Grumbling, voting, demonstrating, and rioting: ''Rationality'' and decision-making in intergroup conflict

An individual faced with intergroup conflict chooses A from a vast array of possible actions, ranging from grumbling among ingroup friends to voting and demonstrating to rioting and revolution. The present paper conceptualises these intergroup choices as rationally shaped by perceptions of the benefits and costs associated with the action (expectancy-value processes). However, in presenting a model of agentic normative influence, it is argued that in intergroup contexts group-level costs and benefits play a critical role in individuals' decision-making. In the context of English-French conflict in Quebec, in Canada, four studies provide evidence that group-level costs and benef influence individuals' decision-making in intergro conflict; that the individual level of analysis need mediate the group level of analysis; that group-level co and benefits mediate the relationship between soc identity and intentions to engage in collective action; a that perceptions of outgroup and ingroup norms for inte group behaviours are relatively invariant and predictal related to perceptions of the group- and individual-le, benefits and costs associated with individualistic vers collective actions. By modelling the relationship betwe group norms and group-level costs and benefits, soc psychologists may begin to address the processes th underlie identity-behaviour relationships in collecti action and intergroup conflict.

Normative influence and rational conflict decisions: Group norms and cost-benefit analyses for intergroup behavior

The present paper articulates a model in which ingroup and outgroup norms inform 'rational' decision-making (cost-benefit analysis) for conflict behaviors. Norms influence perceptions of the consequences of the behavior, and individuals may thus strategically conform to or violate norms in order to acquire benefits and avoid costs. Two studies demonstrate these processes in the context of conflict in Quebec. In the first study, Anglophones' perceptions of Francophone and Anglophone norms for pro-English behaviors predicted evaluations of the benefits and costs of the behaviors, and these cost-benefit evaluations in turn mediated the norm-intention links for both group norms. In the second study, a manipulated focus on supportive versus hostile ingroup and outgroup norms also predicted cost-benefit evaluations, which mediated the norm-intention relationships. The studies support a model of strategic conflict choices in which group norms inform, rather than suppress, rational expectancy value processes. Implications for theories of decision-making and normative influence are discussed.

Cost-benefit analyses for your group and yourself: The rationality of decision-making in conflict

Two studies in the context of English-French relations in Québec suggest that individuals who strongly identify with a group derive the individual-level costs and benefits that drive expectancy-value processes (rational decision-making) from group-level costs and benefits. In Study 1, high identifiers linked group- and individual-level outcomes of conflict choices whereas low identifiers did not. Group-level expectancy-value processes, in Study 2, mediated the relationship between social identity and perceptions that collective action benefits the individual actor and between social identity and intentions to act. These findings suggest the rational underpinnings of identity-driven political behavior, a relationship sometimes obscured in intergroup theory that focuses on cognitive processes of self-stereotyping. But the results also challenge the view that individuals' cost-benefit analyses are independent of identity processes. The findings suggest the importance of modeling the relationship of group and individual levels of expectancy-value processes as both hierarchical and contingent on social identity processes