Licensing in an international market

We study the effects of entry of a foreign firm on domestic welfare in the presence of licensing, when the entrant is technologically superior to the incumbent. We show that foreign entry increases domestic welfare for sufficiently large technological differences between the firms under both fixed-fee licensing and royalty licensing.

Signalling in an international cournot model

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We study the influences of the non-homogeneity of the goods and of the uncertainty on the production costs of the home firm in the signalling strategies by the home firm. We show that some results obtained for homogeneous goods are not robust under non-homogeneity.

Environmental policies in an international mixed duopoly

The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international mixed duopoly serving two markets. We suppose that the firm in the home country is a welfare-maximizing public firm, while the firm in the foreign country is its own profit-maximizing private firm. We find that the environmental tax can be a strategic instrument for the home government to distribute production from the foreign private firm to the home public firm. An additional effect of the home environmental tax is the reduction of the foreign private firm's output for local consumption, thereby expanding the foreign market for the home public firm.

Simultaneous decisions or leadership in an international competition

In this paper, we study an international market with demand uncertainty. The model has two stages. In the ���rst stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize the revenue. Then, the ���rms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. The uncertainty is resolved between the decisions made by the home government and by the ���rms. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the ���rms.

Desirable role in a price-setting international mixed duopoly

In this paper, we study the order of moves in a mixed international duopoly for differentiated goods, where ���rms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. We discuss the desirable role of the public ���rm by comparing welfare among three games. We ���nd that, in the three possible roles, the domestic public ���rm put a lower price, and then produces more than the foreign private ���rm.

Desirable role in an international duopoly model with tariffs

In this paper, we study an international market model in which the home government imposes a tariff on the imported goods. The model has two stages. In the ���rst stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize a function that cares about the home ���rm���s pro���t and the total revenue. Then, the ���rms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the ���rms.

Environmental and international tariffs in a mixed duopoly

In this paper, we study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international mixed duopoly serving two markets, in which the public ���rm maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and its pro���t. We also analyse the effects of privatization. The model has two stages. In the ���rst stage, governments choose environmental taxes and import tariffs, simultaneously. Then, the ���rms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output levels for the domestic market and to export. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the ���rms.

International Stackelberg model with tariffs

This paper analyses the effects of tariffs on an international economy with a monopolistic sector with two ���rms, located in two countries, each one producing a homogeneous good for both home consumption and export to the other identical country. We consider a game among governments and ���rms. First, the government imposes a tariff on imports and then we consider the two types of moving: simultaneous (Cournot-type model) and sequential (Stackelberg-type model) decisions by the ���rms. We also compare the results obtained in each model.

Licensing in an international triopoly

We study the effects of entry of two foreign ���rms on domestic welfare in the presence of licensing, when the incumbent is technologically superior to the entrants. We consider two different situations: (i) the cost-reducing innovation is licensed to both entrants; (ii) the cost- reducing innovation is licensed to just one of the entrants. We analyse three kind of license: (lump- sum) ���xed-fee; (per-unit) royalty; and two-part tariff, that is a combination of a ���xed-fee and a royalty. We prove that a two part tariff is never an optimal licensing scheme for the incumbent. Moreover, (i) when the technology is licensed to the two entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only output royalty; and (ii) when the technology is licensed to just one of the entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only a ���xed-fee.

Implementa����o e integra����o do modelo de acredita����o da Joint Commission International na unidade de imagiologia do Hospital Privado da Boavista

Este trabalho descreve a abordagem abrangente sobre a melhoria do sistema de gest��o da qualidade na Unidade de Imagiologia do Hospital da Boavista atrav��s da implementa����o das normas de acredita����o da Joint Commission International (JCI). Fundamental para a melhoria geral da qualidade �� a redu����o cont��nua de riscos para os doentes e para os profissionais da Unidade. Tais riscos podem existir ao n��vel do ambiente f��sico assim como no circuito dos exames e dos doentes. A acredita����o em Sa��de �� uma das prioridades estrat��gicas do Minist��rio da Sa��de e tem como objetivo fortalecer a confian��a dos cidad��os nos profissionais de sa��de bem como nas institui����es de sa��de. �� importante que Portugal cultive a melhoria da qualidade e seguran��a nas institui����es de sa��de mantendo uma rela����o adequada custo/benef��cio. A Uni��o Europeia tem feito um esfor��o para que a acredita����o seja harmoniosa nos seus princ��pios, no entanto �� respeitada sempre a preval��ncia da legisla����o de cada pa��s, bem como as suas especifica����es culturais e religiosas (Shaw, 2006), responsabilizando-o pelo seu sistema de sa��de O trabalho aqui apresentado tem como objetivo principal fundamentar a escolha do modelo de acredita����o da JCI para o Hospital da Boavista, nomeadamente para a Unidade de Imagiologia, ver se os padr��es est��o de acordo com os procedimentos da Unidade, identificar falhas e apontar possiveis melhorias. Pretende-se ainda mostrar a import��ncia da implementa����o dos sistemas de certifica����o e acredita����o da gest��o da qualidade, documentada pela experi��ncia profissional, bem como o know-how do Hospital da Boavista, assim como a complementaridade dos programas da gest��o da qualidade, certifica����o e acredita����o. A escolha do modelo de acredita����o da JCI, foi uma op����o do Hospital da Boavista baseada na credibilidade e no grau de exig��ncia que a entidade imp��e. Foi imperativo que a Unidade de Imagiologia realizasse as suas fun����es de forma v��lida e fi��vel e que disponibilizasse produtos / servi��os de qualidade. A monitoriza����o e consequente controlo de qualidade do servi��o prestado pela Unidade de Imagiologia, foi dif��cil mas simplificado, em parte, devido ao sistema de gest��o da qualidade ISO 9001:2008 j�� implementado, tendo este sido consolidado com a implementa����o da acredita����o da JCI, com padr��es espec��ficos bem definidos na gest��o do controlo de qualidade na Unidade de Imagiologia do Hospital da Boavista.

Privatization in an international mixed duopoly with environmental taxes

We study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international duopoly serving two countries, with pollution abatement. This analysis is done in both mixed and privatized markets. The model has two stages: First, governments choose environmental taxes and import tariffs, simultaneously; then, the firms compete in the market by choosing output levels for the domestic market and to export and also abatement levels.

Revalorization of spent coffee residues by a direct agronomic approach

Spent coffee grounds (SCG) represent a high-volume food waste worldwide, and several reuse approaches have been attempted. Herein, a greenhouse field experiment was carried out by cultivating Batavia lettuce with 5%, 10%, 15%, 20% and 30% (v/v) espresso SCG directly composted in the soil. Healthy vegetables were obtained for all treatments, without yield loss for up to 10% SCG. A progressive increment of green color intensity with increasing SCG content was observed, corroborated by the increase of their photosynthetic pigments (chlorophylls and carotenoids). Furthermore, total ascorbic acid and tocopherols showed statistical significant increases (p < 0.001) between control and all tested groups. Marked variations of nutritionally relevant minerals, particularly potassium, phosphorous and sodium were also revealed at higher percentage treatments (20% and 30%). This approach constitutes a clean, direct, simple and cost-effective measure to produce value-added vegetables, while reducing food waste disposal.