Emotion and attribution of intentionality in leader–member relationships

In this article, we present a model of emotions and attributions of intentionality within the leader–member relationship. The model is predicated on two central ideas. The first is that leadership is intrinsically an emotional process, where leaders display emotion and attempt to evoke emotion in their members. The second is that leadership is a process of social interaction and is therefore appropriately defined in terms of social, psychological theories such as the attribution theory. Our focus is on the perspective of members, not the leaders. Specifically, members' attributions about their leader's intentions influence how the members evaluate, interpret, and eventually label the leader's influence attempts as either “true” or “pseudo” transformational leadership. These attributions are determined by and themselves influence the members' emotions. We describe each of the elements of the model and conclude with a discussion of the implications of the model for theory, research, and practice.

Emotion and attribution of intentionality in leader-member relationships

In this article, we present a model of emotions and attributions of intentionality within the leader-member relationship. The model is predicated on two central ideas. The first is that leadership is intrinsically an emotional process, where leaders display emotion and attempt to evoke emotion in their members. The second is that leadership is a process of social interaction and is therefore appropriately defined in terms of social, psychological theories such as the attribution theory. Our focus is on the perspective of members, not the leaders. Specifically, members' attributions about their leader's intentions influence how the members evaluate, interpret, and eventually label the leader's influence attempts as either true or pseudo transformational leadership. These attributions are determined by and themselves influence the members' emotions. We describe each of the elements of the model and conclude with a discussion of the implications of the model for theory, research, and practice. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.

Response to Orr and Siegler - collective intentionality and procreative desires: the permissible view on consent to posthumous conception

Orr and Siegler have recently defended a restrictive view concerning posthumous sperm retrieval and conception, which would limit insemination to those cases where the deceased man has provided explicit consent for such a procedure. The restrictive view dominates current law and practice. A permissible view, in contrast, would allow insemination and conception in all but those cases where the posthumous procedure has been explicitly refused, or where there is no reasonable evidence that the deceased person desired children. I describe a phenomenology of procreative desires which supports the permissible view, and which is compatible with requirements concerning the interests of the decedent, concepts of medical infertility, and the welfare of the future child. The account illustrates how our current obsession with individual rights and autonomy can be self-defeating and repressive.

BIO Logical Agents: Norms, Beliefs, Intentions in Defeasible Logic

In this paper we follow the BOID (Belief, Obligation, Intention, Desire) architecture to describe agents and agent types in Defeasible Logic. We argue, in particular, that the introduction of obligations can provide a new reading of the concepts of intention and intentionality. Then we examine the notion of social agent (i.e., an agent where obligations prevail over intentions) and discuss some computational and philosophical issues related to it. We show that the notion of social agent either requires more complex computations or has some philosophical drawbacks.