Attentional modulation of neural responses to action observation: Implications for models of the human 'mirror' system

In primates, the observation of meaningful, goaldirected actions engages a network of cortical areas located within the premotor and inferior parietal lobules. Current models suggest that activity within these regions arises relatively automatically during passive action observation without the need for topdown control. Here we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to determine whether cortical activit)' associated with action observation is modulated by the strategic allocation of selective attention. Normal observers viewed movie clips of reach-to-grasp actions while performing an easy or difficult visual discrimination at the fovea. A wholebrain analysis was performed to determine the effects of attentional load on neural responses to observed hand actions. Our results suggest that cortical areas involved in action observation are significantiy modulated by attentional load. These findings have important implications for recent attempts to link the human action-observation system to response properties of "mirror neurons" in monkeys.

Assessing the competitiveness of loss allocation methods in a deregulated electricity market

This paper critically assesses several loss allocation methods based on the type of competition each method promotes. This understanding assists in determining which method will promote more efficient network operations when implemented in deregulated electricity industries. The methods addressed in this paper include the pro rata [1], proportional sharing [2], loss formula [3], incremental [4], and a new method proposed by the authors of this paper, which is loop-based [5]. These methods are tested on a modified Nordic 32-bus network, where different case studies of different operating points are investigated. The varying results obtained for each allocation method at different operating points make it possible to distinguish methods that promote unhealthy competition from those that encourage better system operation.

Strategic argumentation: A game theoretical investigation

Argumentation is modelled as a game where the payoffs are measured in terms of the probability that the claimed conclusion is, or is not, defeasibly provable, given a history of arguments that have actually been exchanged, and given the probability of the factual premises. The probability of a conclusion is calculated using a standard variant of Defeasible Logic, in combination with standard probability calculus. It is a new element of the present approach that the exchange of arguments is analysed with game theoretical tools, yielding a prescriptive and to some extent even predictive account of the actual course of play. A brief comparison with existing argument-based dialogue approaches confirms that such a prescriptive account of the actual argumentation has been almost lacking in the approaches proposed so far.

Strategic research partnerships: Empirical evidence from Asia

This paper evaluates the role Strategic Research Partnerships (SRPs) play in Asia. Specific Asian institutional settings influence the roles of SRPs. Japan is regarded as a forerunner in the practice of SRPs. In Japan, lack of spillover channels, limited opportunities for mergers and acquisitions, weak university research and pressure for internal diversification motivate firms to form SRPs. In Korea, SRPs are regarded as a means to promote large-scale research projects. In Taiwan, SRPs are formed to facilitate technological diffusion. Empirical findings on SRPs, focusing on government-sponsored R&D consortia in Japan, are summarized. Issues regarding SRP formation, their effect on R&D spending of participating firms, and productivity, are examined. Reference is made to alternative forms of measurement of SRPs and their potential application to Asian countries is assessed. Enhancing the capacity of policy-makers to assess the extent and contribution of SRPs is considered to be a priority.

The land assembly problem revisited

As in the standard land assembly problem, a developer wants to buy two adjacent blocks of land belonging to two different owners. The value of the two blocks of land to the developer is greater than the sum of the individual values of the blocks for each owner. Unlike the land assembly literature, however, our focus is on the incentive that each lot owner has to delay the start of negotiations, rather than on the public goods nature of the problem. An incentive for delay exists, for example, when owners perceive that being last to sell will allow them to capture a larger share of the joint surplus from the development. We show that competition at point of sale can cause equilibrium delay, and that cooperation at point of sale will eliminate delay. This suggests that strategic delay is another source for the inefficient allocation of land, in addition to the public-good type externality pointed out by Grossman and Hart [Bell Journal of Economics 11 (1980) 42] and O'Flaherty [Regional Science and Urban Economics 24 (1994) 287]. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Strategic trade policy under uncertainty: Sufficient conditions for the optimality of ad valorem, specific and quadratic trade taxes

In most previous work on strategic trade policy the form of government intervention has been prescribed in advance. In this paper, we apply a solution concept discussed by Klemperer and Meyer for games in which the strategy space consists of the class of all (non state-contingent) price quantity schedules. We examine a series of specific assumptions on demand and supply conditions and derive the associated equilibrium trade policies. We derive welfare implications for all cases examined.

The effect of spatial definition on the allocation of clients to screening clinics

We compared four strategies for inviting 91,456 women aged 50-69 years to one of six clinics for mammography screening and 40,142 men aged 60-79 years to one of 10 clinics for abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA) screening. The strategies were invitation to the clinic nearest to the client and invitation to the clinic nearest to the client's area of residence defined by census small area, postcode and local government area. For each strategy we calculated the expected demand at each clinic and the travel distances for clients. We found that when women were allocated to mammography clinics on the basis of the local government area instead of their individual address, expected demand at one clinic increased by 60%, and 19% of clients were invited to attend a more remote clinic, entailing 99,000 km of additional travel. Similar results were obtained for men allocated to AAA clinics by their postcode of residence instead of their individual address: 55% difference in expected demand, 13% to a more remote clinic and 60,000 km of extra travel. Allocation on the basis of small areas did not show such great differences, except for travel distance, which was about 5% higher for each clinic type. We recommend that allocation of clients to screening clinics be made according to residential address, that assessment of the location of clinics be based on distances between residences and nearest clinic, but that planning new locations for clinics be aided with spatial analysis tools using small area demographic and social data. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd.