Positive Epistasis Drives the Acquisition of Multidrug Resistance

The evolution of multiple antibiotic resistance is an increasing global problem. Resistance mutations are known to impair fitness, and the evolution of resistance to multiple drugs depends both on their costs individually and on how they interact-epistasis. Information on the level of epistasis between antibiotic resistance mutations is of key importance to understanding epistasis amongst deleterious alleles, a key theoretical question, and to improving public health measures. Here we show that in an antibiotic-free environment the cost of multiple resistance is smaller than expected, a signature of pervasive positive epistasis among alleles that confer resistance to antibiotics. Competition assays reveal that the cost of resistance to a given antibiotic is dependent on the presence of resistance alleles for other antibiotics. Surprisingly we find that a significant fraction of resistant mutations can be beneficial in certain resistant genetic backgrounds, that some double resistances entail no measurable cost, and that some allelic combinations are hotspots for rapid compensation. These results provide additional insight as to why multi-resistant bacteria are so prevalent and reveal an extra layer of complexity on epistatic patterns previously unrecognized, since it is hidden in genome-wide studies of genetic interactions using gene knockouts.

Positive effects of strategic corporate social responsibility

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Internal consultants as positive change agents

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Coke: building on happiness to support “Positive Solutions”

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Positive self-image over time

This paper incorporates egocentric comparisons into a human capital accumulation model and studies the evolution of positive self image over time. The paper shows that the process of human capital accumulation together with egocentric comparisons imply that positive self image of a cohort is first increasing and then decreasing over time. Additionally, the paper finds that positive self image: (1) peaks earlier in activities where skill depreciation is higher, (2) is smaller in activities where the distribution of income is more dispersed, (3) is not a stable characteristic of an individual, and (4) is higher for more patient individuals.

Positive solutions to find a job: Cultural mismatches between companies and employees

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Case study - Herdade Vale da Rosa – The fruits of passion: The role of a positive entrepreneur vision in the success of an organization from a depressed sector and region

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Positive self-image and incentives in organizations

This paper investigates the implications of individuals’ mistaken beliefs of their abilities on incentives in organizations using the principal-agent model of moral hazard. The paper shows that if effort is observable, then an agent’s mistaken beliefs about own ability are always favorable to the principal. However, if effort is unobservable, then an agent’s mistaken beliefs about own ability can be either favorable or unfavorable to the principal. The paper provides conditions under which an agent’s over estimation about own ability is favorable to the principal when effort is unobservable. Finally, the paper shows that workers’ mistaken beliefs about their coworkers’ abilities make interdependent incentive schemes more attractive to firms than individualistic incentive schemes.

Positive self-image in tournaments

This paper analyzes the implications of worker overestimation of productivity for firms in which incentives take the form of tournaments. Each worker overestimates his productivity but is aware of the bias in his opponent’s self-assessment. The manager of the firm, on the other hand, correctly assesses workers’ productivities and self-beliefs when setting tournament prizes. The paper shows that, under a variety of circumstances, firms make higher profits when workers have positive self-image than if workers do not. By contrast, workers’ welfare declines due to their own misguided choices.