Children and economic development: Family size, gender preferences and human capital formation - theory and Indian cases

In the light of Gary Becker's economic theory of the family, considers how economic cost and benefit factors can influence the size of families that parents decide to have. Some support for the importance of such factors is found from results of structured interviews with wives in Kondh-dominated villages in western Orissa. These results are at variance with the hypothesis of Malthus about population growth. Factors that may alter the optimal family size as development proceeds are discussed. It is found in our sampling that, on the whole, there is a preference for daughters rather than sons although this is not as strong in the Kondh-dominated villages as in poor villages in the Santal tribal belt of West Bengal. While in the Kondh-dominated villages some discrimination in access to education in favour of boys compared to girls is present, little such or no such discrimination occurs in relation to access to food and medical attention. In the villages surveyed in the West Bengal Santal tribal belt, discrimination in favour of boys is more pronounced than in the Kondh-dominated area in Orissa. While economic considerations help to explain gender discrimination between boys and girls, we find that social and cultural factors also play a major role. Parents in a similar economic situation seem to display substantially different patterns of gender discrimination between children depending on their social and cultural content. It seems that the extent to which economic theories of the family explain family preferences and behaviour depend significantly on the social and cultural context in which they are to be applied.

Infiltration effects on sediment mobility under waves

Sediment mobility measurements with a horizontal sand bed under non-breaking waves are reported. Conditions include no seepage and steady downward seepage corresponding to head gradients up to 2.5. The results indicate that infiltration tends to inhibit sediment mobility for a horizontal bcd of 0.2 mm quartz sand exposed to moderated wave induced bed shear stresses. The effect is weak for the parameter range of the present study. The two opposing effects of shear stress increase due to boundary layer thinning and the stabilizing downward drag are successfully accounted for through the modified Shields parameter of Nielsen [Nielsen, P., 1997. Coastal groundwater dynamics. Proc. Coastal Dynamics '97, Plymouth, ASCE, Dp, 546-555] using coefficients derived from independent studies. That is, from the shear stress experiments of Conley [Conley, D.C., 1993. Ventilated oscillatory boundary layers. PhD Thesis, University of California, San Diego, 74 pp.] and the slope stability experiments of Martin and Aral [Martin, C.S. and M.M. Aral, 1971. Seepage force on interfacial bed particles. J. Hydraulics Div., proc. ASCE, Vol. 97, No. Hy7, pp. 1081-1100]. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

On the relation between ownership structure and capital structure

The agency relationship between managers and shareholders has the potential to influence decision-making in the firm which in turn potentially impacts on firm characteristics such as value and leverage. Prior evidence has demonstrated an association between ownership structure and firm value. This paper extends the literature by examining a further link between ownership structure and capital structure. Using an agency framework, it is argued that the distribution of equity ownership among corporate managers and external blockholders may have a significant relation with leverage. The empirical results provide support for a positive relation between external blockholders and leverage, and non-linear relation between the level of managerial share ownership and leverage. The results also suggest that the relation between external block ownership and leverage varies across the level of managerial share ownership. These results are consistent with active monitoring by blockholders, and the effects of convergence-of-interests and management entrenchment.