Os diferentes níveis de regulação legal dos conflitos de interesses no âmbito da gestão de fundos de investimento mobiliário

In the context of the activity developed by securities investment funds (hereinafter referred to “SIF”) the holders of investment units have a very tiny power to intervene. Aware of the risks that a decoupling between ownership and control may pose, the legislator has foreseen a number of impositions and limitations to the activity of the managing entities, namely to prevent or prohibit the performance of acts in situations of potential conflicts of interests. Accordingly, the purpose of the dissertation on – “Os diferentes níveis de regulação legal dos conflitos de interesses no âmbito da gestão de FIM” – is exactly to determine the field of application of the several levels of legal regulation of the conflicts of interests that arise within the scope of the management of SIF, both at the level of the new legal requirements governing collective investment undertakings, and at the level of the legal requirements governing the conflicts of interests foreseen in the Portuguese Securities Code, in order to clarify the articulation of these different levels of conflicts of interests regulations.

Pricing of exchange traded funds

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Search-for-yield in Portuguese fixed-income mutual funds and monetary policy

This paper studies the effects of monetary policy on mutual fund risk taking using a sample of Portuguese fixed-income mutual funds in the 2000-2012 period. Firstly I estimate time-varying measures of risk exposure (betas) for the individual funds, for the benchmark portfolio, as well as for a representative equally-weighted portfolio, through 24-month rolling regressions of a two-factor model with two systematic risk factors: interest rate risk (TERM) and default risk (DEF). Next, in the second phase, using the estimated betas, I try to understand what portion of the risk exposure is in excess of the benchmark (active risk) and how it relates to monetary policy proxies (one-month rate, Taylor residual, real rate and first principal component of a cross-section of government yields and rates). Using this methodology, I provide empirical evidence that Portuguese fixed-income mutual funds respond to accommodative monetary policy by significantly increasing exposure, in excess of their benchmarks, to default risk rate and slightly to interest risk rate as well. I also find that the increase in funds’ risk exposure to gain a boost in return (search-for-yield) is more pronounced following the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, indicating that the current historic low interest rates may incentivize excessive risk taking. My results suggest that monetary policy affects the risk appetite of non-bank financial intermediaries.

Measuring the impact of short and lending practices using the DGTW benchmarks

Mutual fund managers increasingly lend their holdings and/or use short sales to generate higher returns for their funds. This project presents a first look into the impact these practices on performance using the performance measures: i) Characteristic Selectivity (CS), the ability of the fund's managers to choose stocks that outperform their benchmarks; ii) Characteristic Timing (CT), the ability of the manager to time the market; iii) and Average Style (AS), the returns from funds systematically holding stocks with certain characteristics. These returns are computed through the DGTW benchmarks. The effect of other variables that have also been shown to impact fund’s returns – total net assets under management, investment styles, turnover and expense ratios – will also be analyzed. I find that managers who use short-sales do not exhibit better stock picking abilities than those who do not, while mutual funds that lend do present higher CS returns. In addition, while lending is not significant for the total performance of a fund, the employment of short-sales and of both short-sales and lending has a negative impact on the fund’s performance.