Flexibility in a Stackelberg leadership with differentiated goods

We study the effects of product differentiation in a Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty for the first mover. We do an ex-ante and ex-post analysis of the profits of the leader and of the follower firms in terms of product differentiation and of the demand uncertainty. We show that even with small uncertainty about the demand, the follower firm can achieve greater profits than the leader, if their products are sufficiently differentiated. We also compute the probability of the second firm having higher profit than the leading firm, subsequently showing the advantages and disadvantages of being either the leader or the follower firm.

Copper and lead removal by peanut hulls: equilibrium and kinetic studies

This research work aims to study the use of peanut hulls, an agricultural and food industry waste, for copper and lead removal through equilibrium and kinetic parameters evaluation. Equilibrium batch studies were performed in a batch adsorber. The influence of initial pH was evaluated (3–5) and it was selected between 4.0 and 4.5. The maximum sorption capacities obtained for the Langmuir model were 0.21 ± 0.03 and 0.18 ± 0.02 mmol/g, respectively for copper and lead. In bi-component systems, competitive sorption of copper and lead was verified, the total amount adsorbed being around 0.21 mmol of metal per gram of material in both mono and bi-component systems. In the kinetic studies equilibrium was reached after 200 min contact time using a 400 rpm stirring rate, achieving 78% and 58% removal, in mono-component system, for copper and lead respectively. Their removal follows a pseudo-second-order kinetics. These studies show that most of the metals removal occurred in the first 20 min of contact, which shows a good uptake rate in all systems.

Two-production-period in a duopoly with nonprofit and for-profit firms

We investigate endogenous roles in a competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, by allowing two production periods. We find that the Cournot-type equilibrium and one Stackelberg-type equilibrium where the nonprofit firm becomes the follower exist; however, another tackelberg-type equilibrium where the nonprofit firm becomes the leader does not exist.

Privatization and government preference in a public Stackelberg leader duopoly

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue in a Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that the government payoff is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We get that if the government puts a sufficiently larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will not privatize the public firm. In contrast, if the government puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will privatize the public firm.

Environmental taxes in a public Stackelberg leader duopoly

We study whether privatization of a public firm improves (or deteriorates) the environment in a mixed Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that each firm can prevent pollution by undertaking abatement measures. We get that, since in the mixed market the industry output is higher than in the private market, the abatement levels are also higher in the mixed market, and, thus, environmental tax rate in the mixed duopoly is higher than that in the privatized duopoly. Furthermore, the environment is more damaged in the mixed than in the private market. The overall effect on the social welfare is that it will becomes higher in the private than in the mixed market.

International Stackelberg model with tariffs

This paper analyses the effects of tariffs on an international economy with a monopolistic sector with two firms, located in two countries, each one producing a homogeneous good for both home consumption and export to the other identical country. We consider a game among governments and firms. First, the government imposes a tariff on imports and then we consider the two types of moving: simultaneous (Cournot-type model) and sequential (Stackelberg-type model) decisions by the firms. We also compare the results obtained in each model.

A physical packing sequence algorithm for the container loading problem with static mechanical equilibrium conditions

The container loading problem (CLP) is a combinatorial optimization problem for the spatial arrangement of cargo inside containers so as to maximize the usage of space. The algorithms for this problem are of limited practical applicability if real-world constraints are not considered, one of the most important of which is deemed to be stability. This paper addresses static stability, as opposed to dynamic stability, looking at the stability of the cargo during container loading. This paper proposes two algorithms. The first is a static stability algorithm based on static mechanical equilibrium conditions that can be used as a stability evaluation function embedded in CLP algorithms (e.g. constructive heuristics, metaheuristics). The second proposed algorithm is a physical packing sequence algorithm that, given a container loading arrangement, generates the actual sequence by which each box is placed inside the container, considering static stability and loading operation efficiency constraints.

Per-unit royalty and fixed-fee licensing in a differentiated Stackelberg model

In the present paper we consider a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim is to study the licensing of the cost-reduction by a per-unit royalty and a fixed-fee. We analyse the implications of these types of licensing contracts over the R&D effort, the profits of the firms, the consumer surplus and the social welfare. By using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods plays an important role in the results.

Separating sequential equilibrium in a Bayesian international duopoly

We consider two Cournot firms, one located in the home country and the other in the foreign country, producing substitute goods for consumption in a third country. We suppose that neither the home government nor the foreign firm know the costs of the home firm, while the foreign firm cost is common knowledge. We determine the separating sequential equilibrium outputs.

Stackelberg duopoly with demand uncertainty

We consider a symmetric Stackelberg model in which there is asymmetric demand information owned by first and second movers. We analyse the advantages of leadership and flexibility, and prove that when the leading firm faces demand uncertainty, but the follower does not, the first mover does not necessarily have advantage over the second mover. Moreover, we show that the advantage of one firm over the other depends upon the demand fluctuation and also upon the degree of substitutability of the products.