Rapid Evolution of the Sequences and Gene Repertoires

Proteins secreted to the extracellular environment or to the periphery of the cell envelope, the secretome, play essential roles in foraging, antagonistic and mutualistic interactions. We hypothesize that arms races, genetic conflicts and varying selective pressures should lead to the rapid change of sequences and gene repertoires of the secretome. The analysis of 42 bacterial pan-genomes shows that secreted, and especially extracellular proteins, are predominantly encoded in the accessory genome, i.e. among genes not ubiquitous within the clade. Genes encoding outer membrane proteins might engage more frequently in intra-chromosomal gene conversion because they are more often in multi-genic families. The gene sequences encoding the secretome evolve faster than the rest of the genome and in particular at non-synonymous positions. Cell wall proteins in Firmicutes evolve particularly fast when compared with outer membrane proteins of Proteobacteria. Virulence factors are over-represented in the secretome, notably in outer membrane proteins, but cell localization explains more of the variance in substitution rates and gene repertoires than sequence homology to known virulence factors. Accordingly, the repertoires and sequences of the genes encoding the secretome change fast in the clades of obligatory and facultative pathogens and also in the clades of mutualists and free-living bacteria. Our study shows that cell localization shapes genome evolution. In agreement with our hypothesis, the repertoires and the sequences of genes encoding secreted proteins evolve fast. The particularly rapid change of extracellular proteins suggests that these public goods are key players in bacterial adaptation.

Desirable role in a price-setting international mixed duopoly

In this paper, we study the order of moves in a mixed international duopoly for differentiated goods, where firms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. We discuss the desirable role of the public firm by comparing welfare among three games. We find that, in the three possible roles, the domestic public firm put a lower price, and then produces more than the foreign private firm.

Effects of international diffusion of a general purpose technology on wage inequality

This paper studies the effects of the diffusion of a General Purpose Technology (GPT) that spreads first within the developed North country of its origin, and then to a developing South country. In the developed general equilibrium growth model, each final good can be produced by one of two technologies. Each technology is characterized by a specific labor complemented by a specific set of intermediate goods, which are enhanced periodically by Schumpeterian R&D activities. When quality reaches a threshold level, a GPT arises in one of the technologies and spreads first to the other technology within the North. Then, it propagates to the South, following a similar sequence. Since diffusion is not even, neither intra- nor inter-country, the GPT produces successive changes in the direction of technological knowledge and in inter- and intra-country wage inequality. Through this mechanism the different observed paths of wage inequality can be accommodated.

Signalling in an international cournot model

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We study the influences of the non-homogeneity of the goods and of the uncertainty on the production costs of the home firm in the signalling strategies by the home firm. We show that some results obtained for homogeneous goods are not robust under non-homogeneity.

Environmental policies in an international mixed duopoly

The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international mixed duopoly serving two markets. We suppose that the firm in the home country is a welfare-maximizing public firm, while the firm in the foreign country is its own profit-maximizing private firm. We find that the environmental tax can be a strategic instrument for the home government to distribute production from the foreign private firm to the home public firm. An additional effect of the home environmental tax is the reduction of the foreign private firm's output for local consumption, thereby expanding the foreign market for the home public firm.

Desirable role in an international duopoly model with tariffs

In this paper, we study an international market model in which the home government imposes a tariff on the imported goods. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize a function that cares about the home firm’s profit and the total revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

Environmental and international tariffs in a mixed duopoly

In this paper, we study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international mixed duopoly serving two markets, in which the public firm maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and its profit. We also analyse the effects of privatization. The model has two stages. In the first stage, governments choose environmental taxes and import tariffs, simultaneously. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output levels for the domestic market and to export. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

Implementação e integração do modelo de acreditação da Joint Commission International na unidade de imagiologia do Hospital Privado da Boavista

Este trabalho descreve a abordagem abrangente sobre a melhoria do sistema de gestão da qualidade na Unidade de Imagiologia do Hospital da Boavista através da implementação das normas de acreditação da Joint Commission International (JCI). Fundamental para a melhoria geral da qualidade é a redução contínua de riscos para os doentes e para os profissionais da Unidade. Tais riscos podem existir ao nível do ambiente físico assim como no circuito dos exames e dos doentes. A acreditação em Saúde é uma das prioridades estratégicas do Ministério da Saúde e tem como objetivo fortalecer a confiança dos cidadãos nos profissionais de saúde bem como nas instituições de saúde. É importante que Portugal cultive a melhoria da qualidade e segurança nas instituições de saúde mantendo uma relação adequada custo/benefício. A União Europeia tem feito um esforço para que a acreditação seja harmoniosa nos seus princípios, no entanto é respeitada sempre a prevalência da legislação de cada país, bem como as suas especificações culturais e religiosas (Shaw, 2006), responsabilizando-o pelo seu sistema de saúde O trabalho aqui apresentado tem como objetivo principal fundamentar a escolha do modelo de acreditação da JCI para o Hospital da Boavista, nomeadamente para a Unidade de Imagiologia, ver se os padrões estão de acordo com os procedimentos da Unidade, identificar falhas e apontar possiveis melhorias. Pretende-se ainda mostrar a importância da implementação dos sistemas de certificação e acreditação da gestão da qualidade, documentada pela experiência profissional, bem como o know-how do Hospital da Boavista, assim como a complementaridade dos programas da gestão da qualidade, certificação e acreditação. A escolha do modelo de acreditação da JCI, foi uma opção do Hospital da Boavista baseada na credibilidade e no grau de exigência que a entidade impõe. Foi imperativo que a Unidade de Imagiologia realizasse as suas funções de forma válida e fiável e que disponibilizasse produtos / serviços de qualidade. A monitorização e consequente controlo de qualidade do serviço prestado pela Unidade de Imagiologia, foi difícil mas simplificado, em parte, devido ao sistema de gestão da qualidade ISO 9001:2008 já implementado, tendo este sido consolidado com a implementação da acreditação da JCI, com padrões específicos bem definidos na gestão do controlo de qualidade na Unidade de Imagiologia do Hospital da Boavista.

Privatization and social welfare in an international mixed Stackelberg duopoly

Competition between public and private firms exists in a range of industries like telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, airlines industries, as weel as services including hospitals, banking and education. Some authors studied mixed oligopolies under Cournot competition (firms move simultaneously) and some others considered Stackelberg models (firms move sequentially). Tomaru [1] analyzed, in a Cournot model, how decision-making upon cost-reducing R&D investment by a domestic public firm is affected by privatization when competing in the domestic market with a foreign firm. He shows that privatization of the domestic public firm lowers productive efficiency and deteriorates domestic social welfare. In this paper, we examine the same question but in a Stackelberg formulation instead of Cournot. The model is a three-stage game. In the first stage, the domestic firm chooses the amount of cost-reducing R&D investment. Then, the firms compete à la Stackelberg. Two cases are considered: (i) The domestic firm is the leader; (ii) The foreign firm is the leader. We show that the results obtained in [1] for Cournot competition are robust in the sence that they are also true when firms move sequentially.

Separating sequential equilibrium in a Bayesian international duopoly

We consider two Cournot firms, one located in the home country and the other in the foreign country, producing substitute goods for consumption in a third country. We suppose that neither the home government nor the foreign firm know the costs of the home firm, while the foreign firm cost is common knowledge. We determine the separating sequential equilibrium outputs.