Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

Viabilidade económico-financeira do projecto da Unidade de Cuidados Continuados Integrados de Longa Duração e Manutenção da Fundação COI : estudo de caso

RESUMO - Este trabalho consiste numa análise sobre a viabilidade económico-financeira do projecto de construção de uma Unidade de Cuidados Continuados Integrados de Longa Duração e Manutenção pela Fundação COI, que pretende ser uma resposta adequada à diversidade de fenómenos que têm origem no envelhecimento populacional, inserindo-se no modelo de prestação de cuidados de saúde e apoio social preconizado pela Rede Nacional de Cuidados Continuados Integrados. Em termos estruturais, numa primeira fase, o trabalho faz uma análise sobre o estado da arte dos cuidados continuado, nomeadamente através da sua conceptualização e enquadramento, focando os aspectos e características da RNCCI, nomeadamente os aspectos relacionados com a sustentabilidade financeira e os desafios futuros que este sector da saúde se confronta. Numa segunda fase, o trabalho apresenta o projecto de investimento alvo do estudo de caso, mediante o enquadramento histórico e caracterização da Fundação COI, sendo descrita especificamente a tipologia de longa duração e manutenção e o projecto em termos da sua estrutura física e humana. Numa terceira fase, o trabalho estuda a racionalidade do projecto de investimento, através da análise económico-financeira. Tendo-se concluído, com a utilização de indicadores de avaliação e decisão de investimentos, que a ULDM, é viável. Deve-se contudo ter em conta que a sua viabilidade é sensível a hipotéticas alterações de cenários, nomeadamente perante diferentes taxas de ocupação ou alteração do modelo de pagamento. ----------------------- ABSTRACT - This paper consists on analyzing the economical and financial viability of a project of Integrated Continuous Cares on Long-Term and Maintenance Unit (LTMU), managed by COI Foundation, that can create a correct social answer on the various aspects and phenomenon’s that have their origin in an aged population. This kind of project belongs in the role model of social and health cares of the National Network of Integrated Continuous Cares (NNICC). In a first stage the paper is focused on the analysis of the state of the present services of the continuous cares in Portugal, more concretely of his conceptualization and social frame, putting under the lights the aspects and characteristics of the NNICC, more closely the parts related to their financial sustainability and the challenges that this health sector faces nowadays. The next stage is about the investment project applied to this case-study, given his social and historical frame and attending to the specific characteristics of the COI Foundation. It’s also describing its specific LTMU typology under the involved physic and human structure. Finally this paper study the investment project rationality trough scientific methods like its economic–financial analysis. The conclusion, using decision and evaluation procedures that lead to financial indicators, is that the LTMU, is viable. However, the viability of the project is sensible to an hypothetical change of scenario, namely with different rates of change of occupation or type of payment.

Detecting and evaluating land cover change in the eastern half of East Timor (1972-2011)

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Geospatial Technologies.

Forecasts of relative performance in tournaments: Evidence from the field

This paper uses a field experiment to investigate the quality of individuals’ forecasts of relative performance in tournaments. We ask players in luck-based (poker) and skill-based (chess) tournaments to make point forecasts of rank. The main finding of the paper is that players’ forecasts in both types of tournaments are biased towards overestimation of relative performance. However, the size of the biases found is not as large as the ones often reported in the psychology literature. We also find support for the “unskilled and unaware hypothesis” in chess: high skilled chess players make better forecasts than low skilled chess players. Finally, we find that chess players’ forecasts of relative performance are not efficient.

Spiteful Strategies. The ontogeny and the practice of spite in human interaction: an experimental game theory approach and empirical applications

As estratégias de malevolência implicam que um indivíduo pague um custo para infligir um custo superior a um oponente. Como um dos comportamentos fundamentais da sociobiologia, a malevolência tem recebido menos atenção que os seus pares o egoísmo e a cooperação. Contudo, foi estabelecido que a malevolência é uma estratégia viável em populações pequenas quando usada contra indivíduos negativamente geneticamente relacionados pois este comportamento pode i) ser eliminado naturalmente, ou ii) manter-se em equilíbrio com estratégias cooperativas devido à disponibilidade da parte de indivíduos malevolentes de pagar um custo para punir. Esta tese propõe compreender se a propensão para a malevolência nos humanos é inerente ou se esta se desenvolve com a idade. Para esse efeito, considerei duas experiências de teoria de jogos em crianças em ambiente escolar com idades entre os 6 e os 22 anos. A primeira, um jogo 2x2 foi testada com duas variantes: 1) um prémio foi atribuído a ambos os jogadores, proporcionalmente aos pontos acumulados; 2), um prémio foi atribuído ao jogador com mais pontos. O jogo foi desenhado com o intuito de causar o seguinte dilema a cada jogador: i) maximizar o seu ganho e arriscar ter menos pontos que o adversário; ou ii) decidir não maximizar o seu ganho, garantindo que este não era inferior ao do seu adversário. A segunda experiência consistia num jogo do ditador com duas opções: uma escolha egoísta/altruísta (A), onde o ditador recebia mais ganho, mas o seu recipiente recebia mais que ele e uma escolha malevolente (B) que oferecia menos ganhos ao ditador que a A mas mais ganhos que o recipiente. O dilema era que se as crianças se comportassem de maneira egoísta, obtinham mais ganho para si, ao mesmo tempo que aumentavam o ganho do seu colega. Se fossem malevolentes, então prefeririam ter mais ganho que o seu colega ao mesmo tempo que tinham menos para eles próprios. As experiências foram efetuadas em escolas de duas áreas distintas de Portugal (continente e Açores) para perceber se as preferências malevolentes aumentavam ou diminuíam com a idade. Os resultados na primeira experiência sugerem que (1) os alunos compreenderam a primeira variante como um jogo de coordenação e comportaram-se como maximizadores, copiando as jogadas anteriores dos seus adversários; (2) que os alunos repetentes se comportaram preferencialmente como malevolentes, mais frequentemente que como maximizadores, com especial ênfase para os alunos de 14 anos; (3) maioria dos alunos comportou-se reciprocamente desde os 12 até aos 16 anos de idade, após os quais começaram a desenvolver uma maior tolerância às escolhas dos seus parceiros. Os resultados da segunda experiência sugerem que (1) as estratégias egoístas eram prevalentes até aos 6 anos de idade, (2) as tendências altruístas emergiram até aos 8 anos de idade e (3) as estratégias de malevolência começaram a emergir a partir dos 8 anos de idade. Estes resultados complementam a literatura relativamente escassa sobre malevolência e sugerem que este comportamento está intimamente ligado a preferências de consideração sobre os outros, o paroquialismo e os estágios de desenvolvimento das crianças.************************************************************Spite is defined as an act that causes loss of payoff to an opponent at a cost to the actor. As one of the four fundamental behaviours in sociobiology, it has received far less attention than its counterparts selfishness and cooperation. It has however been established as a viable strategy in small populations when used against negatively related individuals. Because of this, spite can either i) disappear or ii) remain at equilibrium with cooperative strategies due to the willingness of spiteful individuals to pay a cost in order to punish. This thesis sets out to understand whether propensity for spiteful behaviour is inherent or if it develops with age. For that effect, two game-theoretical experiments were performed with schoolboys and schoolgirls aged 6 to 22. The first, a 2 x 2 game, was tested in two variants: 1) a prize was awarded to both players, proportional to accumulated points; 2), a prize was given to the player with most points. Each player faced the following dilemma: i) to maximise pay-off risking a lower pay-off than the opponent; or ii) not to maximise pay-off in order to cut down the opponent below their own. The second game was a dictator experiment with two choices, (A) a selfish/altruistic choice affording more payoff to the donor than B, but more to the recipient than to the donor, and (B) a spiteful choice that afforded less payoff to the donor than A, but even lower payoff to the recipient. The dilemma here was that if subjects behaved selfishly, they obtained more payoff for themselves, while at the same time increasing their opponent payoff. If they were spiteful, they would rather have more payoff than their colleague, at the cost of less for themselves. Experiments were run in schools in two different areas in Portugal (mainland and Azores) to understand whether spiteful preferences varied with age. Results in the first experiment suggested that (1) students understood the first variant as a coordination game and engaged in maximising behaviour by copying their opponent’s plays; (2) repeating students preferentially engaged in spiteful behaviour more often than maximising behaviour, with special emphasis on 14 year-olds; (3) most students engaged in reciprocal behaviour from ages 12 to 16, as they began developing higher tolerance for their opponent choices. Results for the second experiment suggested that (1) selfish strategies were prevalent until the age of 6, (2) altruistic tendencies emerged since then, and (3) spiteful strategies began being chosen more often by 8 year-olds. These results add to the relatively scarce body of literature on spite and suggest that this type of behaviour is closely tied with other-regarding preferences, parochialism and the children’s stages of development.

Bits, Atoms, and Information Sharing: new opportunities for participation

The particular characteristics and affordances of technologies play a significant role in human experience by defining the realm of possibilities available to individuals and societies. Some technological configurations, such as the Internet, facilitate peer-to-peer communication and participatory behaviors. Others, like television broadcasting, tend to encourage centralization of creative processes and unidirectional communication. In other instances still, the affordances of technologies can be further constrained by social practices. That is the case, for example, of radio which, although technically allowing peer-to-peer communication, has effectively been converted into a broadcast medium through the legislation of the airwaves. How technologies acquire particular properties, meanings and uses, and who is involved in those decisions are the broader questions explored here. Although a long line of thought maintains that technologies evolve according to the logic of scientific rationality, recent studies demonstrated that technologies are, in fact, primarily shaped by social forces in specific historical contexts. In this view, adopted here, there is no one best way to design a technological artifact or system; the selection between alternative designs—which determine the affordances of each technology—is made by social actors according to their particular values, assumptions and goals. Thus, the arrangement of technical elements in any technological artifact is configured to conform to the views and interests of those involved in its development. Understanding how technologies assume particular shapes, who is involved in these decisions and how, in turn, they propitiate particular behaviors and modes of organization but not others, requires understanding the contexts in which they are developed. It is argued here that, throughout the last century, two distinct approaches to the development and dissemination of technologies have coexisted. In each of these models, based on fundamentally different ethoi, technologies are developed through different processes and by different participants—and therefore tend to assume different shapes and offer different possibilities. In the first of these approaches, the dominant model in Western societies, technologies are typically developed by firms, manufactured in large factories, and subsequently disseminated to the rest of the population for consumption. In this centralized model, the role of users is limited to selecting from the alternatives presented by professional producers. Thus, according to this approach, the technologies that are now so deeply woven into human experience, are primarily shaped by a relatively small number of producers. In recent years, however, a group of three interconnected interest groups—the makers, hackerspaces, and open source hardware communities—have increasingly challenged this dominant model by enacting an alternative approach in which technologies are both individually transformed and collectively shaped. Through a in-depth analysis of these phenomena, their practices and ethos, it is argued here that the distributed approach practiced by these communities offers a practical path towards a democratization of the technosphere by: 1) demystifying technologies, 2) providing the public with the tools and knowledge necessary to understand and shape technologies, and 3) encouraging citizen participation in the development of technologies.

Caraterização da tomada de decisão em organizações hospitalares : impacto do estatuto jurídico

RESUMO - O decisor hospitalar tem como função decidir os recursos de uma organização de saúde, sejam estes financeiros, materiais ou humanos, sendo decisivo o conhecimento e informação que o apoiem na aplicabilidade nas tomadas de decisão e na solução dos problemas. As tomadas de decisão suportam-se em modelos reproduzidos pelos decisores, em processos, modelos, e em princípios, que podem ou não assumir intuição, objetividade, racionalidade e ética, bem como de técnicas várias que podem ser limitativas ou condicionadas, por força de fatores vários, como: a falta de informação inerente de uma multidisciplinaridade do processo; de condicionalismos organizacionais, internos ou externos, associados à envolvente e cultura organizacional e influências políticas e macroeconómicas; ao fator tempo; a tecnologia; a estrutura e desenho organizacional; a autoridade/poder e a autonomia para decidir; a liderança, e do estatuto jurídico que o hospital possui. Este último ponto será esmiuçado, mais profundamente, neste estudo. Iremos, através do estudo, compreender se os elementos componentes das decisões tomadas nos hospitais, são ou não adaptadas em consonância com diferentes políticas de governação hospitalar, em contextos e dinâmicas organizacionais diferenciadas, por diferentes Estatutos Jurídicos Hospitalares - EPE, SPA, PPP e Privados. Foi realizado um estudo de caráter exploratório, descritivo-correlacional e transversal, baseou-se num questionário aplicado a decisores hospitalares, incidindo nos dois vetores centrais do estudo, na tomada de decisão e no estatuto jurídico hospitalar. A decisão é então, um valiosíssimo veículo na persecução das estratégias e planos formulados pelo hospital, esperando-se destes produzir consequentes resultados eficientes, eficazes e efetivos na sua aplicação.

O enredo prisional em Angola: soberanias duais na disciplina do corpo colonial

A análise das estruturas de aprisionamento necessita de atender ao quadro institucional no qual se encontra enquadrado. A compreensão das finalidades às quais reporta apenas pode ser captada na alusão a um quadro teórico e conceptual que não se cinja à apreensão restrita das suas mais evidentes manifestações. O enredo da Angola colonial, no qual nos focamos, imprime a necessidade de nos afastarmos dos recorrentes estudos que tendem a evidenciar a brutalidade da prática repressiva no interior das prisões, menosprezando, por iminência, uma análise que capte as características longitudinais que ditam as estruturas administrativas das suas bases materiais. Assente na defesa de um alargamento conceptual das práticas de confinamento, pretende esta investigação contribuir para os estudos que atendem à necessidade destes estabelecimentos serem analisados à luz de outras instâncias, nomeadamente o trabalho forçado e o incipiente poder infraestrutural do estado colonial. De forma a alcançar tal propósito esta dissertação concebe uma análise que contrapõe às finalidades impressas nos códigos legais dos estatutos criminais coloniais os relatórios arquivísticos. Estes dão conta da prática que regia o modus operandi destes estabelecimentos e atestam a debilidade morfológica do poder estatal colonial. É face a tal que se apresenta, numa última análise, as instâncias que nos permitem pensar o enredo edificado pelas empresas concessionárias no território colonial numa relação de analogia com a prisão colonial. Tal comparação é aqui edificada pelo recurso ao estudo de caso da Companhia de Diamantes de Angola, problematizando-se o modo como esta empresa substituía o poder do estado colonial ao implementar políticas públicas de gestão e controlo das massas trabalhadoras que se encontravam sob a sua alçada.

Opa e fusão

Control of a public company can be obtained through several ways, of which the tender offer and the merger are only two. We attempt to understand what are the risks involved in the appearance of a control position. Such underlying risks justify the rationality of the mandatory bid rule, as well as the consequences of said rule. Finally, we attempt to understand if the interests of the minority shareholders are duly defended in the case of control being acquired through merger, since that is the understanding of the legislator.