Flexibility in a Stackelberg leadership with differentiated goods

We study the effects of product differentiation in a Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty for the first mover. We do an ex-ante and ex-post analysis of the profits of the leader and of the follower firms in terms of product differentiation and of the demand uncertainty. We show that even with small uncertainty about the demand, the follower firm can achieve greater profits than the leader, if their products are sufficiently differentiated. We also compute the probability of the second firm having higher profit than the leading firm, subsequently showing the advantages and disadvantages of being either the leader or the follower firm.

Software transactional memory as a building block for parallel embedded realtime systems

The recent trends of chip architectures with higher number of heterogeneous cores, and non-uniform memory/non-coherent caches, brings renewed attention to the use of Software Transactional Memory (STM) as a fundamental building block for developing parallel applications. Nevertheless, although STM promises to ease concurrent and parallel software development, it relies on the possibility of aborting conflicting transactions to maintain data consistency, which impacts on the responsiveness and timing guarantees required by embedded real-time systems. In these systems, contention delays must be (efficiently) limited so that the response times of tasks executing transactions are upper-bounded and task sets can be feasibly scheduled. In this paper we assess the use of STM in the development of embedded real-time software, defending that the amount of contention can be reduced if read-only transactions access recent consistent data snapshots, progressing in a wait-free manner. We show how the required number of versions of a shared object can be calculated for a set of tasks. We also outline an algorithm to manage conflicts between update transactions that prevents starvation.

Simultaneous decisions or leadership in an international competition

In this paper, we study an international market with demand uncertainty. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize the revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. The uncertainty is resolved between the decisions made by the home government and by the firms. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

Flexibility and leadership advantages in a model with uncertain demand

We consider a differentiated Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty only for the first mover. We study the advantages of flexibility over leadership as the degree of the differentiation of the goods changes.