Flexibility in a Stackelberg leadership with differentiated goods

We study the effects of product differentiation in a Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty for the first mover. We do an ex-ante and ex-post analysis of the profits of the leader and of the follower firms in terms of product differentiation and of the demand uncertainty. We show that even with small uncertainty about the demand, the follower firm can achieve greater profits than the leader, if their products are sufficiently differentiated. We also compute the probability of the second firm having higher profit than the leading firm, subsequently showing the advantages and disadvantages of being either the leader or the follower firm.

A flexibility reference model to achieve leagility in virtual organizations

The paper proposes a Flexibility Requirements Model and a Factory Templates Framework to support the dynamic Virtual Organization decision-makers in order to reach effective response to the emergent business opportunities ensuring profitability. Through the construction and analysis of the flexibility requirements model, the network managers can achieve and conceive better strategies to model and breed new dynamic VOs. This paper also presents the leagility concept as a new paradigm fit to equip the network management with a hybrid approach that better tackle the performance challenges imposed by the new and competitive business environments.

Flexibility and leadership advantages in a model with uncertain demand

We consider a differentiated Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty only for the first mover. We study the advantages of flexibility over leadership as the degree of the differentiation of the goods changes.

Flexibility in Stackelberg leadership

We consider a Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty, only for the first mover. We study the advantages of leadership and flexibility with the variation of the demand uncertainty. Liu proved for demand uncertainty parameter greater than three that the follower firm can have an advantage with respect to the leading firm for some realizations of the demand intercept. Here, we prove that for demand uncertainty parameter less than three the leading firm is always in advantage.