Baumol revisitado: Que futuro para o peso do sector da saúde em portugal?

A “Doença de Baumol” refere que o baixo crescimento da produtividade no sector da saúde e a uniformidade dos salários da economia como um todo, fazem com que os custos neste sector, dito “estagnado”, sejam inevitavelmente crescentes o longo do tempo. Este facto coloca uma pressão real acrescida na sustentabilidade dos Orçamentos de Estado na generalidade dos países desenvolvidos, que é difícil de resolver e para o qual se torna urgente desenvolver métodos de análise e solução eficazes. Concretamente, partindo de hipóteses cruciais, a fracção de despesa pública em saúde em Portugal, poderá atingir 9,5% do PIB já em 2010 e 20,9% do mesmo em 2030. Dado que não se põe a hipótese de conter custos baixando a qualidade dos cuidados médicos proporcionados pelo sector público, os dois caminhos mais plausíveis no curto prazo, são aumentar a eficiência ou incrementar o financiamento e provisão pelo sector privado e outras instituições de cariz social.

Complexity Simplicity Simplexity

“In the midst of order, there is chaos; but in the midst of chaos, there is order”, John Gribbin wrote in his book Deep Simplicity (p.76). In this dialectical spirit, we discuss the generative tension between complexity and simplicity in the theory and practice of management and organization. Complexity theory suggests that the relationship between complex environments and complex organizations advanced by the well-known Ashby’s law, may be reconsidered: only simple organization provides enough space for individual agency to match environmental turbulence in the form of complex organizational responses. We suggest that complex organizing may be paradoxically facilitated by a simple infrastructure, and that the theory of organizations may be viewed as resulting from the interplay between simplicity and complexity.

The ethical dilemma of expatriates in emerging economies: A liminal perspective

Adjustment to emerging economies is benefited if Western expatriates recognise they are experiencing a liminal situation, which can lead to the instrumental utilisation of coping strategies as equivalent to rites of passage between distinct ethical frameworks. Given the characteristics ascribed to rites, the ethical dilemma resulting from the simultaneous demand to abide by local rules and to respect Western ethical principles is more easily solved. Consequently, effective and sustainable adjustment is favoured. Implications for organisations and individuals are discussed.

Structuring for glocalization

Globalization and localization seem to be opposite concepts – a thesis and its antithesis. Nonetheless, managers seem to be able to handle the paradox posed by these two contradicting tensions by enacting, via action, a synthesis that allows for the co-presence of a high level of global integration and local adaptation (instead of a compromise between both), which has been labeled glocalization. We discuss how the concept of improvisation allows this synthesis by developing the two poles that ground it, namely ‘glocal’ strategy and ‘glocal’ organization. Global advantage requires a dialectical capability that organizations rarely achieve, and the importance of which orthodox management theory rarely recognizes.

Improvisation in tightly controlled work environments: The case of medical practice

We present a qualitative analysis of organizational improvisation and provide a preliminary insight into the following question: how is improvisation present in tightly controlled work environments? We conducted in situ observations of, and interviews with, several emergency medical teams and complemented this information with statistical and media data. Using grounded theory, we developed four propositions that were arranged into a model that allowed the identification of two use levels of established routines: (1) the visible side that accommodates contextual requirements, and (2) the improvisational side that provides a response to activity characteristics. This dual process is related to the existence of pressures that operate at the institutional level with practical needs emerging from the operational domain. In contrast with most of the literature, this study reveals that the presence of a broad procedural organizational memory does not restrict improvisation but enables a bureaucratic system to produce flexible improvised performance.

Endogenous spillovers in the trade-off between centralization and decentralization

In this paper, we revisit the classical trade-off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods, in a setting where interregional spillovers depend on the level of a national public good. We compare the standard benevolent planner approach with a political economy in which decisions, in a centralized system, are undertaken by a non-cooperative legislature with no separation of powers. We observe that the policy-maker in a centralized system is able to play both with local public goods and spillovers, a mechanism that is not available under a decentralized system. When compared to the traditional exogenous spillovers assumption, this improves the case for centralization under the standard benevolent planner approach. However, the same is not necessarily true in the non-cooperative legislature, as in this case the interests of the legislator do not need to be aligned with those of the society. Finally, we extend the traditional political economy analysis by considering a legislature in which decisions are undertaken by different committees (separation of powers), and show that it performs better than the original non-cooperative legislature, greatly improving the case for centralization.

Share the fame or share the blame? The reputational implications of partnerships

We use an adverse selection model to study the dynamics of firms' reputations when firms implement joint projects. We show that in contrast with projects implemented by a single firm, in the case of joint projects a firm's reputation does not necessarily increase following a success and does not necessarily decrease following a failure. We also study how reputation considerations affect firms ' decisions to participate in joint projects. We show that a high quality partner may not be preferable to a low quality partner, and that a high reputation partner is not necessarily preferable to a low reputation partner.

A mudança do regime cambial português: Um balanço 15 anos depois de Maastricht

A mudança de regime para a estabilidade e convertibilidade cambiais deve ser enquadrada numa mudança de regime económico e financeiro. A parte monetária foi feita por pressão europeia directa mas não se pode mudar a constituição fiscal a partir de fora. Para tal, não bastam tratados nem pactos com restrições às despesas e receitas públicas, porque a constituição fiscal assenta num processo orçamental que reflecte o sistema político. A falta de complementaridade entre políticas explica que as nossas reformas nãotenham durado o suficiente para que as empresas se sintam parte interessada. O resultado da “boleia de juros” foi uma procura excessiva de bens e serviços transaccionáveis por parte dos residentes, que se manifestou quer na despesa em bens e serviços importados ou exportáveis. Tendo em conta a baixa classificação de Portugal em termos de produtividade e também em termos de atractividade para o investor, não se vai realizar o alto potencial exportador sem alterar os preços relativos. O balanço 15 anos depois de Maastricht é pois de que, sem uma estratégia sustentada de reformas, o potencial exportador não se pode realizar. Sem realizar esse potencial, não se pode restaurar uma diferencialidade portuguesa assente nas pertenças e liberdades.

Experimentation with accumulation

We study signal-dependent experimentation in the presence of accumulation and show that the passive-learner’s action surprisingly coincides with the experimentor’s when the unknown term is the one determining the decay rate of the stock, while they differ when the parameter being learned is the one measuring the accumulation rate. These results highlight the importance of the dynamic structure of the problem in signal-dependent experimentation. Moreover, they have important consequences for the pollution-accumulation debate currently in progress.

Positive self-image over time

This paper incorporates egocentric comparisons into a human capital accumulation model and studies the evolution of positive self image over time. The paper shows that the process of human capital accumulation together with egocentric comparisons imply that positive self image of a cohort is first increasing and then decreasing over time. Additionally, the paper finds that positive self image: (1) peaks earlier in activities where skill depreciation is higher, (2) is smaller in activities where the distribution of income is more dispersed, (3) is not a stable characteristic of an individual, and (4) is higher for more patient individuals.

Making sense of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing in duopoly markets

The prediction of asymmetric equilibria with Stackelberg outcomes is clearly the most frequent result in the endogenous timing literature. Several experiments have tried to validate this prediction empirically, but failed to find support for it. By contrast, the experiments find that simultaneous-move outcomes are modal and that behavior in endogenous timing games is quite heterogeneous. This paper generalizes Saloner’s (1987) and Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) endogenous timing games by assuming that players are averse to inequality in payoffs. We explore the theoretical implications of inequity aversion and compare them to the empirical evidence. We find that this explanation is able to organize most of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing games. However, inequity aversion is not able to explain delay in Hamilton and Slutsky’s endogenous timing games.

Reciprocity, inequity aversion, and oligopolistic competition

This paper studies how reciprocity and inequity aversion influence the behavior of firms in imperfectly competitive markets. The paper shows that if reciprocal firms compete à la Cournot, then they are able to sustain “collusive” outcomes under a positive reciprocity equilibrium. By contrast, Stackelberg warfare outcomes may emerge under a negative reciprocity equilibrium. The results for inequity aversion are similar. Cournot competition between inequity averse firms can be harmful to consumers if it leads to equilibria where firms feel compassion toward each other. However, in equilibria where inequity averse firms are envious of each other consumers are better off than if firms were selfish. The paper also shows that only under very restrictive conditions does reciprocity or inequity aversion have an impact on Bertrand competition. Finally, the paper shows that non-selfish preferences have a greater impact on equilibrium outcomes in markets with a small number of firms.

Absorption in human capital and r&d effects in an endogenous growth model

Until now, in models of endogenous growth with physical capital, human capital and R&D such as in Arnold [Journal of Macroeconomics 20 (1998)] and followers, steady-state growth is independent of innovation activities. We introduce absorption in human capital accumulation and describe the steady-state and transition of the model. We show that this new feature provides an effect of R&D in growth, consumption and welfare. We compare the quantitative effects of R&D productivity with the quantitative effects of Human Capital productivity in wealth and welfare.

Transitional dynamics of an endogenous growth model with an erosion effect

The convergence features of an Endogenous Growth model with Physical capital, Human Capital and R&D have been studied. We add an erosion effect (supported by empirical evidence) to this model, and fully characterize its convergence properties. The dynamics is described by a fourth-order system of differential equations. We show that the model converges along a one-dimensional stable manifold and that its equilibrium is saddle-path stable. We also argue that one of the implications of considering this “erosion effect” is the increase in the adherence of the model to data.

Positive self-image and incentives in organizations

This paper investigates the implications of individuals’ mistaken beliefs of their abilities on incentives in organizations using the principal-agent model of moral hazard. The paper shows that if effort is observable, then an agent’s mistaken beliefs about own ability are always favorable to the principal. However, if effort is unobservable, then an agent’s mistaken beliefs about own ability can be either favorable or unfavorable to the principal. The paper provides conditions under which an agent’s over estimation about own ability is favorable to the principal when effort is unobservable. Finally, the paper shows that workers’ mistaken beliefs about their coworkers’ abilities make interdependent incentive schemes more attractive to firms than individualistic incentive schemes.