15 resultados para Reasoning in science
em University of Queensland eSpace - Australia
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There is evidence that alienation from science is linked to the dominant discourse practices of science classrooms (cf. Lemke, J. L. (1990). Talking Science: Language, Learning, and Values. Norwood, NJ: Ablex). Yet, in secondary science education it is particularly hard to find evidence of curriculum reform that includes explicit changes in pedagogic discourses to accommodate the needs of students from a wide range of backgrounds. However, such evidence does exist and needs to be highlighted wherever it is found to help address social justice concerns in science education. In this article, I show how critical discourse analysis can be used to explore a way of challenging the dominant discourse in teacher-student interactions in science classrooms. My findings suggest a new way of moving toward more socially just science curricula in middle years and secondary classrooms by using hybrid discourses that can serve emancipatory purposes. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals. Inc.
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Computational Methods for Coupled Problems in Science and Engineering
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The aim of this study was to develop and trial a method to monitor the evolution of clinical reasoning in a PBL curriculum that is suitable for use in a large medical school. Termed Clinical Reasoning Problems (CRPs), it is based on the notion that clinical reasoning is dependent on the identification and correct interpretation of certain critical clinical features. Each problem consists of a clinical scenario comprising presentation, history and physical examination. Based on this information, subjects are asked to nominate the two most likely diagnoses and to list the clinical features that they considered in formulating their diagnoses, indicating whether these features supported or opposed the nominated diagnoses. Students at different levels of medical training completed a set of 10 CRPs as well as the Diagnostic Thinking Inventory, a self-reporting questionnaire designed to assess reasoning style. Responses were scored against those of a reference group of general practitioners. Results indicate that the CRPs are an easily administered, reliable and valid assessment of clinical reasoning, able to successfully monitor its development throughout medical training. Consequently, they can be employed to assess clinical reasoning skill in individual students and to evaluate the success of undergraduate medical schools in providing effective tuition in clinical reasoning.
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Inagaki and Hatano (2002) have argued that young children initially understand biological phenomena in terms of vitalism, a mode of construal in which life or life-force is the central causal-explanatory concept. This study investigated the development of vitalistic reasoning in young children's concepts of life, the human body and death. Sixty preschool children between the ages of 3 years, 7 months and 5 years, 11 months participated. All children were initially given structured interviews to assess their knowledge of (1) human body function and (2) death. From this sample 40 children in the Training group were taught about the human body and how it functions to maintain life. The Control group (n = 20) received no training. All 60 children were subsequently reassessed on their knowledge of human body function and death. Results from the initial interviews indicated that young children who spontaneously appealed to vitalistic concepts in reasoning about human body functioning were also more sophisticated in their understanding of death. Results from the posttraining interviews showed that children readily learned to adopt a vitalistic approach to human body functioning, and that this learning coincided with significant development in their understanding of human body function, and of death. The overall pattern of results supports the claim that the acquisition of a vitalistic causal-explanatory framework serves to structure children's concepts and facilitates learning in the domain of biology. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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Can a work setting with its organizational, cultural, and practical considerations influence the way occupational therapists make decisions regarding client interventions? There is currently a paucity of evidence available to answer this question. This study aimed to investigate the influence of work setting on therapists’ clinical reasoning in the management of clients with cerebral palsy and upper limb hypertonicity. Specifically the study aimed to examine therapists’ objective and stated policies, and their intervention decisions using Social Judgement Theory methodology. Participants were eighteen occupational therapists with more than five years experience with clients with cerebral palsy who were asked to make intervention decisions for clients represented by 90 case vignettes. They worked in three settings, hospitals (5), schools (6), and community (6). The results indicated that therapy settings did influence therapists’ decisions about intervention choices but not their objective and subjective policy decisions.
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In Late summer 1999, an outbreak of human encephalitis occurred in the northeastern United States that was concurrent with extensive mortality in crows (Corvus species) as well as the deaths of several exotic birds at a zoological park in the same area. Complete genome sequencing of a flavivirus isolated from the brain of a dead Chilean flamingo (Phoenicopterus chilensis), together with partial sequence analysis of envelope glycoprotein (E-glycoprotein) genes amplified from several other species including mosquitoes and two fatal human cases, revealed that West Nile (WN) virus circulated in natural transmission cycles and was responsible for the human disease. Antigenic mapping with E-glycoprotein-specific monoclonal antibodies and E-glycoprotein phylogenetic analysis confirmed these viruses as WN. This North American WN virus was most closely related to a WN virus isolated from a dead goose in Israel in 1998.
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Intelligent design theorist William Dembski has proposed an explanatory filter for distinguishing between events due to chance, lawful regularity or design. We show that if Dembski's filter were adopted as a scientific heuristic, some classical developments in science would not be rational, and that Dembski's assertion that the filter reliably identifies rarefied design requires ignoring the state of background knowledge. If background information changes even slightly, the filter's conclusion will vary wildly. Dembski fails to overcome Hume's objections to arguments from design.