Introduction: Casting new light on old stones

The purpose of this monograph is to take a new look at various aspects of stone artefact analysis that reveal important and exciting new information about the past. This invovles reorienting our methodological approach to stone artefacts as well as the questions asked of them. The papers making up this volume tackle a number of issues that have long been at the heart of archaeology’s problematic relationship with stone artefacts, including our understanding of the dynamic nature of past stoneworking practices, the utility of traditional classificatory schemes, and ways to unlock the vast amount of information about the strategic role of lithic technology that resides in stone artefact assemblages.

A Comparison of Bayesian and Sampling Theory Inferences in a Probit Model

HE PROBIT MODEL IS A POPULAR DEVICE for explaining binary choice decisions in econometrics. It has been used to describe choices such as labor force participation, travel mode, home ownership, and type of education. These and many more examples can be found in papers by Amemiya (1981) and Maddala (1983). Given the contribution of economics towards explaining such choices, and given the nature of data that are collected, prior information on the relationship between a choice probability and several explanatory variables frequently exists. Bayesian inference is a convenient vehicle for including such prior information. Given the increasing popularity of Bayesian inference it is useful to ask whether inferences from a probit model are sensitive to a choice between Bayesian and sampling theory techniques. Of interest is the sensitivity of inference on coefficients, probabilities, and elasticities. We consider these issues in a model designed to explain choice between fixed and variable interest rate mortgages. Two Bayesian priors are employed: a uniform prior on the coefficients, designed to be noninformative for the coefficients, and an inequality restricted prior on the signs of the coefficients. We often know, a priori, whether increasing the value of a particular explanatory variable will have a positive or negative effect on a choice probability. This knowledge can be captured by using a prior probability density function (pdf) that is truncated to be positive or negative. Thus, three sets of results are compared:those from maximum likelihood (ML) estimation, those from Bayesian estimation with an unrestricted uniform prior on the coefficients, and those from Bayesian estimation with a uniform prior truncated to accommodate inequality restrictions on the coefficients.