Smart Grid Market Using Joint Energy and Ancillary Services Bids

The power systems operation in the smart grid context increases significantly the complexity of their management. New approaches for ancillary services procurement are essential to ensure the operation of electric power systems with appropriate levels of stability, safety, quality, equity and competitiveness. These approaches should include market mechanisms which allow the participation of small and medium distributed energy resources players in a competitive market environment. In this paper, an energy and ancillary services joint market model used by an aggregator is proposed, considering bids of several types of distributed energy resources. In order to improve economic efficiency in the market, ancillary services cascading market mechanism is also considered in the model. The proposed model is included in MASCEM – a multi-agent system electricity market simulator. A case study considering a distribution network with high penetration of distributed energy resources is presented.

Elspot: Nord Pool Spot Integration in MASCEM Electricity Market Simulator

The energy sector in industrialized countries has been restructured in the last years, with the purpose of decreasing electricity prices through the increase in competition, and facilitating the integration of distributed energy resources. However, the restructuring process increased the complexity in market players' interactions and generated emerging problems and new issues to be addressed. In order to provide players with competitive advantage in the market, decision support tools that facilitate the study and understanding of these markets become extremely useful. In this context arises MASCEM (Multi-Agent Simulator of Competitive Electricity Markets), a multi-agent based simulator that models real electricity markets. To reinforce MASCEM with the capability of recreating the electricity markets reality in the fullest possible extent, it is crucial to make it able to simulate as many market models and player types as possible. This paper presents a new negotiation model implemented in MASCEM based on the negotiation model used in day-ahead market (Elspot) of Nord Pool. This is a key module to study competitive electricity markets, as it presents well defined and distinct characteristics from the already implemented markets, and it is a reference electricity market in Europe (the one with the larger amount of traded power).

Particle Swarm Optimization of Electricity Market Negotiating Players Portfolio

Energy systems worldwide are complex and challenging environments. Multi-agent based simulation platforms are increasing at a high rate, as they show to be a good option to study many issues related to these systems, as well as the involved players at act in this domain. In this scope the authors’ research group has developed a multi-agent system: MASCEM (Multi- Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets), which performs realistic simulations of the electricity markets. MASCEM is integrated with ALBidS (Adaptive Learning Strategic Bidding System) that works as a decision support system for market players. The ALBidS system allows MASCEM market negotiating players to take the best possible advantages from each market context. However, it is still necessary to adequately optimize the players’ portfolio investment. For this purpose, this paper proposes a market portfolio optimization method, based on particle swarm optimization, which provides the best investment profile for a market player, considering different market opportunities (bilateral negotiation, market sessions, and operation in different markets) and the negotiation context such as the peak and off-peak periods of the day, the type of day (business day, weekend, holiday, etc.) and most important, the renewable based distributed generation forecast. The proposed approach is tested and validated using real electricity markets data from the Iberian operator – MIBEL.

Incentive-based demand response programs designed by asset-light retailers for day-ahead market

Following the deregulation experience of retail electricity markets in most countries, the majority of the new entrants of the liberalized retail market were pure REP (retail electricity providers). These entities were subject to financial risks because of the unexpected price variations, price spikes, volatile loads and the potential for market power exertion by GENCO (generation companies). A REP can manage the market risks by employing the DR (demand response) programs and using its' generation and storage assets at the distribution network to serve the customers. The proposed model suggests how a REP with light physical assets, such as DG (distributed generation) units and ESS (energy storage systems), can survive in a competitive retail market. The paper discusses the effective risk management strategies for the REPs to deal with the uncertainties of the DAM (day-ahead market) and how to hedge the financial losses in the market. A two-stage stochastic programming problem is formulated. It aims to establish the financial incentive-based DR programs and the optimal dispatch of the DG units and ESSs. The uncertainty of the forecasted day-ahead load demand and electricity price is also taken into account with a scenario-based approach. The principal advantage of this model for REPs is reducing the risk of financial losses in DAMs, and the main benefit for the whole system is market power mitigation by virtually increasing the price elasticity of demand and reducing the peak demand.

Towards a unified European electricity market: The contribution of data-mining to support realistic simulation studies

Worldwide electricity markets have been evolving into regional and even continental scales. The aim at an efficient use of renewable based generation in places where it exceeds the local needs is one of the main reasons. A reference case of this evolution is the European Electricity Market, where countries are connected, and several regional markets were created, each one grouping several countries, and supporting transactions of huge amounts of electrical energy. The continuous transformations electricity markets have been experiencing over the years create the need to use simulation platforms to support operators, regulators, and involved players for understanding and dealing with this complex environment. This paper focuses on demonstrating the advantage that real electricity markets data has for the creation of realistic simulation scenarios, which allow the study of the impacts and implications that electricity markets transformations will bring to the participant countries. A case study using MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is presented, with a scenario based on real data, simulating the European Electricity Market environment, and comparing its performance when using several different market mechanisms.

Privatization and social welfare in an international mixed Stackelberg duopoly

Competition between public and private firms exists in a range of industries like telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, airlines industries, as weel as services including hospitals, banking and education. Some authors studied mixed oligopolies under Cournot competition (firms move simultaneously) and some others considered Stackelberg models (firms move sequentially). Tomaru [1] analyzed, in a Cournot model, how decision-making upon cost-reducing R&D investment by a domestic public firm is affected by privatization when competing in the domestic market with a foreign firm. He shows that privatization of the domestic public firm lowers productive efficiency and deteriorates domestic social welfare. In this paper, we examine the same question but in a Stackelberg formulation instead of Cournot. The model is a three-stage game. In the first stage, the domestic firm chooses the amount of cost-reducing R&D investment. Then, the firms compete à la Stackelberg. Two cases are considered: (i) The domestic firm is the leader; (ii) The foreign firm is the leader. We show that the results obtained in [1] for Cournot competition are robust in the sence that they are also true when firms move sequentially.

Privatização num mercado misto com decisões sequenciais

Consideramos um mercado no qual competem uma empresa pública e uma empresa privada, decidindo, de forma sequencial, as quantidades a produzir. O governo impõe um imposto sobre as quantidades comercializadas, de acordo com uma função que consiste numa soma ponderada entre o bem-estar público e a receita total obtida pela aplicação desse imposto. O objetivo deste trabalho é estudar o efeito da privatização da empresa pública, (i) quando a empresa líder é a empresa pública; e (ii) quando a empresa líder é a empresa privada. Além disso, fazemos uma comparação entre os resultados obtidos nos dois modelos estudados.

Analysis of Electricity Market Prices Using Multidimensional Scaling

This paper studies the impact of the energy upon electricity markets using Multidimensional Scaling (MDS). Data from major energy and electricity markets is considered. Several maps produced by MDS are presented and discussed revealing that this method is useful for understanding the correlation between them. Furthermore, the results help electricity markets agents hedging against Market Clearing Price (MCP) volatility.

Multidimensional Scaling Analysis of Stock Market Indexes

This paper applies multidimensional scaling techniques and Fourier transform for visualizing possible time-varying correlations between 25 stock market values. The method is useful for observing clusters of stock markets with similar behavior.

Price-setting dynamical duopoly with incomplete information

We consider a price competition in a duopoly with substitutable goods, linear and symmetric demand. There is a firm (F 1) that chooses first the price p 1 of its good; the other firm (F 2) observes p 1 and then chooses the price p 2 of its good. The conclusions of this price-setting dynamical duopoly are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about rival’s production costs. In this paper, we consider asymmetric information about rival’s production costs. We do ex-ante and ex-post analyses of firms’ profits and market prices. We compare the ex-ante firms’ expected profits with the ex-post firms’ profits.

Uncertainty on a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation

The conclusions of the Bertrand model of competition are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about rival’s production costs. In this paper, we consider a Bertrand competition, with differentiated goods. Furthermore, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We do ex-ante and ex-post analyses of firms’ profits and market prices. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.

Cournot model with investments to change the market size

We present a new deterministic dynamical model on the market size of Cournot competitions, based on Nash equilibria of R&D investment strategies to increase the size of the market of the firms at every period of the game. We compute the unique Nash equilibrium for the second subgame and the profit functions for both firms. Adding uncertainty to the R&D investment strategies, we get a new stochastic dynamical model and we analyse the importance of the uncertainty to reverse the initial advantage of one firm with respect to the other.

Coalition of distributed generation units to Virtual Power Players - a game theory approach

Smart Grids (SGs) have emerged as the new paradigm for power system operation and management, being designed to include large amounts of distributed energy resources. This new paradigm requires new Energy Resource Management (ERM) methodologies considering different operation strategies and the existence of new management players such as several types of aggregators. This paper proposes a methodology to facilitate the coalition between distributed generation units originating Virtual Power Players (VPP) considering a game theory approach. The proposed approach consists in the analysis of the classifications that were attributed by each VPP to the distributed generation units, as well as in the analysis of the previous established contracts by each player. The proposed classification model is based in fourteen parameters including technical, economical and behavioural ones. Depending of the VPP strategies, size and goals, each parameter has different importance. VPP can also manage other type of energy resources, like storage units, electric vehicles, demand response programs or even parts of the MV and LV distribution network. A case study with twelve VPPs with different characteristics and one hundred and fifty real distributed generation units is included in the paper.

Multi-agent simulation of competitive electricity markets: Autonomous systems cooperation for European market modeling

The electricity market restructuring, and its worldwide evolution into regional and even continental scales, along with the increasing necessity for an adequate integration of renewable energy sources, is resulting in a rising complexity in power systems operation. Several power system simulators have been developed in recent years with the purpose of helping operators, regulators, and involved players to understand and deal with this complex and constantly changing environment. The main contribution of this paper is given by the integration of several electricity market and power system models, respecting to the reality of different countries. This integration is done through the development of an upper ontology which integrates the essential concepts necessary to interpret all the available information. The continuous development of Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets platform provides the means for the exemplification of the usefulness of this ontology. A case study using the proposed multi-agent platform is presented, considering a scenario based on real data that simulates the European Electricity Market environment, and comparing its performance using different market mechanisms. The main goal is to demonstrate the advantages that the integration of various market models and simulation platforms have for the study of the electricity markets’ evolution.

A Study on Microstructure Characteristics of TEPs-modified Adhesives

Thermally expandable particles (TEPs) were developed by Dow Chemical Co in the early 1970´s [1] and were further developed by others [2, 3]. They are particles made up of a thermoplastic shell filled with liquid hydrocarbon. On heating them, two transformations will occur. One is the softening of shell material and the other is the gasification of the hydrocarbon liquid inside it. As a consequence, the shell will expand as the gas inside it will push the softened shell from inside out causing it to grow in size [4]. When fully expanded, the growth in volume of the particle can be from 50 to 100 times [3]. Owing to this unique behaviour, TEPs are used by the industry in a wide variety of applications mainly for weight reduction and appearance improvement for thermoplastics, inks, and coatings. In adhesive bonding, TEPs have been used for recycling purposes. Moreover, TEPs might be used to modify structural adhesives for other new purposes, such as: to increase the joint strength by creating an adhesive functionally modified along the overlap of the joint by gradual heating and/or to heal the adhesive in case of damage.