Effective assertive behavior in the workplace: Responding to unfair criticism

A social rules perspective was employed to identify the elements of socially appropriate responses to unfair criticism in the workplace. Women generally endorsed for themselves response strategies based on stronger obligation and softer rights components, while men endorsed responses based on stronger personal rights expression and weaker obligation components. In support of the utility of a social rules approach to operationalizing context-specific expectations, behavioral responses based on gender and status-specific rules were evaluated as more effective on task, relationship, and self-respect dimensions than were rights-only, rights-plus-empathy, or submissive strategies. Results are discussed in terms of the development of a context-specific model of interpersonal competence and implications for interpersonal skills and assertion training.

All's fair in love and war - but not contract

Changes to Queensland's unfair terms in consumer contracts expected - nature of the changes outlined - protections given to consumers, with respect to unfair contracts, in Victoria and the United Kingdom.

Alternating offer games and private rulings of the Australian Tax Office

The concept of submitting oneself to a voluntary negotiation is by no means new to big business. Formal bargaining has been quite successful over the years in providing the venue for agents to explore a more logical and mathematical approach to bargaining. However in more recent times external influences have been applied to agents who provide better deals for favored executives. This external influence has displayed itself in taxtion negotiations to the extent that tax office agents have been dismissed for irresponsible conduct. We explore this specific type of negotiation using an alternating offer bargaining game to model the particular influences, which create unfair rulings in negotiations. By the constraints of this systematic mathematical approach to negotiation, we will explore the advantages of a more formal game theoretic approach. In this presentation we will also elaborate on finding Nash Equilibrium in alternating offer games.

Am I being treated fairly by my leaders? The roles of group identification and self-other comparisons in judgements of procedural justice

The current experiment focuses on the roles of social identity and social comparison in perceptions of procedural justice. Participants are randomly allocated to conditions in a 2 (whether the participant has the opportunity to voice an opinion), X 2 (whether the comparison other has the opportunity to voice an opinion), X 2 (whether the comparison other is an ingroup or an outgroup member), between subjects design. Participants are then asked to report the extent to which they perceive the procedure they are involved in to be fair. It is predicted that participants will have a strong feeling of procedural unfairness when they are not given an opportunity by the leader to voice their opinion, but learn that their comparison other is given that opportunity. It is also predicted that the feeling of unfairness should be stronger when the comparison other is an outgroup rather than an ingroup member. Additionally, participants receiving a fair treatment may regard the procedure as fair when their outgoup comparison other receives an unfair treatment. Results support these predictions and reveal that how people make judgments of procedural justice through social comparison is qualified by the social identities of the parties involved.