O papel das agências de rating e a dívida pública portuguesa

Durante as últimas décadas observou-se o crescimento da importância das avaliações fornecidas pelas agências de rating, sendo este um fator decisivo na tomada de decisão dos investidores. Também os emitentes de dívida são largamente afetados pelas alterações das classificações atribuídas por estas agências. Esta investigação pretende, por um lado, compreender se estas agências têm poder para conseguirem influenciar a evolução da dívida pública e qual o seu papel no mercado financeiro. Por outro, pretende compreender quais os fatores determinantes da dívida pública portuguesa, bem como a realização de uma análise por percentis com o objetivo de lhe atribuir um rating. Para a análise dos fatores que poderão influenciar a dívida pública, a metodologia utilizada é uma regressão linear múltipla estimada através do Método dos Mínimos Quadrados (Ordinary Least Squares – OLS), em que num cenário inicial era composta por onze variáveis independentes, sendo a dívida pública a variável dependente, para um período compreendido entre 1996 e 2013. Foram realizados vários testes ao modelo inicial, com o objetivo de encontrar um modelo que fosse o mais explicativo possível. Conseguimos ainda identificar uma relação inversa entre o rating atribuído por estas agências e a evolução da dívida pública, no sentido em que para períodos em que o rating desce, o crescimento da dívida é mais acentuado. Não nos foi, no entanto, possível atribuir um rating à dívida pública através de uma análise de percentis.

Privatization and social welfare in an international mixed Stackelberg duopoly

Competition between public and private firms exists in a range of industries like telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, airlines industries, as weel as services including hospitals, banking and education. Some authors studied mixed oligopolies under Cournot competition (firms move simultaneously) and some others considered Stackelberg models (firms move sequentially). Tomaru [1] analyzed, in a Cournot model, how decision-making upon cost-reducing R&D investment by a domestic public firm is affected by privatization when competing in the domestic market with a foreign firm. He shows that privatization of the domestic public firm lowers productive efficiency and deteriorates domestic social welfare. In this paper, we examine the same question but in a Stackelberg formulation instead of Cournot. The model is a three-stage game. In the first stage, the domestic firm chooses the amount of cost-reducing R&D investment. Then, the firms compete à la Stackelberg. Two cases are considered: (i) The domestic firm is the leader; (ii) The foreign firm is the leader. We show that the results obtained in [1] for Cournot competition are robust in the sence that they are also true when firms move sequentially.

Two new power indices based on winning coalitions

Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan–Packel index and the Public Good Index. In the definition of these indices, only minimal winning coalitions are taken into account. Using similar arguments, we define two new power indices. These new indices are defined taking into account only those winning coalitions that do not contain null players. The results obtained with the different power indices are compared by means of two real-world examples taken from the political field.

Decision Support for Energy Contracts Negotiation with Game Theory and Adaptive Learning

This paper presents a decision support methodology for electricity market players’ bilateral contract negotiations. The proposed model is based on the application of game theory, using artificial intelligence to enhance decision support method’s adaptive features. This model is integrated in AiD-EM (Adaptive Decision Support for Electricity Markets Negotiations), a multi-agent system that provides electricity market players with strategic behavior capabilities to improve their outcomes from energy contracts’ negotiations. Although a diversity of tools that enable the study and simulation of electricity markets has emerged during the past few years, these are mostly directed to the analysis of market models and power systems’ technical constraints, making them suitable tools to support decisions of market operators and regulators. However, the equally important support of market negotiating players’ decisions is being highly neglected. The proposed model contributes to overcome the existing gap concerning effective and realistic decision support for electricity market negotiating entities. The proposed method is validated by realistic electricity market simulations using real data from the Iberian market operator—MIBEL. Results show that the proposed adaptive decision support features enable electricity market players to improve their outcomes from bilateral contracts’ negotiations.

Six thinking hats: A novel metalearner for intelligent decision support in electricity markets

The energy sector has suffered a significant restructuring that has increased the complexity in electricity market players' interactions. The complexity that these changes brought requires the creation of decision support tools to facilitate the study and understanding of these markets. The Multiagent Simulator of Competitive Electricity Markets (MASCEM) arose in this context, providing a simulation framework for deregulated electricity markets. The Adaptive Learning strategic Bidding System (ALBidS) is a multiagent system created to provide decision support to market negotiating players. Fully integrated with MASCEM, ALBidS considers several different strategic methodologies based on highly distinct approaches. Six Thinking Hats (STH) is a powerful technique used to look at decisions from different perspectives, forcing the thinker to move outside its usual way of thinking. This paper aims to complement the ALBidS strategies by combining them and taking advantage of their different perspectives through the use of the STH group decision technique. The combination of ALBidS' strategies is performed through the application of a genetic algorithm, resulting in an evolutionary learning approach.