Mental playmates: Siblings, executive functioning and theory of mind

This study assessed the theory of mind (ToM) and executive functioning (EF) abilities of 124 typically developing preschool children aged 3 to 5 years in relation to whether or not they had a child-aged sibling (i.e. a child aged 1 to 12 years) at home with whom to play and converse. On a ToM battery that included tests of false belief, appearance-reality (AR) and pretend representation, children who had at least 1 child-aged sibling scored significantly higher than both only children and those whose only siblings were infants or adults. The numbers of child-aged siblings in preschoolers' families positively predicted their scores on both a ToM battery (4 tasks) and an EF battery (2 tasks), and these associations remained significant with language ability partialled out. Results of a hierarchical multiple regression analysis revealed that independent contributions to individual differences in ToM were made by language ability, EF skill and having a child-aged sibling. However, even though some conditions for mediation were met, there was no statistically reliable evidence that EF skills mediated the advantage of presence of child-aged siblings for ToM performance. While consistent with the theory that distinctively childish interaction among siblings accelerates the growth of both TOM and EF capacities, alternative evidence and alternative theoretical interpretations for the findings were also considered.

Linguistic determinism and theory of mind in deaf children

DeVilliers and DeVilliers (2000, 2005) propose that deaf and hearing children acquire a theory of mind (or the understanding that human behaviour is the product of psychological states like true and false beliefs) as a consequence of their linguistic mastery of a rule of syntax. Specifically, they argue that the syntactic rule for sentential complementation with verbs of speech (e.g., “say”) precedes syntactic mastery of complementation for cognition (e.g., “think”) and both of these developmentally precede and promote conceptual mastery of a theory of mind (ToM), as indexed via success on standard false belief tests. The present study examined this proposition in groups of primary-school-aged deaf children and hearing preschoolers who took false belief tests and a modified memory for complements test that included control questions. Guttman scaling techniques indicated no support either for the prediction that syntactic skill precedes ToM understanding or for the earlier emergence of complementation for “say” than for “think”. Methodological issues and implications for deaf children's ToM development are discussed.

Children's understanding of pictorial and mental representations

Two studies demonstrate dissociation between children's understanding of pictorial representations (photos and drawings) and mental representations (beliefs). In Study 1, 37 preschoolers were tested on false belief, appearance-reality, false photo, and false drawing tasks. The false picture tasks were significantly easier, and no correlation was found between children's performances on false belief and false picture tasks. Ln Study 2, 30 children who failed a false belief pretest were randomly assigned to 3 training groups: Belief (trained on false belief tasks), Picture (trained on false picture tasks), or Control (trained on number conservation tasks). Training was conducted in 2 sessions over the course of 2 weeks, tasks were presented and feedback was provided. All children were posttested on theory of mind tasks, false picture tasks, and a number conservation task. The posttest results showed differential patterns of performance, with the Belief group scoring highest on the theory of mind posttests, the Picture group scoring highest on the false picture posttests, and the Control group scoring highest on the number conservation posttest. Results are discussed with respect to competing models of theory of mind development.

Seeing is not (necessarily) believing

We doubt that theory of mind can be sufficiently demonstrated without reliance on verbal tests. Where language is the major tool of social manipulation, an effective theory of mind must use language as an input. We suspect, therefore, that in this context, prelinguistic human and nonhuman minds are more alike than are human pre- and postlinguistic minds.

The dimerization and topological specificity functions of MinE reside in a structurally autonomous C-terminal domain

Correct placement of the division septum in Escherichia coli requires the co-ordinated action of three proteins, MinC, MinD and MinE. MinC and MinD interact to form a non-specific division inhibitor that blocks septation at all potential division sites. MinE is able to antagonize MinCD in a topologically sensitive manner, as it restricts MinCD activity to the unwanted division sites at the cell poles, Here, we show that the topological specificity function of MinE residues in a structurally autonomous, trypsin-resistant domain comprising residues 31-88, Nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) and circular dichroic spectroscopy indicate that this domain includes both alpha and beta secondary structure, while analytical ultracentrifugation reveals that it also contains a region responsible for MinE homodimerization. While trypsin digestion indicates that the anti-MinCD domain of MinE (residues 1-22) does not form a tightly folded structural domain, NMR analysis of a peptide corresponding to MinE(1-22) indicates that this region forms a nascent helix in which the peptide rapidly interconverts between disordered (random coil) and alpha-helical conformations, This suggests that the N-terminal region of MinE may be poised to adopt an alpha-helical conformation when it interacts with the target of its anti-MinCD activity, presumably MinD.

Contemporary strategies for rural community development in Australia: a governmentality perspective

Contemporary strategies for rural development in Australia are based upon notions of self-help and bottom-up, community-based initiatives which are said to 'empower' the individual from the imposing structures of government intervention. While such strategies are not entirely new to Australia, they have, it seems, been inadequately theorised to date and are generally regarded, in rather functionalist terms, as indicative of attempts to cut back on public expenditure. Harnessing itself to the 'governmentality' perspective, this paper explores government and 'expert' discourses of rural community development in Queensland and suggests, instead, that these strategies are indicative of an advanced liberal form of rule which seeks to 'govern through community'. With this in mind, three basic research questions are identified as worthy of further exploration; how are the notions of self-governing individuals and communities constructed in political discourse; what political rationalities are used to justify current levels of(non) intervention and finally; what are the discourses, forms and outcomes of empowerment at the local level? The paper concludes by arguing that while the empowering effects of self-help are frequently cited as its greatest virtue, it is not so much control as the added burden of responsibility that is being devolved to local people. Given the emphasis of the governmentality perspective on strategies for 'governing at a distance', however, these conclusions can hardly be unexpected. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd, All rights reserved.

An investigation of pretend play, mental state terms and false belief understanding: In search of a metarepresentational link

The aim of this study was to investigate the association between false belief comprehension, the exhibition of pretend play and the use of mental state terms in pre-school children. Ferry children, aged between 36 and 54 months were videotaped engaging in free play with each parent. The exhibit-ion of six distinct acts of pretend play and the expression of 16 mental sr:ate terms were coded during play. Each child was also administered a pantomime task and three standard false belief casks. Reliable associations were also found between false belief performance and the pretence categories of object substitution and role assignment, and the exhibition of imaginary object pantomimes. Moreover, the use of mental state terms was positively correlated with false belief and the pretence categories of object substitution, imaginary play and role assignment, and negatively correlated with the exhibition of body part object pantomimes. These findings indicate that the development of a mental state lexicon and some, bur not all, components of pretend play are dependent on the capacity for metarepresentational cognition.