Still in the Era of Area Studies? Political-Scientific Perspectives on European Competition Policy in the 2000s

This note reviews the political-scientific literature on European competition policy (ECP) in the 2000s. Based on a data set extracted from four well-known journals, and using an upfront methodology and explicit criteria, it analyzes the literature both quantitatively and qualitatively. On the quantitative side, it shows that, although a few sub-policy areas are still neglected, ECP is not the under-researched policy it used to be. On the qualitative side, the literature has greatly improved since the 1990s: Almost all articles now present a clear research question, and most advance specific theoretical claims/hypotheses. Yet, improvements can be made on research design, statistical testing, and, above all, state-of-the-art theorizing (e.g. in the game-theoretical treatment of delegation problems). Indeed, it is paradoxical that ECP specialists do not pay more attention to theoretical questions which are so central to the actual policy area they study.

Política de la competència de la Unió Europea en el sector audiovisual. El cas dels operadors públics estatals de televisió a Espanya i el Regne Unit: RTVE i BBC

Estudi elaborat a partir d’una estada al Center for Socio-Legal Studies de la Universitat d’Oxford, Gran Bretanya, entre setembre del 2006 i gener del 2007. L'objectiu d'aquesta recerca ha estat determinar i avaluar com la política de la competència de la Unió Europea ha contribuït a la configuració del sector públic televisiu espanyol i britànic. El marc teòric està basat en el concepte d’ “europeització”, desenvolupat per Harcourt (2002) en el sector de mitjans, i que implica una progressiva referencialitat de les polítiques estatals amb les europees mitjançant dos mecanismes: la redistribució de recursos i els efectes en la socialització de la política europea. Per tal de verificar aquest impacte en el sector televisiu, la recerca ha desenvolupat una aproximació en dues etapes. En primer lloc, a banda de fer un inicial repàs bibliogràfic s'han estudiat les accions de la Comissió Europea en aquest terreny, sobre tot la Comunicació sobre aplicació de la reglamentació d'ajudes públiques al sector de la radiodifusió de 2001. En una segona etapa, s'han desenvolupat un seguit d'entrevistes personals a directius i polítics del sector a Brussel•les, Londres i Madrid. Els resultats de la recerca mostren que el procés d’Europeïtzació es un fenomen creixent en el sector audiovisual públic a Espanya i el Regne Unit, però que encara les peculiaritats estatals juguen un factor preponderant en regular aquesta influència de la UE. L'anàlisi de les entrevistes qualitatives mostren també que hi ha una relació inversament proporcional entre la tradició democràtica i el grau d’influència i de referència que suposa la UE en el sector audiovisual. Mentre que el Regne Unit, l'acció de la política de la competència de la UE es percep com a element suplementari, a Espanya la seva referencialitat ha estat clau, tot i que no decisiva, per la reforma dels mitjans públics estatals.  

Productivity growth and competition in Spanish manufacturing firms: What has happened in recent years?

This paper addresses the issue of the relationship between productivity and market competition. In comparison to the economies of other European countries, the Spanish economy has been growing, while productivity growth has stagnated. Here we provide empirical evidence about the relationship between productivity and market competition from Spanish manufacturing firms at firm level between 1994 and 2004. Correcting for selection bias, our study pays special attention to the patterns of productivity growth between openness and non-openness firms. When market competition increases the effect on firms operating in domestic markets is positive but when the level of competition is high incentives to invest in innovation and productivity gains disappear. The empirical relationship between competition and productivity is an inverted U-shape, where productivity growth is highest at intermediate levels of competition. The productivity growth of firms operating in international markets is higher than that of non-openness firms, but when market competition rises they moderate their productivity growth. Our empirical results suggest that the correct competition policy in the Spanish economy should remove the barriers to competition in internal markets in order to increase the incentives for manufacturing firms to invest in innovation and productivity growth.

Why the EU does not Have an Independent Competition Agency: French Interests and Transaction Costs in Early European Integration

A major achievement of new institutionalism in economics and political science is the formalisation of the idea that certain policies are more efficient when administered by a politically independent organisation. Based on this insight, several policy actors and scholars criticise the European Community for relying too much on a multi-task, collegial, and politicised organisation, the European Commission. This raises important questions, some constitutional (who should be able to change the corresponding procedural rules?) and some political-economic (is Europe truly committed to free and competitive markets?). Though acknowledging the relevance of legal and normative arguments, this paper contributes to the debate with a positive political-scientific perspective. Based on the view that institutional equilibria raise the question of equilibrium institutions, it shows that collegiality was (a) an equilibrium institution during the Paris negotiations of 1950-51; and (b) an institutional equilibrium for the following 50 years. The conclusion points to some recent changes in the way that European competition policy is implemented, and discusses how these affect the “constitutional” principle of collegial European governance.

Domestic and International Research Joint Ventures: The Effect of Collusion

We analyze the effect of research joint ventures (RJVs) on consumer welfare in an international context when collusion can occur. The main novelty of our analysis is to study the differentiated effect of domestic and international RJVs. The recent literature shows that RJVs with collusion harm consumers. However, our results introduce a qualifi cation to this statement: international RJVs with collusion might be bene ficial for consumers when internationalization costs are high. The EU and US competition policy advises against RJVs that facilitate collusion on the grounds of their expected negative effects. Our results suggest that antitrust authorities should distinguish between domestic and international RJVs and, in certain cases, be more benevolent with international RJVs. Keywords: collusion; domestic research joint venture; international research joint venture JEL Classi fication Numbers: K21, L24, L44, O32

Human Capital, the Structure of Production, and Growth

Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate payment systems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees (MIF): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificial lowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing; but it will however lead to higher cardholders fees and, likely, new prices for point of sale terminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent that increased cardholders fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an imbalance between the two sides of the networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from the decisions will cause unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided, to be either provided by third parties, by issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences that the TDC precludes pricing them in variable terms.

A Simple Access Pricing Rule to Achieve the Ramsey Outcome in Two-Way Access

In this paper, I consider a general and informationally effcient approach to determine the optimal access rule and show that there exists a simple rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium when networks compete in linear prices without network-based price discrimination. My approach is informationally effcient in the sense that the regulator is required to know only the marginal cost structure, i.e. the marginal cost of making and terminating a call. The approach is general in that access prices can depend not only on the marginal costs but also on the retail prices, which can be observed by consumers and therefore by the regulator as well. In particular, I consider the set of linear access pricing rules which includes any fixed access price, the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and the Modified ECPR as special cases. I show that in this set, there is a unique access rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium as long as there exists at least a mild degree of substitutability among networks' services.

Competing engines of growth: Innovation and standardization

We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes theform of the introduction of new goods whose production requires skilled workers.Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these newgoods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our framework highlightsa number of novel results. First, standardization is both an engine of growth anda potential barrier to it. As a result, growth is an inverse U-shaped function ofthe standardization rate (and of competition). Second, we characterize the growthand welfare maximizing speed of standardization. We show how optimal protection of intellectual property rights affecting the cost of standardization vary withthe skill-endowment, the elasticity of substitution between goods and other parameters. Third, we show that, depending on how competition between innovatingand standardizing firms is modelled and on parameter values, a new type of multiplicity of equilibria may arise. Finally, we study the implications of our model forthe skill-premium and we illustrate novel reasons for linking North-South trade tointellectual property rights protection.

Price regulation of plastic money: A critical assessment of Spanish rules

Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate paymentsystems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees(MIF): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificiallowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing; but itwill however lead to higher cardholders fees and, likely, new prices for point of saleterminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent that increased cardholders fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an imbalance between the two sides of the networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from the decisions will cause unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided, to be either provided by third parties, by issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences that the TDC precludes pricing them in variable terms.

A simple access pricing rule to achieve the Ramsey outcome for interconnected networks

This paper considers a general and informationally efficient approach to determine the optimal access pricing rule for interconnected networks. It shows that there exists a simple rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium when networks compete in linear prices without network-based price discrimination. The approach is informationally efficient in the sense that the regulator is required to know only the marginal cost structure, i.e. the marginal cost of making and terminating a call. The approach is general in that access prices can depend not only on the marginal costs but also on the retail prices, which can be observed by consumers and therefore by the regulator as well. In particular, I consider the set of linear access pricing rules which includes any fixed access price, the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and the Modified ECPR as special cases. I show that in this set, there is a unique rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium independently of the underlying demand conditions.

On the receiver pays principle

This paper extends the theory of network competition betweentelecommunications operators by allowing receivers to derive a surplusfrom receiving calls (call externality) and to affect the volume ofcommunications by hanging up (receiver sovereignty). We investigate theextent to which receiver charges can lead to an internalization of thecalling externality. When the receiver charge and the termination(access) charge are both regulated, there exists an e±cient equilibrium.Effciency requires a termination discount. When reception charges aremarket determined, it is optimal for each operator to set the prices foremission and reception at their off-net costs. For an appropriately chosentermination charge, the symmetric equilibrium is again effcient. Lastly,we show that network-based price discrimination creates strong incentivesfor connectivity breakdowns, even between equal networks.

A retail benchmarking approach to efficient two-way access pricing

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges as in the existing literature, we study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In the case of competition in linear prices, we show that there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of the underlying demand conditions. In the case of competition in two-part tariffs, we consider a class of access pricing rules, similar to the optimal one under linear prices but based on average retail prices. We show that firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost under this class of rules. Therefore, the regulator (or the competition authority) can choose one among the rules to pursue additional objectives such as consumer surplus, network coverage or investment: for instance, we show that both static and dynamic e±ciency can be achieved at the same time.

Debating as a classroom tool for adapting learning outcomes to the European higher education area

The creation of the European Higher Education Area has meant a number of significant changes to the educational structures of the university community. In particular, the new system of European credits has generated the need for innovation in the design of curricula and teaching methods. In this paper, we propose debating as a classroom tool that can help fulfill these objectives by promoting an active student role in learning. To demonstrate the potential of this tool, a classroom experiment was conducted in a bachelor’s degree course in Industrial Economics -Regulation and Competition-, involving a case study in competition policy and incorporating the techniques of a conventional debate -presentation of standpoints, turns, right to reply and summing up-. The experiment yielded gains in student attainment and positive assessments of the subject. In conclusion, the incorporation of debating activities helps students to acquire the skills, be they general or specific, required to graduate successfully in Economics.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.