80 resultados para GEL FORMATION
Resumo:
The ability to entrap drugs within vehicles and subsequently release them has led to new treatments for a number of diseases. Based on an associative phase separation and interfacial diffusion approach, we developed a way to prepare DNA gel particles without adding any kind of cross-linker or organic solvent. Among the various agents studied, cationic surfactants offered particularly efficient control for encapsulation and DNA release from these DNA gel particles. The driving force for this strong association is the electrostatic interaction between the two components, as induced by the entropic increase due to the release of the respective counter-ions. However, little is known about the influence of the respective counter-ions on this surfactant-DNA interaction. Here we examined the effect of different counter-ions on the formation and properties of the DNA gel particles by mixing DNA (either single- (ssDNA) or double-stranded (dsDNA)) with the single chain surfactant dodecyltrimethylammonium (DTA). In particular, we used as counter-ions of this surfactant the hydrogen sulfate and trifluoromethane sulfonate anions and the two halides, chloride and bromide. Effects on the morphology of the particles obtained, the encapsulation of DNA and its release, as well as the haemocompatibility of these particles, are presented, using the counter-ion structure and the DNA conformation as controlling parameters. Analysis of the data indicates that the degree of counter-ion dissociation from the surfactant micelles and the polar/hydrophobic character of the counter-ion are important parameters in the final properties of the particles. The stronger interaction with amphiphiles for ssDNA than for dsDNA suggests the important role of hydrophobic interactions in DNA.
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This article reports the phase behavior determi- nation of a system forming reverse liquid crystals and the formation of novel disperse systems in the two-phase region. The studied system is formed by water, cyclohexane, and Pluronic L-121, an amphiphilic block copolymer considered of special interest due to its aggregation and structural proper- ties. This system forms reverse cubic (I2) and reverse hexagonal (H2) phases at high polymer concentrations. These reverse phases are of particular interest since in the two-phase region, stable high internal phase reverse emulsions can be formed. The characterization of the I2 and H2 phases and of the derived gel emulsions was performed with small-angle X-ray scattering (SAXS) and rheometry, and the influence of temperature and water content was studied. TheH2 phase experimented a thermal transition to an I2 phase when temperature was increased, which presented an Fd3m structure. All samples showed a strong shear thinning behavior from low shear rates. The elasticmodulus (G0) in the I2 phase was around 1 order of magnitude higher than in theH2 phase. G0 was predominantly higher than the viscousmodulus (G00). In the gel emulsions,G0 was nearly frequency-independent, indicating their gel type nature. Contrarily to water-in-oil (W/O) normal emulsions, in W/I2 and W/H2 gel emulsions, G0, the complex viscosity (|η*|), and the yield stress (τ0) decreased with increasing water content, since the highly viscous microstructure of the con- tinuous phase was responsible for the high viscosity and elastic behavior of the emulsions, instead of the volumefraction of dispersed phase and droplet size. A rheological analysis, in which the cooperative flow theory, the soft glass rheology model, and the slip plane model were analyzed and compared, was performed to obtain one single model that could describe the non-Maxwellian behavior of both reverse phases and highly concentrated emulsions and to characterize their microstructure with the rheological properties.
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We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.
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This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.
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We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.
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We study the relation between public capital, employment and growth under different assumptions concerning wage formation. We show that public capital increases economic growth, and that, if there is wage inertia, employment positively depends on both economic growth and public capital.
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We analyze the welfare properties of the competitive equilibrium in a capital accumulation model where individual preferences are subjected to both habit formation and consumption spillovers. We also discuss how consumption externalities and habits interact to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium. Finally, we characterize optimal tax policies aimed to restore efficient decentralized paths.
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When habits are introduced multiplicatively in a capital accumulation model, the consumers' objective function might fail to be concave. In this paper we provide conditions aimed at guaranteeing the existence of interior solutions to the consumers' problem. We also characterize the equilibrium path of two growth models with multiplicative habits: the internal habit formation model, where individual habits coincide with own past consumption, and the external habit formation (or catching-up with the Joneses) model, where habits arise from the average past consumption in the economy. We show that the introduction of external habits makes the equilibrium path inefficient during the transition towards the balanced growth path. We characterize in this context the optimal tax policy.
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We analyze the dynamic behavior and the welfare properties of the equilibrium path of a growth model where both habits and consumption externalities affect the utility of consumers. We discuss the effects of flat rate income taxes and characterize the optimal income taxation policy. We show that, when consumption externalities and habit adjusted consumption are not perfect substitutes, a counter-cyclical income tax rate allows the competitive equilibrium to replicate the efficient path. Our analysis highlights the crucial role played by complementarities between externalities and habits in order to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium.
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The objective of this paper is to investigate, in a methodologically consistent manner, the regional effects of public capital formation and the possible existence of regional spillover effects in Spain. The empirical results are based on VAR estimates at both the aggregate and regional levels using output, employment, and private capital, as well as different measures of public capital. Empirical results suggest that public capital affects output positively at the aggregate level as well as in all but one region. For most regions, the effects of public capital installed in the region itself are important but the spillover effects induced from public capital installed elsewhere are also very important. In fact, the spillover effects account for over half of the total effects of public capital formation in Spain. Furthermore, these spillover effects have a clear geographical pattern in that they tend to be more important in the peripheral regions of the country. We also find that relative to their share of the Spanish output, the biggest beneficiaries of public capital formation are the largest regions in the country. This suggests that public capital formation has contributed to concentration of output in these regions. Finally, in terms of the effects of public capital formation on the private inputs we find that both private capital and employment are affected positively at the aggregate level as well as for most of the regions. Nevertheless, the effects on private capital seem to be larger. Also, the spillover effects are very important for private capital but not for employment. This reflects a great degree of dynamism and mobility in the capital markets as opposed to the labor markets.
Resumo:
Maybe because of the inconclusive nature of the results on the impact of public capital on output at the regional level, the issue of the possible existence of the regional spillovers from public capital formation has received little attention. The objective of this paper is to provide evidence on the possible existence of such spillovers. We consider the case of Spain and its seventeen regions. Our methodological approach consists in estimating an aggregate VAR model for Spain as well as seventeen region-specific VAR models in which both capital installed in the region and capital installed outside the region are allowed to play a role in enhancing regional output. The estimation results can be summarized as follows. The aggregate effects of public capital formation in Spain are important. They cannot, however, be captured in their entirety by the direct effects in each region from public capital installed in the region itself. When for each region both the capital installed in the region and the capital installed outside the region are considered the total disaggregated effect from the seventeen regional models are very much in line with the aggregate results. Furthermore, the aggregate effect seems to be due in almost equal parts to the direct and spillover effects of public capital formation. Ultimately, this paper establishes the relevance of both capital installed in each region and spillover effects in the understanding of the regional decomposition of the aggregate effects of public capital formation. In doing so it opens the door to some tantalizing and potentially highly charged research issues in terms of the determination of the optimal location of public investment projects.
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This paper explores the effects of new business formation on employment growth in Spanish manufacturing industries. New firms are believed to make an important contribution to economic growth but the extent of this contribution is unclear. We consider time lags of new firm formation as explanatory variables of employment change and identify how long the effect of new firm entries on employment lasts. Our main results show that the effects of new business formation are positive in the short term, negative in the medium term and positive in the long term, thus confirming the existence of indirect supply-side effects found in similar studies for other countries. Key words: regional growth, firm entry, time lags and Spanish economy. JEL classifications: L00, L60, R11, R12
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In this paper, we investigate the agency costs of government ownership and their impact on corporate governance and firm value. China is used as a laboratory because of the prevalent state shareholdings in exchange-listed firms. In this context, we specifically consider the trade-offs involved in the voluntary formation of an audit committee when the controlling shareholder is the state. The decision to improve corporate governance (in this case, introduce an audit committee) is shown to be value relevant and a function of existing agency relationships and non-trivial implementation costs. Our findings are robust to the level of pyramid groups, the ownership-control wedge, and financial leverage. The research adds to the debate regarding the effect of government shareholdings on corporate culture and performance - a topic that hastaken on renewed importance in recent times.