Transmission costs allocation based on optimal re-dispatch

Congestion management of transmission power systems has achieve high relevance in competitive environments, which require an adequate approach both in technical and economic terms. This paper proposes a new methodology for congestion management and transmission tariff determination in deregulated electricity markets. The congestion management methodology is based on a reformulated optimal power flow, whose main goal is to obtain a feasible solution for the re-dispatch minimizing the changes in the transactions resulting from market operation. The proposed transmission tariffs consider the physical impact caused by each market agents in the transmission network. The final tariff considers existing system costs and also costs due to the initial congestion situation and losses. This paper includes a case study for the 118 bus IEEE test case.

Transmission cost allocation using cooperative game theory: a comparative study

In this paper is presented a Game Theory based methodology to allocate transmission costs, considering cooperation and competition between producers. As original contribution, it finds the degree of participation on the additional costs according to the demand behavior. A comparative study was carried out between the obtained results using Nucleolus balance and Shapley Value, with other techniques such as Averages Allocation method and the Generalized Generation Distribution Factors method (GGDF). As example, a six nodes network was used for the simulations. The results demonstrate the ability to find adequate solutions on open access environment to the networks.

Cooperation mechanism for team-work based multi-agent system in dynamic scheduling through meta-heuristics

This paper describes a Multi-agent Scheduling System that assumes the existence of several Machines Agents (which are decision-making entities) distributed inside the Manufacturing System that interact and cooperate with other agents in order to obtain optimal or near-optimal global performances. Agents have to manage their internal behaviors and their relationships with other agents via cooperative negotiation in accordance with business policies defined by the user manager. Some Multi Agent Systems (MAS) organizational aspects are considered. An original Cooperation Mechanism for a Team-work based Architecture is proposed to address dynamic scheduling using Meta-Heuristics.

Bertrand oligopoly when rivals' costs are unknown

We study a Bertrand oligopoly model with incomplete information about rivals' costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game, the ex-ante expected profit and the ex-post profit of each firm. We see that, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies when rivals' costs are unknown

We study Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly models with incomplete information about rivals’ costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian- Nash equilibrium of both games, the ex-ante expected profits and the ex-post profits of each firm. We see that, in the price competition, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Contributo das tecnologias de informação na gestão do regime terapêutico no diabético

A diabetes é a doença do seculo XXI, atinge mais de um milhão de portugueses cada vez mais jovens em idades trabalhadoras, e já custa mais de 1% do PIB, além dos enormes danos que pode causar às pessoas e à sociedade. Segundo o Relatório Anual do Observatório Nacional da Diabetes, em 2011, cerca de um quarto da população portuguesa integrada no escalão etário dos 60 aos 79 tem Diabetes. Um estudo realizado pelo Lisbon Internet and Networks Institute (LINI), em 2010, diz-nos que “a internet é um recurso para a informação e educação para a saúde”. Em 2010 49% dos lares portugueses possuem acesso à internet e 44% da população é utilizadora (acréscimo significativo relativamente aos 29% em 2003). Destes, dois terços têm entre os 15 e os 24 anos. Os idosos representam 1,6%, dos quais os reformados e pensionistas representam 5%, as domésticas representam 11% e os trabalhadores manuais 22%, sendo estes os menos utilizadores. Um terço da restante população procura informação sobre saúde semanalmente, cerca de 16%. Face à atual conjuntura económica, com restrições orçamentais, nomeadamente na área da saúde, devem-se encontrar meios para prevenir e lidar com a Diabetes numa perspetiva de custo-benefício, isto porque a Diabetes pode reduzir as oportunidades de emprego e de aprendizagem. O atual diretor da Organização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Económico (OCDE) Yyes Leterme diz que “Prevenir e tratar a Diabetes e as suas complicações custa cerca de 90 mil milhões de euros anualmente na Europa”. Atualmente, não é muito utilizado nem explorado o potencial das tecnologias de informação e as ferramentas web ao serviço da saúde, quer por profissionais de saúde, quer por utentes na gestão ao regime terapêutico na doença crónica, mais precisamente na gestão adequada da Diabetes. Potenciar uma visão integrada dos diferentes recursos de comunicação e a sua utilização conjugada com a promoção da saúde e prevenção da doença poderá enfatizar em termos de eficácia e eficiência a minimização de recursos das organizações de saúde e promover a gestão adequada da Diabetes. Tendo por base esta problemática, este estudo pretende abordar e refletir o possível contributo das tecnologias de informação e das ferramentas web na gestão adequada ao regime terapêutico da Diabetes.

Strategic trade policy and signaling costs with differentiated goods

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We compute the separating equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we compare the subsidies, firms’ expected profits and home government’s welfare in both equilibria, for different values of the own price effect parameter.