Three essays on game theory and bargaining

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

How to promote and enhance communication between a big retailer's after-sales department and its suppliers

W is the biggest electronic goods retailer in Portugal accounting with almost fifty percent of market share in its area. During the last years, many small W suppliers had to close their doors, and many others are in huge troubles. Among the reason for this situation, the huge bargaining power of W in the relationship seems crucial. The focus of the directed research will be in the after sales department where I did an internship from September 2014 to January 2015.

Períodos de Fidelização

This dissertation aims to study the loyalty clauses present in most of the long lasting service contracts. We introduce its main features and the consequences that arise from breaching of contract. We analyze the presence of loyalty periods in the Portuguese legislation. In this sense, we discuss Decree-Law 446/85, Law 24/96, Decree-Law 57/2008 and Decree-Law 56/2010. The loyalty period is the minimum period of time for which the contract should be maintained. In most cases, when this obligation is not fulfilled a penalty clause is set, intending to push the weaker party to comply with the contract or sanction it when the party fails to do so. We conclude that the contractual relationship where there is a loyalty period is usually an unbalanced relationship because it only protects the interest of one party. The penalty clause should not be admitted between parties with unequal bargaining powers. The contractual imbalance is not limited to consumer contracts.

O abuso de informação privilegiada (insider trading)

In the stock market, information takes on special relevance, due to the market’s permanent updating and the great fluidity of information existent therein. Just as in any other negotiations, the party with the better information has a bargaining advantage, as it is able to make more advantageous business decisions. However, unlike most other markets, the proper functioning of the stock market is greatly dependent on investors’ trust in the market itself. As such, if there are investors who, due to any condition they possess or office they hold, have access to relevant information which is not accessible to the general public, distrust is bred within the market and, consequently, investment is lessened. Thus, there is a need to prevent those who hold privileged information from using it in abusive ways. In Portugal, abuse of privileged information is set out and punished criminally in Article 378. of the Portuguese Securities Code (‘Código dos Valores Mobiliários’). In this dissertation, I have set out, firstly, to analyze the inherent conditions for there to be a crime of abuse of privileged information; secondly, to analyze two well-known cases, which took place and were decided in other jurisdictions, and attempt to understand how these cases would fall under Article 378. of the Portuguese Securities Code. Whereas the first case, Chiarella v. United States, was scrutinize under Article 378 of the Portuguese Securities Code, in the second, Lafonta v. AMF, the conclusion arrived at was that the crime taken place was different. This analysis allowed, on one hand, the application to a particular case of prerequisites and concepts which were explained, at a first approach, from a more theoretical perspective; on the other hand, it also allowed the further development of specific aspects of the regime, namely the difference between an insider and a tipee, as well as to more clearly set out the limits to the precise character of the information at hand.