Phase behavior of complex superprotonic solid acids

Superprotonic phase transitions and thermal behaviors of three complex solid acid systems are presented, namely Rb3H(SO4)2-RbHSO4 system, Rb3H(SeO4)2-Cs3H(SeO4)2 solid solution system, and Cs6(H2SO4)3(H1.5PO4)4. These material systems present a rich set of phase transition characteristics that set them apart from other, simpler solid acids. A.C. impedance spectroscopy, high-temperature X-ray powder diffraction, and thermal analysis, as well as other characterization techniques, were employed to investigate the phase behavior of these systems.

Rb3H(SO4)2 is an atypical member of the M3H(XO4)2 class of compounds (M = alkali metal or NH4+ and X = S or Se) in that a transition to a high-conductivity state involves disproportionation into two phases rather than a simple polymorphic transition [1]. In the present work, investigations of the Rb3H(SO4)2-RbHSO4 system have revealed the disproportionation products to be Rb2SO4 and the previously unknown compound Rb5H3(SO4)4. The new compound becomes stable at a temperature between 25 and 140 °C and is isostructural to a recently reported trigonal phase with space group P3̅m of Cs5H3(SO4)4 [2]. At 185 °C the compound undergoes an apparently polymorphic transformation with a heat of transition of 23.8 kJ/mol and a slight additional increase in conductivity.

The compounds Rb3H(SeO4)2 and Cs3H(SeO4)2, though not isomorphous at ambient temperatures, are quintessential examples of superprotonic materials. Both adopt monoclinic structures at ambient temperatures and ultimately transform to a trigonal (R3̅m) superprotonic structure at slightly elevated temperatures, 178 and 183 °C, respectively. The compounds are completely miscible above the superprotonic transition and show extensive solubility below it. Beyond a careful determination of the phase boundaries, we find a remarkable 40-fold increase in the superprotonic conductivity in intermediate compositions rich in Rb as compared to either end-member.

The compound Cs6(H2SO4)3(H1.5PO4)4 is unusual amongst solid acid compounds in that it has a complex cubic structure at ambient temperature and apparently transforms to a simpler cubic structure of the CsCl-type (isostructural with CsH2PO4) at its transition temperature of 100-120 °C [3]. Here it is found that, depending on the level of humidification, the superprotonic transition of this material is superimposed with a decomposition reaction, which involves both exsolution of (liquid) acid and loss of H2O. This reaction can be suppressed by application of sufficiently high humidity, in which case Cs6(H2SO4)3(H1.5PO4)4 undergoes a true superprotonic transition. It is proposed that, under conditions of low humidity, the decomposition/dehydration reaction transforms the compound to Cs6(H2-0.5xSO4)3(H1.5PO4)4-x, also of the CsCl structure type at the temperatures of interest, but with a smaller unit cell. With increasing temperature, the decomposition/dehydration proceeds to greater and greater extent and unit cell of the solid phase decreases. This is identified to be the source of the apparent negative thermal expansion behavior.

References

[1] L.A. Cowan, R.M. Morcos, N. Hatada, A. Navrotsky, S.M. Haile, Solid State Ionics 179 (2008) (9-10) 305.

[2] M. Sakashita, H. Fujihisa, K.I. Suzuki, S. Hayashi, K. Honda, Solid State Ionics 178 (2007) (21-22) 1262.

[3] C.R.I. Chisholm, Superprotonic Phase Transitions in Solid Acids: Parameters affecting the presence and stability of superprotonic transitions in the MHnXO4 family of compounds (X=S, Se, P, As; M=Li, Na, K, NH4, Rb, Cs), Materials Science, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California (2003).

Voting games with incomplete information

We examine voting situations in which individuals have incomplete information over each others' true preferences. In many respects, this work is motivated by a desire to provide a more complete understanding of so-called probabilistic voting.

Chapter 2 examines the similarities and differences between the incentives faced by politicians who seek to maximize expected vote share, expected plurality, or probability of victory in single member: single vote, simple plurality electoral systems. We find that, in general, the candidates' optimal policies in such an electoral system vary greatly depending on their objective function. We provide several examples, as well as a genericity result which states that almost all such electoral systems (with respect to the distributions of voter behavior) will exhibit different incentives for candidates who seek to maximize expected vote share and those who seek to maximize probability of victory.

In Chapter 3, we adopt a random utility maximizing framework in which individuals' preferences are subject to action-specific exogenous shocks. We show that Nash equilibria exist in voting games possessing such an information structure and in which voters and candidates are each aware that every voter's preferences are subject to such shocks. A special case of our framework is that in which voters are playing a Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), (1998)). We then examine candidate competition in such games and show that, for sufficiently large electorates, regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space or the number of candidates, there exists a strict equilibrium at the social welfare optimum (i.e., the point which maximizes the sum of voters' utility functions). In two candidate contests we find that this equilibrium is unique.

Finally, in Chapter 4, we attempt the first steps towards a theory of equilibrium in games possessing both continuous action spaces and action-specific preference shocks. Our notion of equilibrium, Variational Response Equilibrium, is shown to exist in all games with continuous payoff functions. We discuss the similarities and differences between this notion of equilibrium and the notion of Quantal Response Equilibrium and offer possible extensions of our framework.