Human Error Contribution in Collision and Grounding of Oil Tankers

The purpose of this article is to present a quantitative analysis of the human failure contribution in the collision and/or grounding of oil tankers, considering the recommendation of the ""Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment"" of the International Maritime Organization. Initially, the employed methodology is presented, emphasizing the use of the technique for human error prediction to reach the desired objective. Later, this methodology is applied to a ship operating on the Brazilian coast and, thereafter, the procedure to isolate the human actions with the greatest potential to reduce the risk of an accident is described. Finally, the management and organizational factors presented in the ""International Safety Management Code"" are associated with these selected actions. Therefore, an operator will be able to decide where to work in order to obtain an effective reduction in the probability of accidents. Even though this study does not present a new methodology, it can be considered as a reference in the human reliability analysis for the maritime industry, which, in spite of having some guides for risk analysis, has few studies related to human reliability effectively applied to the sector.

Pricing farm-level agricultural insurance: a Bayesian approach

This paper applies Hierarchical Bayesian Models to price farm-level yield insurance contracts. This methodology considers the temporal effect, the spatial dependence and spatio-temporal models. One of the major advantages of this framework is that an estimate of the premium rate is obtained directly from the posterior distribution. These methods were applied to a farm-level data set of soybean in the State of the Parana (Brazil), for the period between 1994 and 2003. The model selection was based on a posterior predictive criterion. This study improves considerably the estimation of the fair premium rates considering the small number of observations.

A note on the multiple partners assignment game

In the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M., 1972. The assignment game. I. The core, International journal of Game Theory 1, 11-130] agents are allowed to form one partnership at most. That paper proves that, in the context of firms and workers, given two stable payoffs for the firms there is a stable payoff which gives each firm the larger of the two amounts and also one which gives each of them the smaller amount. Analogous result applies to the workers. Sotomayor [Sotomayor, M., 1992. The multiple partners game. In: Majumdar, M. (Ed.), Dynamics and Equilibrium: Essays in Honor to D. Gale. Mcmillian, pp. 322-336] extends this analysis to the case where both types of agents may form more than one partnership and an agent`s payoff is multi-dimensional. Instead, this note concentrates in the total payoff of the agents. It is then proved the rather unexpected result that again the maximum of any pair of stable payoffs for the firms is stable but the minimum need not be, even if we restrict the multiplicity of partnerships to one of the sides. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games

Stability of matchings was proved to be a new cooperative equilibrium concept in Sotomayor (Dynamics and equilibrium: essays in honor to D. Gale, 1992). That paper introduces the innovation of treating as multi-dimensional the payoff of a player with a quota greater than one. This is done for the many-to-many matching model with additively separable utilities, for which the stability concept is defined. It is then proved, via linear programming, that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty and it may be strictly bigger than the set of dual solutions and strictly smaller than the core. The present paper defines a general concept of stability and shows that this concept is a natural solution concept, stronger than the core concept, for a much more general coalitional game than a matching game. Instead of mutual agreements inside partnerships, the players are allowed to make collective agreements inside coalitions of any size and to distribute his labor among them. A collective agreement determines the level of labor at which the coalition operates and the division, among its members, of the income generated by the coalition. An allocation specifies a set of collective agreements for each player.

The pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences

In a decentralized setting the game-theoretical predictions are that only strong blockings are allowed to rupture the structure of a matching. This paper argues that, under indifferences, also weak blockings should be considered when these blockings come from the grand coalition. This solution concept requires stability plus Pareto optimality. A characterization of the set of Pareto-stable matchings for the roommate and the marriage models is provided in terms of individually rational matchings whose blocking pairs, if any, are formed with unmatched agents. These matchings always exist and give an economic intuition on how blocking can be done by non-trading agents, so that the transactions need not be undone as agents reach the set of stable matchings. Some properties of the Pareto-stable matchings shared by the Marriage and Roommate models are obtained.

Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game

Starting with an initial price vector, prices are adjusted in order to eliminate the excess demand and at the same time to keep the transfers to the sellers as low as possible. In each step of the auction, to which set of sellers should those transfers be made is the key issue in the description of the algorithm. We assume additively separable utilities and introduce a novel distinction by considering multiple sellers owing multiple identical objects and multiple buyers with an exogenously defined quota, consuming more than one object but at most one unit of a seller`s good and having multi-dimensional payoffs. This distinction induces a necessarily more complicated construction of the over-demanded sets than the constructions of these sets for the other assignment games. For this approach, our mechanism yields the buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium payoff, which equals the buyer-optimal stable payoff. The symmetry of the model allows to getting the seller-optimal stable payoff and the seller-optimal competitive equilibrium payoff can then be also derived.

Heterogeneity, saving-investment dynamics and capital mobility in Latin America

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the dynamics of national saving-investment relationship in order to determine the degree of capital mobility in 12 Latin American countries. The analytically relevant correlation is the short-term one, defined as that between changes in saving and investment. Of special interest is the speed at which variables return to the long run equilibrium relationship, which is interpreted as being negatively related to the degree of capital mobility. The long run correlation, in turn, captures the coefficient implied by the solvency constraint. We find that heterogeneity and cross-section dependence completely change the estimation of the long run coefficient. Besides we obtain a more precise short run coefficient estimate compared to the existent estimates in the literature. There is evidence of an intermediate degree of capital mobility, and the coefficients are extremely stable over time.

The structure of worker compensation in Brazil, with a comparison to France and the United States

We employ comprehensive linked employer-employee data for Brazil to analyze wage determinants and compare results to Abowd et al. (2001) for French and U.S. manufacturing. While returns to human capita in Brazilian manufacturing exceed those of the other countries, occupation and gender differentials are similar. The worker-characteristics component accounts for much of the greater wage inequality in Brazil, but the establishment-fixed component has scant explanatory power. Thus, firm-or industry-level factors offer little scope for explaining the differences in wage inequality. Brazil`s wage structure resembles that of France, a country with some similarity in labor market institutions.

The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules

A stable matching rule is used as the outcome function for the Admission game where colleges behave straightforwardly and the students` strategies are given by their preferences over the colleges. We show that the college-optimal stable matching rule implements the set of stable matchings via the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. For any other stable matching rule the strategic behavior of the students may lead to outcomes that are not stable under the true preferences. We then introduce uncertainty about the matching selected and prove that the natural solution concept is that of NE in the strong sense. A general result shows that the random stable matching rule, as well as any stable matching rule, implements the set of stable matchings via NE in the strong sense. Precise answers are given to the strategic questions raised.

ICT AND PRODUCTIVITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: NEW FIRM-LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM BRAZIL AND INDIA

This paper uses a unique new data set on manufacturing firms in Brazil and India to estimate production functions, augmented by information and communications technology (ICT). We find a strong positive association between ICT capital and productivity in both countries that is robust to several different specification tests. The paper also breaks new ground when using the Indian data to investigate the effect of the institutional and policy environment on ICT capital investment and productivity. We find that poorer infrastructure quality and labor market policy are associated with lower levels of ICT adoption, while poorer infrastructure is also associated with lower returns to investment.

The influence of oscillations on global existence for a class of semi-linear wave equations

The goal of this paper is to study the global existence of small data solutions to the Cauchy problem for the nonlinear wave equation u(tt) - a(t)(2) Delta u = u(t)(2) - a(t)(2)vertical bar del u vertical bar(2). In particular we are interested in statements for the 1D case. We will explain how the interplay between the increasing and oscillating behavior of the coefficient will influence global existence of small data solutions. Copyright c 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Small-World Effect in Epidemics Using Cellular Automata

The spread of an infectious disease in a population involves interactions leading to an epidemic outbreak through a network of contacts. Extending on Watts and Strogatz (1998) who showed that short-distance connections create a small-world effect, a model combining short-and long-distance probabilistic and regularly updated contacts helps considering spatial heterogeneity. The method is based on cellular automata. The presence of long-distance connections accelerates the small-world effect, as if the world shrank in proportion of their total number.

Estimating the True Incidence of Rubella

The true incidence of infectious diseases is difficult to determine from surveillance or from notification data. The proportion of new infections of rubella yields a model from serological surveys. The discrepancy between results and official notification data before vaccination era leads one to suspect the presence of hidden infections. Simulation on 80% of effective vaccination coverage shows a similar discrepancy of the total number of infections compared to notification data.

Dynamics and Control of Stray Dog Populations

The population dynamics of stray dogs is simulated to assess the effects of sterilization and euthanasia. From simulations representing less than 5 years, sterilization is less efficient than euthanasia to reduce the stray dog population, considering similar rates, but the total number of sterilized dogs is less than the total number of euthanized dogs per km(2) per year. Over 20 years, both strategies have similar efficiency. Beyond a certain rate of dog abandonment, both strategies are inefficient.