of T estimates the word length, that F is undistorted in T, and that cyclic subgroups of T are undistorted. We show that every element of T has a power which is conjugate to an element of F and describe how to recognize torsion elements in T.

Dynamic matching and bargaining: the role of deadlines

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.

Search and bargaining in large markets with homogeneous traders

We study pair-wise decentralized trade in dynamic markets with homogeneous, non-atomic, buyers and sellers that wish to exchange one unit. Pairs of traders are randomly matched and bargaining a price under rules that offer the freedom to quit the match at any time. Market equilbria, prices and trades over time, are characterized. The asymptotic behavior of prices and trades as frictions (search costs and impatience) vanish, and the conditions for (non) convergence to walrasian prices are explored. As a side product of independent interest, we present a self-contained theory of non-cooperative bargaining with two-sided, time-varying, outside options.

Stochastic dominance and absolute risk aversion

In this paper we propose the infimum of the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion as a measure of global risk aversion of a utility function. We then show that, for any given arbitrary pair of distributions, there exists a threshold level of global risk aversion such that all increasing concave utility functions with at least as much global risk aversion would rank the two distributions in the same way. Furthermore, this threshold level is sharp in the sense that, for any lower level of global risk aversion, we can find two utility functions in this class yielding opposite preference relations for the two distributions.