Transnational organised crime and the International Criminal Court developments and debates

Limitation to jurisdiction of International Criminal Court (ICC) - proposal to strengthen the universal criminalisation of transnational organised crimes by enabling them to be prosecuted through an international authority - debate on whether existing offences under the ICC Statute encompass certain transnational organised crimes - whether the Statute should be expanded to include crimes that have been recognised in international treaties.

Transnational organised crime and international law: The Palermo Convention

The last decade has witnessed a significant growth in transnational organised crime activities. It has also seen multiple efforts by the international community to come to terms with this rise of organised crime and to work towards an international instrument to combat the activities of criminal organisations. In December 2000, the United Nations opened for signature the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2001), also known as the Palermo Convention, a treaty that is supplemented by three protocols on trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, and trafficking in firearms and ammunition. The conclusion of the Convention marks the end of more than eight years of consultations on a universal instrument to criminalise and counteract transnational criminal organisations. This article illustrates the developments that led to the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and reflects on the amendments and concessions that have been made to earlier proposals during the elaboration process. This article highlights the strengths of the Convention in the areas of judicial cooperation and mutual legal assistance, and the shortcomings of the new Convention, in particular in failing to establish a universal, unequivocal definition of “transnational organized crime”.

A simulation analysis of the market effect of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation

In this paper we utilise a stochastic address model of broadcast oligopoly markets to analyse the Australian broadcast television market. In particular, we examine the effect of the presence of a single government market participant in this market. An examination of the dynamics of the simulations demonstrates that the presence of a government market participant can simultaneously generate positive outcomes for viewers as well as for other market suppliers. Further examination of simulation dynamics indicates that privatisation of the government market participant results in reduced viewer choice and diversity. We also demonstrate that additional private market participants would not result in significant benefits to viewers.

Community broadcasting and the enclosure of the public sphere

One of the normative tenets of the Habermasian public sphere is that it should be an open and universally accessible forum. In Australia, one way of achieving this is the provision for community broadcasting in the Broadcasting Services Act. A closer examination of community broadcasting, however, suggests practices that contradict the idea of an open and accessible public sphere. Community broadcasting organizations regulate access to their media assets through a combination of formal and informal structures. This suggests that the public sphere can be understood as a resource, and that community broadcasting organizations can be analysed as ‘commons regimes’. This approach reveals a fundamental paradox inherent in the public sphere: access, participation and the quality of discourse in the public sphere are connected to its enclosure, which limits membership and participation through a system of rules and norms that govern the conduct of a group. By accepting the view that a public sphere is governed by property rights, it follows that an open and universally accessible public sphere is neither possible nor desirable.