32 resultados para international purchasing
em Instituto Politécnico do Porto, Portugal
Resumo:
Background: The Erasmus program is a subprogram of the Lifelong Learning program, exclusive for Higher Education that promotes (among other initiatives), the mobility of students(studies, training or internships). The mobility of students of higher education seeks to improve the quality and development of future professionals, providing a multidisciplinary and multicultural experience. Setting: Academic Pharmacy/Pharmacy Technicians Methods: We conducted a descriptive and transversal study on the implementation of the mobility program and analyze the results, which involved applying a survey to students. Results: Since 2009/2010, the Pharmacy Degree at ESTSP has established 7 SMs protocols resulting in an average mobility of 5 students IN and 7 Students OUT. We have also endeavoured in SMp Protocols for extracurricular training with an average of 3 students OUT. The application process is normally open during the year before the mobility period. For most of the students involved, this was a first time opportunity to be in a foreign country and more than 70% choose the mobility program because it is seen as a possibility to improve their curriculum, for personal development or even to pursue employment opportunities abroad. The mobility for teachers is also encouraged. Conclusions: The exchange of experiences and training, acquired during cooperation activities should be an element of continuous dynamics and institutional affirmation. Initiatives such as the ERASMUS Program contribute to the educational and scientific enrichment, and promote international competitiveness among Higher Education Institutions.
Resumo:
We study market reaction to the announcements of the selected country hosting the Summer and Winter Olympic Games, the World Football Cup, the European Football Cup and World and Specialized Exhibitions. We generalize previous results analyzing a large number and different types of mega-events, evaluate the effects for winning and losing countries, investigate the determinants of the observed market reaction and control for the ex ante probability of a country being a successful bidder. Average abnormal returns measured at the announcement date and around the event are not significantly different from zero. Further, we find no evidence supporting that industries, that a priori were more likely to extract direct benefits from the event, observe positive significant effects. Yet, when we control for anticipation, the stock price reactions around the announcements are significant.
Resumo:
Purpose: To describe and compare the content of instruments that assess environmental factors using the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF). Methods: A systematic search of PubMed, CINAHL and PEDro databases was conducted using a pre-determined search strategy. The identified instruments were screened independently by two investigators, and meaningful concepts were linked to the most precise ICF category according to published linking rules. Results: Six instruments were included, containing 526 meaningful concepts. Instruments had between 20% and 98% of items linked to categories in Chapter 1. The highest percentage of items from one instrument linked to categories in Chapters 2–5 varied between 9% and 50%. The presence or absence of environmental factors in a specific context is assessed in 3 instruments, while the other 3 assess the intensity of the impact of environmental factors. Discussion: Instruments differ in their content, type of assessment, and have several items linked to the same ICF category. Most instruments primarily assess products and technology (Chapter 1), highlighting the need to deepen the discussion on the theory that supports the measurement of environmental factors. This discussion should be thorough and lead to the development of methodologies and new tools that capture the underlying concepts of the ICF.
Resumo:
23rd SPACE AGM and Conference from 9 to 12 May 2012 Conference theme: The Role of Professional Higher Education: Responsibility and Reflection Venue: Mikkeli University of Applied Sciences, Mikkeli, Finland
Resumo:
This paper studies the effects of the diffusion of a General Purpose Technology (GPT) that spreads first within the developed North country of its origin, and then to a developing South country. In the developed general equilibrium growth model, each final good can be produced by one of two technologies. Each technology is characterized by a specific labor complemented by a specific set of intermediate goods, which are enhanced periodically by Schumpeterian R&D activities. When quality reaches a threshold level, a GPT arises in one of the technologies and spreads first to the other technology within the North. Then, it propagates to the South, following a similar sequence. Since diffusion is not even, neither intra- nor inter-country, the GPT produces successive changes in the direction of technological knowledge and in inter- and intra-country wage inequality. Through this mechanism the different observed paths of wage inequality can be accommodated.
Resumo:
THE ninth edition of the International Conference on Remote Engineering and Virtual Instrumentation (REV) [1] was held at the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Deusto, Bilbao (Spain), from the 4th to the 6th of July, 2012. A world-class research community in the subject of remote and virtual laboratories joined the event.
Resumo:
We study the effects of entry of a foreign firm on domestic welfare in the presence of licensing, when the entrant is technologically superior to the incumbent. We show that foreign entry increases domestic welfare for sufficiently large technological differences between the firms under both fixed-fee licensing and royalty licensing.
Resumo:
We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We study the influences of the non-homogeneity of the goods and of the uncertainty on the production costs of the home firm in the signalling strategies by the home firm. We show that some results obtained for homogeneous goods are not robust under non-homogeneity.
Resumo:
The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international mixed duopoly serving two markets. We suppose that the firm in the home country is a welfare-maximizing public firm, while the firm in the foreign country is its own profit-maximizing private firm. We find that the environmental tax can be a strategic instrument for the home government to distribute production from the foreign private firm to the home public firm. An additional effect of the home environmental tax is the reduction of the foreign private firm's output for local consumption, thereby expanding the foreign market for the home public firm.
Resumo:
In this paper, we study an international market with demand uncertainty. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize the revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. The uncertainty is resolved between the decisions made by the home government and by the firms. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.
Resumo:
In this paper, we study the order of moves in a mixed international duopoly for differentiated goods, where firms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. We discuss the desirable role of the public firm by comparing welfare among three games. We find that, in the three possible roles, the domestic public firm put a lower price, and then produces more than the foreign private firm.
Resumo:
In this paper, we study an international market model in which the home government imposes a tariff on the imported goods. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize a function that cares about the home firm’s profit and the total revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.
Resumo:
In this paper, we study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international mixed duopoly serving two markets, in which the public firm maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and its profit. We also analyse the effects of privatization. The model has two stages. In the first stage, governments choose environmental taxes and import tariffs, simultaneously. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output levels for the domestic market and to export. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.
Resumo:
This paper analyses the effects of tariffs on an international economy with a monopolistic sector with two firms, located in two countries, each one producing a homogeneous good for both home consumption and export to the other identical country. We consider a game among governments and firms. First, the government imposes a tariff on imports and then we consider the two types of moving: simultaneous (Cournot-type model) and sequential (Stackelberg-type model) decisions by the firms. We also compare the results obtained in each model.
Resumo:
We study the effects of entry of two foreign firms on domestic welfare in the presence of licensing, when the incumbent is technologically superior to the entrants. We consider two different situations: (i) the cost-reducing innovation is licensed to both entrants; (ii) the cost- reducing innovation is licensed to just one of the entrants. We analyse three kind of license: (lump- sum) fixed-fee; (per-unit) royalty; and two-part tariff, that is a combination of a fixed-fee and a royalty. We prove that a two part tariff is never an optimal licensing scheme for the incumbent. Moreover, (i) when the technology is licensed to the two entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only output royalty; and (ii) when the technology is licensed to just one of the entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only a fixed-fee.