Planning, Cooperation and Competition: A case study in industry and construction in a Portuguese Region

In the present paper we analyzed the behavior of firms in the construction and manufacturing sectors, located in the region of Vale do Sousa, in the north of Portugal. From the literature, even existing some disagreements, it is possible to conclude that planning is crucial for firms survival and growth. Cooperation is another aspect that the literature presents as an important factor for firms sustainability. It also plays a major role in competition, since firms are adopting coopetition strategies. By studying a sample of 251 firms, it was possible to realize, that the majority started their business without a formal planning, and they keep going without using it. In cooperation aspects, there is a lack of cooperation. It was possible to verify, that existing cooperation has some evidence but at a vertical level. These vertical relations were also identified in stakeholder’s involvement.

On the development of an automatic voice pleasantness classification and intensity estimation system

In the last few years, the number of systems and devices that use voice based interaction has grown significantly. For a continued use of these systems, the interface must be reliable and pleasant in order to provide an optimal user experience. However there are currently very few studies that try to evaluate how pleasant is a voice from a perceptual point of view when the final application is a speech based interface. In this paper we present an objective definition for voice pleasantness based on the composition of a representative feature subset and a new automatic voice pleasantness classification and intensity estimation system. Our study is based on a database composed by European Portuguese female voices but the methodology can be extended to male voices or to other languages. In the objective performance evaluation the system achieved a 9.1% error rate for voice pleasantness classification and a 15.7% error rate for voice pleasantness intensity estimation.

Legal and political regulation of higher education in Portugal: an evolutionary perspective on the current policy issues and the problem of order

The higher education system in Europe is currently under stress and the debates over its reform and future are gaining momentum. Now that, for most countries, we are in a time for change, in the overall society and the whole education system, the legal and political dimensions have gained prominence, which has not been followed by a more integrative approach of the problem of order, its reform and the issue of regulation, beyond the typical static and classical cost-benefit analyses. The two classical approaches for studying (and for designing the policy measures of) the problem of the reform of the higher education system - the cost-benefit analysis and the legal scholarship description - have to be integrated. This is the argument of our paper that the very integration of economic and legal approaches, what Warren Samuels called the legal-economic nexus, is meaningful and necessary, especially if we want to address the problem of order (as formulated by Joseph Spengler) and the overall regulation of the system. On the one hand, and without neglecting the interest and insights gained from the cost-benefit analysis, or other approaches of value for money assessment, we will focus our study on the legal, social and political aspects of the regulation of the higher education system and its reform in Portugal. On the other hand, the economic and financial problems have to be taken into account, but in a more inclusive way with regard to the indirect and other socio-economic costs not contemplated in traditional or standard assessments of policies for the tertiary education sector. In the first section of the paper, we will discuss the theoretical and conceptual underpinning of our analysis, focusing on the evolutionary approach, the role of critical institutions, the legal-economic nexus and the problem of order. All these elements are related to the institutional tradition, from Veblen and Commons to Spengler and Samuels. The second section states the problem of regulation in the higher education system and the issue of policy formulation for tackling the problem. The current situation is clearly one of crisis with the expansion of the cohorts of young students coming to an end and the recurrent scandals in private institutions. In the last decade, after a protracted period of extension or expansion of the system, i. e., the continuous growth of students, universities and other institutions are competing harder to gain students and have seen their financial situation at risk. It seems that we are entering a period of radical uncertainty, higher competition and a new configuration that is slowly building up is the growth in intensity, which means upgrading the quality of the higher learning and getting more involvement in vocational training and life-long learning. With this change, and along with other deep ones in the Portuguese society and economy, the current regulation has shown signs of maladjustment. The third section consists of our conclusions on the current issue of regulation and policy challenge. First, we underline the importance of an evolutionary approach to a process of change that is essentially dynamic. A special attention will be given to the issues related to an evolutionary construe of policy analysis and formulation. Second, the integration of law and economics, through the notion of legal economic nexus, allows us to better define the issues of regulation and the concrete problems that the universities are facing. One aspect is the instability of the political measures regarding the public administration and on which the higher education system depends financially, legally and institutionally, to say the least. A corollary is the lack of clear strategy in the policy reforms. Third, our research criticizes several studies, such as the one made by the OECD in late 2006 for the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education, for being too static and neglecting fundamental aspects of regulation such as the logic of actors, groups and organizations who are major players in the system. Finally, simply changing the legal rules will not necessary per se change the behaviors that the authorities want to change. By this, we mean that it is not only remiss of the policy maker to ignore some of the critical issues of regulation, namely the continuous non-respect by academic management and administrative bodies of universities of the legal rules that were once promulgated. Changing the rules does not change the problem, especially without the necessary debates form the different relevant quarters that make up the higher education system. The issues of social interaction remain as intact. Our treatment of the matter will be organized in the following way. In the first section, the theoretical principles are developed in order to be able to study more adequately the higher education transformation with a modest evolutionary theory and a legal and economic nexus of the interactions of the system and the policy challenges. After describing, in the second section, the recent evolution and current working of the higher education in Portugal, we will analyze the legal framework and the current regulatory practices and problems in light of the theoretical framework adopted. We will end with some conclusions on the current problems of regulation and the policy measures that are discusses in recent years.

Quantity-setting competition with differentiated goods under uncertain demand

We consider a quantity-setting duopoly model, and we study the decision to move first or second, by assuming that the firms produce differentiated goods and that there is some demand uncertainty. The competitive phase consists of two periods, and in either period, the firms can make a production decision that is irreversible. As far as the firms are allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they make the decision, we study the circumstances that favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions.

Cournot competition between a non-profit firm and a for-profit firm with uncertainty

In this paper, we consider a Cournot competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, with uncertain demand. Given an asymmetric tax schedule, we compute explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we analyze the effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes.

Simultaneous decisions or leadership in an international competition

In this paper, we study an international market with demand uncertainty. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize the revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. The uncertainty is resolved between the decisions made by the home government and by the firms. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

Maximum-revenue tariff with different roles in a price-setting competition

Published also at Lecture Notes in Engineering and Computer Science

Solar Intensity Forecasting using Artificial Neural Networks and Support Vector Machines

This paper presents several forecasting methodologies based on the application of Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) and Support Vector Machines (SVM), directed to the prediction of the solar radiance intensity. The methodologies differ from each other by using different information in the training of the methods, i.e, different environmental complementary fields such as the wind speed, temperature, and humidity. Additionally, different ways of considering the data series information have been considered. Sensitivity testing has been performed on all methodologies in order to achieve the best parameterizations for the proposed approaches. Results show that the SVM approach using the exponential Radial Basis Function (eRBF) is capable of achieving the best forecasting results, and in half execution time of the ANN based approaches.

Quantity-setting competition under uncertain demand

We consider a quantity-setting duopoly model, and we study the decision to move first or second, by assuming that. the firms produce homogeneous goods and that. there is some demand uncertainty. The competitive phase consists of two periods, and in either period, the firms can make a production decision that is irreversible. As far as the firms are allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they make the decision, we study the circumstances that favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions.

Asymmetric taxation in a competition between nonprofit and for-profit firms

This paper considers a Cournot competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, with uncertain demand. Given an asymmetric tax schedule, we compute explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we analize the effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes.

Quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly

In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods, linear and symmetric demand and with unknown costs. In our model, the two firms play a non-cooperative game with two stages: in a first stage, firm F 1 chooses the quantity, q 1, that is going to produce; in the second stage, firm F 2 observes the quantity q 1 produced by firm F 1 and chooses its own quantity q 2. Firms choose their output levels in order to maximise their profits. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the variations of the expected profits with the parameters of the model, namely with the parameters of the probability distributions, and with the parameters of the demand and differentiation.

Asymmetric dynamic price competition with uncertainty

We consider a dynamic setting-price duopoly model in which a dominant (leader) firm moves first and a subordinate (follower) firm moves second. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We analyse the effect of the production costs uncertainty on the profits of the firms, for different values of the intercept demand parameters.

Cournot duopoly with competition in the R&D expenditures

We present a new R&D investment in a Cournot Duopoly model and we analyze the different possible types of Nash R&D investments. We observe that the new production costs region can be decomposed in three economical regions, depending on the Nash R&D investment, showing the relevance of the use of patents in new technologies.