Asymmetric rivalry within and between strategic groups

Our study examines asymmetric rivalry within and between strategic groups defined according to the size of their members. We hypothesize that, owing to several forms of group-level effects, including switching costs and efficiency, strategic groups comprising large firms expect to experience a large amount of retaliation from firms within their group and accommodation from the group comprising smaller firms. Small firms, on the other hand, expect to experience a small amount of retaliation from the group comprising large firms and no reaction from the other firms in their group. We estimate the effect of group-level strategic interactions on firm performance. Our analysis reveals that the rivalry behavior within and between groups is asymmetric, which supports the dominant-fringe relation between firms, as described in our hypothesis.

Who performs a stronger response to whom? Detecting individual competitive actions and reactions

This study analyzes the degree of competition through individual actions and reactions. Empirical support for this analysis has derived mainly from structural econometric models describing the nature of competition. This analysis extends the existing literature by empirically considering a direct measurement of competition through the analysis of the competitive actions and responses, and describing how firms compete within and between strategic groups. We estimate the firms’ conduct in the Spanish deposits market with 146 firms and 18,888 observations. This is a specially compelling context for the banking industry, in which a deregulation process gives rise to the adoption of aggressive strategies seeking to increase the market shares of deposit accounts; thus, producing a turbulent situation of increasing rivalry. Our results offer a deeper understanding of the firms’ competitive behavior, since we identify different patterns of actions and reactions depending upon the strategic group the firm belongs to.