6 resultados para Banks and banking, Central
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Double Degree. A Work Project presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics and a Masters Degree in Finance from Louvain School of Management
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In this discussion OLS regressions are used to study the factors that influence sovereign yield spreads and domestic bank indeces for a set of euro area countries. The results show that common factors explain changes in bank indeces better than in the yields. Moreover, although there is some country differentiation, a common pattern among all is visible. A contemporary spillover effect between banks and sovereigns emerged after bank bailouts and became stronger with the burst of the sovereign debt crisis. The vicious cycle between the two has contributed to the escalation of spreads and to painful austerity measures.
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Trabalho de Projeto apresentado como requisito parcial para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Estatística e Gestão de Informação
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This paper provides an ongoing analysis to one of the biggest ethical and financial scandals in Portugal – Banco Espírito Santo (BES). BES was considered one of the three best banks but it went bankrupted and its employees were transferred to a new entity – Novo Banco. This study was conducted in order to provide an understanding of the employees’ side, which has been forgotten so far. An ethical scandal (sensebreaking) creates ambiguity and uncertainty which triggers new sensemaking processes in order to understand and derive meaning from the new reality. The methodology followed was semi-structured interviews to employees both from the branches and the central services. We found evidence that in organizations with strong identification, unethical behavior has a significant impact on followers’ – the new process of sensemaking is particularly important in this situation because employees suffer more from the disruption of their reality.
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For some years, researchers could not find a clear effect of capital adequacy on the risk profile of banks, as shareholders could increase the riskiness of the assets (qualitative effect), crowding-out the effect of reduced leverage (volume effect). Some shareholders might have the will to increase the riskiness of the assets, but they may lack the power to do so. Considering only ”powerful” shareholders, definitive conclusions were drawn but with constant ownership profile. In this paper I investigate whether there is a significant change in the type of shareholders in response to regulatory capital shocks and, if so, will the banking system be in the hands of more “desired” shareholders. I find that ownership profile responds to a regulatory shock, changing the risk appetite of the ruling power at the bank. I find more banks and the government in the ownership of undercapitalised banks and much less institutional shareholders and free float. I claim that these new shareholders may not the desired ones, given the objective of the regulatory change, as they are associated with a preference for more leverage. One possible explanation for this crowding-out effect is that regulators are trying to contain idiosyncratic risk (more linked to the riskiness of the assets) with a rule that contains systematic risk (capital adequacy). This has a distorting effect on ownership. Another insight can be drawn from the tests: supervisors should be aware of significant ownership movements that cause the crowding-out.
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In broad sense, Project Financing1 as a mean of financing large scale infrastructural projects worldwide has had a steady growth in popularity for the last 20 years. This growth has been relatively unscathed from most economic cycles. However in the wake of the 2007 systemic Financial Crisis, Project Financing was also in trouble. The liquidity freeze and credit crunch that ensued affected all parties involved. Traditional Lenders, of this type of financial instrument, locked-in long-term contractual obligations, were severely hit with scarcity of funding compounded by rapidly increasing cost of funding. All the while, Banks were “rescued” by the concerted actions of Central Banks and other Multi-Lateral Agencies around the world but at the same time “stressed” by upcoming regulatory effort (Basel Committee). This impact resulted in specific changes to this type of long-term financing. Changes such as Commercial Banks’ increased risk aversion; pricing increase and maturities decrease of credit facilities; enforcement of Market Disruption Event clauses; partial responsibility for project risk by Multilateral Agencies; and adoption of utility-like availability payments in other industrial sectors such as transportation and even social infrastructure. To the extent possible, this report is then divided in three parts. First, it begins with a more instructional part, touching academic literature (theory) and giving the Banks perspective (practice), but mostly as an overview of Project Finance for awareness’ sake. The renowned Harvard Business School professor – Benjamin Esty, states2 that Project Finance is a “relatively unexplored territory for both empirical and theoretical research” which means that academic research efforts are lagging the practice of Project Finance. Second, the report presents a practical case regarding the first Road Concession in Portugal in 1998 ending with the lessons learned 10 years after Financial Close. Lastly, the report concludes with the analysis of the current trends and changes to the industry post Financial Crisis of the late 2000’s. To achieve this I’ll reference relevant papers, books on the subject, online articles and my own experience in the Project Finance Department at a major Portuguese Investment Bank. Regarding the latter, with the signing of a confidentiality agreement, I’m duly omitting sensitive and proprietary bank information.