Economic Incentives to Conserve Wildlife on Private Lands: Analysis and Policy

Some believe that provision of private property rights in wildlife on private land provides a powerful economic incentive for nature conservation because it enables property owners to market such wildlife or its attributes. If such marketing is profitable, private landholders will conserve the wildlife concerned and its required habitat. But land is not always most profitably used for exploitation of wildlife, and many economic values of wildlife (such as non-use economic values) cannot be marketed. The mobility of some wildlife adds to the limitations of the private-property approach. While some species may be conserved by this approach, it is suboptimal as a single policy approach to nature conservation. Nevertheless, it is being experimented with, in the Northern Territory of Australia where landholders had a possibility of harvesting on their properties a quota of eggs and chicks of red-tailed black cockatoos for commercial sale. This scheme was expected to provide an incentive to private landholders to retain hollow trees essential for the nesting of these birds but failed. This case and others are analysed. Despite private-property failures, the long-term survival of some wildlife species depends on their ability to use private lands without severe harassment, either for their migration or to supplement their available resources, for example, the Asian elephant. Nature conservation on private land is often a useful, if not essential, supplement to conservation on public lands. Community and public incentives for such conservation are outlined.

Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries

The failures of traditional target-species management have led many to propose an ecosystem approach to fisheries to promote sustainability. The ecosystem approach is necessary, especially to account for fishery-ecosystem interactions, but by itself is not sufficient to address two important factors contributing to unsustainable fisheries: inappropriate incentives bearing on fishers and the ineffective governance that frequently exists in commercial, developed fisheries managed primarily by total-harvest limits and input controls. We contend that much greater emphasis must be placed on fisher motivation when managing fisheries. Using evidence from more than a dozen natural experiments in commercial fisheries, we argue that incentive-based approaches that better specify community and individual harvest or territorial rights and price ecosystem services and that are coupled with public research, monitoring, and effective oversight promote sustainable fisheries.

A complex systems approach to the value of ecological resources

A theory of value sits at the core of every school of economic thought and directs the allocation of resources to competing uses. Ecological resources complicate the modem neoclassical approach to determining value due to their complex nature, considerable non-market values and the difficulty in assigning property rights. Application of the market model through economic valuation only provides analytical solutions based on virtual markets, and neither the demand nor supply-side techniques of valuation can adequately consider the complex set of biophysical and ecological relations that lead to the provision of ecosystem goods and services. This paper sets out a conceptual framework for a complex systems approach to the value of ecological resources. This approach is based on there being both an intrinsic quality of ecological resources and a subjective evaluation by the consumer. Both elements are necessary for economic value. This conceptual framework points the way towards a theory of value that incorporates both elements, so has implications for principles by which ecological resources can be allocated. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Community broadcasting and the enclosure of the public sphere

One of the normative tenets of the Habermasian public sphere is that it should be an open and universally accessible forum. In Australia, one way of achieving this is the provision for community broadcasting in the Broadcasting Services Act. A closer examination of community broadcasting, however, suggests practices that contradict the idea of an open and accessible public sphere. Community broadcasting organizations regulate access to their media assets through a combination of formal and informal structures. This suggests that the public sphere can be understood as a resource, and that community broadcasting organizations can be analysed as ‘commons regimes’. This approach reveals a fundamental paradox inherent in the public sphere: access, participation and the quality of discourse in the public sphere are connected to its enclosure, which limits membership and participation through a system of rules and norms that govern the conduct of a group. By accepting the view that a public sphere is governed by property rights, it follows that an open and universally accessible public sphere is neither possible nor desirable.