Asymmetric rivalry within and between strategic groups

Our study examines asymmetric rivalry within and between strategic groups defined according to the size of their members. We hypothesize that, owing to several forms of group-level effects, including switching costs and efficiency, strategic groups comprising large firms expect to experience a large amount of retaliation from firms within their group and accommodation from the group comprising smaller firms. Small firms, on the other hand, expect to experience a small amount of retaliation from the group comprising large firms and no reaction from the other firms in their group. We estimate the effect of group-level strategic interactions on firm performance. Our analysis reveals that the rivalry behavior within and between groups is asymmetric, which supports the dominant-fringe relation between firms, as described in our hypothesis.

Microfoundations of strategic management: Toward micro–macro research in the resource-based theory

Over the last few years, a new stream of research has emerged in the field of strategic management which focuses on the analysis of its microfoundations. This line of research analyzes strategic topics examining their foundations rooted in individual actions and interactions. The main purpose of this paper is to examine this emerging literature of microfoundations, indicating its usefulness and main characteristics. Through a systematic literature review, this paper contributes to the field by identifying the main areas studied, the benefits and potential of this approach, and some limitations and criticisms. Moreover, the paper studies how the integration of micro and macro aspects in strategy research may be carried out, examining several works that use a multilevel approach. Some methodological approaches that may help to effect this integration are indicated. These aspects will be analyzed in relation to the resource-based theory.