The simple economics of risk-sharing agreements between the NHS and the pharmaceutical industry

The Janssen-Cilag proposal for a risk-sharing agreement regarding bortezomib received a welcome signal from NICE. The Office of Fair Trading report included risk-sharing agreements as an available tool for the National Health Service. Nonetheless, recent discussions have somewhat neglected the economic fundamentals underlying risk-sharing agreements. We argue here that risk-sharing agreements, although attractive due to the principle of paying by results, also entail risks. Too many patients may be put under treatment even with a low success probability. Prices are likely to be adjusted upward, in anticipation of future risk-sharing agreements between the pharmaceutical company and the third-party payer. An available instrument is a verification cost per patient treated, which allows obtaining the first-best allocation of patients to the new treatment, under the risk sharing agreement. Overall, the welfare effects of risk-sharing agreements are ambiguous, and care must be taken with their use.

“The impact of online ratings on video game sales”

Online third-party reviews have been grown over the last decade and they now play an important role as a tool for helping customers evaluate products and services that in many cases offer more than tangible features. This study intends to quantify the impact online ratings have over video game sales by conducting a linear regression analysis on 300 titles for the previous console generation (PlayStation® 3 and Xbox® 360) using a data from the video game industry to understand the existing influence on this particular market. The findings showed that these variables have a weak linear relationship thus suggesting that quality of a title explains little the commercial success of a video game and instead this should cover a wider range of factors. Afterwards, we compare results to previous ones and discuss the managerial implications for upcoming gaming generations.

A intervenção da seguradora nas acções propostas contra o segurado

The problem to be discussed results from the relationship established between the insurer and insured by the conclusion of an insurance contract, namely an optional liability insurance contract, to cover the risks taken by the insured resulting from the occurrence of a claim, such as those arising from the emergence of the liability and consequent obligation to compensate damages caused to a third party. This thesis concerns thus the debate between those who consider that, in the optional insurance, the third party may require compliance with the provision to both the insured and the insurer (in the case of voluntary joinder, pursuant to Art. 27 CCP, which corresponds Art. 32 of the New Code of Civil Procedure, Law n. 41/2013 of 26 June, which entered into force on 1 September, hereinafter New Code) - insurance contract on behalf of a third party conception - in the same way that the insured defendant can bring the insurer to intervene as co-defendant in the main process, pursuant al. a) of art. 325 of the CCP (corresponding to art. 316 of the New Code - main intervention caused), and those who argue that the insurer may only intervene in the action as an ancillary party, to assist the defendant, lacking interest, therefore, in necessary or volunteer joinder, with the consequence that the insurer cannot be sued as a main party - only ancillary intervention is justifiable (cf. art. 330 CPC, which corresponds to art. 321 of the New Code).