Setting target rotation time in PROFIBUS based real-time distributed applications

In this paper, we analyse the ability of Profibus fieldbus to cope with the real-time requirements of a Distributed Computer Control System (DCCS), where messages associated to discrete events must be made available within a maximum bound time. Our methodology is based on the knowledge of real-time traffic characteristics, setting the network parameters in order to cope with timing requirements. Since non-real-time traffic characteristics are usually unknown at the design stage, we consider an operational profile where, constraining non-real-time traffic at the application level, we assure that realtime requirements are met.

Quantity-setting competition with differentiated goods under uncertain demand

We consider a quantity-setting duopoly model, and we study the decision to move first or second, by assuming that the firms produce differentiated goods and that there is some demand uncertainty. The competitive phase consists of two periods, and in either period, the firms can make a production decision that is irreversible. As far as the firms are allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they make the decision, we study the circumstances that favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions.

Maximum-revenue tariff with different roles in a price-setting competition

Published also at Lecture Notes in Engineering and Computer Science

Desirable role in a price-setting international mixed duopoly

In this paper, we study the order of moves in a mixed international duopoly for differentiated goods, where firms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. We discuss the desirable role of the public firm by comparing welfare among three games. We find that, in the three possible roles, the domestic public firm put a lower price, and then produces more than the foreign private firm.

Cultural Intelligence Scale: Validation in a Multicultural Setting of Erasmus Mundus Students and Alumni

Purpose: This work aims at further developing and testing the psychometric properties of the Cultural Intelligence Scale (Ang & Van Dyne, 2006) in an Erasmus Mundus Students and Alumni Population, including reliability. Design Methodology: The study included 626 participants from 109 different countries that emcompasses 6 continents. Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis procedures were carried out in order to test the scale in a multicultural scale of Erasmus Mundus Students. Reliability was assessed using Cronbach Alpha. Results: The scale presents excellent psychometric properties with alpha values that range from .84 to .90. Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analyses demonstrated that the original model of the scale presents an exceptionally good fit. Limitations: The present study was conducted using a convenience sample and online questionnaires that limit its conclusions when we consider the globality of the Erasmus Mundus Students. Research/Practical Implications: This study presents evidence that Ang and Van Dyne’s scale is an adequate measure instrument to assess intercultural intelligence in a multicultural setting of students and alumni. Originality/Value: Multicultural samples and studies are becoming more and more present and relevant; the study of intercultural competences and habilities is becoming increasingly important, and in this task, solid psychometric instruments are of paramount importance. This study presents evidence that Ang and Van Dyne’s (2006) scale is a fairly recent and parsimonious instrument with excellent psychometric properties properties.

Equilibria of quantity setting differentiated duopoly with uncertainty

In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods and with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the output levels of their products according to the well-known concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. There is a firm ( F1 ) that chooses first the quantity 1 q of its good; the other firm ( F2 ) observes 1 q and then chooses the quantity 2 q of its good. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with the highest production cost versus the one with the cheapest cost.

Quantity-setting competition under uncertain demand

We consider a quantity-setting duopoly model, and we study the decision to move first or second, by assuming that. the firms produce homogeneous goods and that. there is some demand uncertainty. The competitive phase consists of two periods, and in either period, the firms can make a production decision that is irreversible. As far as the firms are allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they make the decision, we study the circumstances that favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions.

Price-setting dynamical duopoly with incomplete information

We consider a price competition in a duopoly with substitutable goods, linear and symmetric demand. There is a firm (F 1) that chooses first the price p 1 of its good; the other firm (F 2) observes p 1 and then chooses the price p 2 of its good. The conclusions of this price-setting dynamical duopoly are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about rival’s production costs. In this paper, we consider asymmetric information about rival’s production costs. We do ex-ante and ex-post analyses of firms’ profits and market prices. We compare the ex-ante firms’ expected profits with the ex-post firms’ profits.