War and propaganda in the XXth Century

Propaganda represented the sacrifice of soldiers in war and praised the power of the country. It has been around these images that all over the world entire populations were mobilized on the expectation of victory. Through the static image of printed posters or the newspaper news projected in cinemas all over the globe, governments sought to promote a patriotic spirit, encouraging the effort of individual sacrifice by sending a clear set of messages that directly appealed to the voluntary enlistment in the armies, messages that explained the important of rationing essential goods, of the intensification of food production or the purchase of war bonds, exacerbating feelings, arousing emotions and projecting an image divided between the notion of superiority and the idea of fear of the opponent. From press, in the First World War, to radio in World War II, to television and cinema from the 1950s onwards, propaganda proved to be a weapon as deadly as those managed by soldiers in the battlefield. That’s why it is essential to analyse and discuss the topic of War and Propaganda in the Twentieth Century. This conference is organized by the IHC and the CEIS20 and is part of the Centennial Program of the Great War, organized by the IHC, and the International Centennial Program coordinated by the Imperial War Museum in London.

O contrato de Project Finance

Currently, Angola portrays a notorious economic growth and due to recent innovative legislations, it has become the major investment attracting pole, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, having, thus, an extraordinary potentiality for a rapid and sustainable development, likely to place her in outstanding positions in the world economic ranking. Yet, such economic growth entails demanding levels of intensive investment in infrastructure, what has been reported of the Angolan Government to be unable to respond to, save if recurring to very high index of external debt, poisoning, in this way, the future budgeting of the country. Due to these infrastructure investment shortages, the cost of production remains highly onerous and the cost of life extremely unaffordable. On this account, the current study disserts about the contract of Project Finance; an alternative finance resource given as a viable solution for the private financing of infrastructure, aiming to demonstrate that such contractual figure, likewise the experience of several emerging economies and others, is a contract bid framework to take into account in today’s world. It refers to a financing technique – through which the Government may satisfy a common need (for example, the construction of a public domain or public servicing), without having to pay neither offer any collateral – based on a complex legal-financial engineering, arranged throughout a coalition of typical and atypical agreements, whereby it is mandatory to look back at the basic concepts of corporate law. More than just a simple financial study, the dissertation at stake analyses the nature and legal framework of Project Finance, which is a legally atypical and innominate contract, concluding that there is a relevant need for regulating and devoting a special legal regime in the Angolan jurisdiction for this promising legal form in the contemporary corporate finance world.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

Kixikila - um contrato de financiamento informal

The purpose of the present work is to analyse and provide kixikila legal framework under Angolan law. Kixikila, despite being a legally atypical agreement, is a socially typical contract, governed essentially by the practices and customs in Angola and concluded throughout the country. With the above purpose in mind, this thesis is structured in five chapters: the first one aims at better understanding its features and, therefore, it describes the kixikila in accordance with oral research, direct observation and the contributions of scholars that have examined this matter. The second chapter aims at qualifying the kixikila as a legal transaction. For this purpose, we have analysed its requirements, formation stages, content and form, characteristics, rights and obligations of the parties, effects and compliance. We have also covered the reasons that explain why this type of agreement shall be legally protected in line with the protection conferred upon other legal agreements, taking into account its economic and social function. The third chapter covers the vicissitudes which may occur during the term of the kixikila agreement, as well as the enforcement mechanisms in face of breach and its termination. The fourth chapter aims at qualifying this agreement by comparing its most relevant characteristics with those of typical agreements, with a view to determining its legal nature based upon the similarity with other contractual types. This chapter further makes a comparative synthesis between the contracts in analysis. The fifth chapter analyses the legal nature and legal framework applicable to kixikila taking into account mixed-purpose contracts and sui generis contracts. We conclude that practices and customs in Angola take precedence as regards kixikila. Lastly, we attach additional information, such as excerpts of interviews with some individuals intervening in kixikila, the functional structure of kixikila and examples of kixikila, as well as demonstrative lists of countries where this type of agreement takes place and the obligations arising therefrom.