What is the Point of Copyright History?:Reflections on Copyright at Common law in 1774 by H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui

Copyright history has long been a subject of intense and contested enquiry. Historical narratives about the early development of copyright were first prominently mobilised in eighteenth century British legal discourse, during the so-called Battle of the Booksellers between Scottish and London publishers. The two landmark copyright decisions of that time – Millar v. Taylor (1769) and Donaldson v. Becket (1774) – continue to provoke debate today. The orthodox reading of Millar and Donaldson presents copyright as a natural proprietary right at common law inherent in authors. Revisionist accounts dispute that traditional analysis. These conflicting perspectives have, once again, become the subject of critical scrutiny with the publication of Copyright at Common Law in 1774 by Prof Tomas Gomez-Arostegui in 2014, in the Connecticut Law Review ((2014) 47 Conn. L. Rev. 1) and as a CREATe Working Paper (No. 2014/16, 3 November 2014).

Taking Prof Gomez-Arostegui’s extraordinary work in this area as a point of departure, Dr Elena Cooper and Professor Ronan Deazley (then both academics at CREATe) organised an event, held at the University of Glasgow on 26th and 27th March 2015, to consider the interplay between copyright history and contemporary copyright policy. Is Donaldson still relevant, and, if so, why? What justificatory goals are served by historical investigation, and what might be learned from the history of the history of copyright? Does the study of copyright history still have any currency within an evidence-based policy context that is increasingly preoccupied with economic impact analysis?

This paper provides a lasting record of these discussions, including an editorial introduction, written comments by each of the panelists and Prof. Gomez-Arostegui and an edited transcript of the Symposium debate.

What is the Point of Copyright History?

Copyright history has long been a subject of intense and contested enquiry, and has once again become the subject of critical scrutiny with the publication of "Copyright at Common Law in 1774" by Prof Tomas Gomez-Arostegui in the Connecticut Law Review ((2014) 47 Conn. L. Rev. 1).
This online resource documents two events organised to explore the impact of "Copyright at Common Law in 1774". It incorporates a public lecture by Prof Gomez-Arostegui, and the full record of a one-day symposium of international experts debating the implications of Gomez-Arostegui's scholarship in this domain.

Episodic Future Thinking in 4-Year-Olds, Poster Symposium: The who, what, where and when of episodic foresight development

The ability to project oneself into the future to pre-experience an event is referred to as episodic future thinking (Atance & O’Neill, 2001). Only a relatively small number of studies have attempted to measure this ability in pre-school aged children (Atance & Meltzoff, 2005; Busby & Suddendorf, 2005ab, 2010; Russell, Alexis, & Clayton, 2010).Perhaps the most successful method is that used by Russell et al (2010). In this task, 3- to 5-year-olds played a game of blow football on one end of a table. After this children were asked to select tools that would enable them to play the same game tomorrow from the opposite, unreachable, side of the table. Results indicated that only 5-year-olds were capable of selecting the right objects for future use more often than would be expected by chance. Above-chance performance was observed in this older group even though most children failed the task because there was a low probability of selecting the correct 2 objects from a choice of 6 by chance.This study aimed to identify the age at which children begin to consistently pass this type of task. Three different tasks were designed in which children played a game on one side of a table, and then were asked to choose a tool to play a similar game on the other side of the table the next day. For example, children used a toy fishing rod to catch magnetic fish on one side of the table; playing the same game from the other side of the table required a different type of fishing rod. At test, children chose between just 2 objects: the tool they had already used, which would not work on the other side, and a different tool that they had not used before but which was suitable for the other side of the table. Experiment 1: Forty-eight 4-year-olds (M = 53.6 months, SD = 2.9) took part. These children were assigned to one of two conditions: a control condition (present-self) where the key test questions were asked in the present tense and an experimental condition (future-self) where the questions were in the future tense. Surprisingly, the results showed that both groups of 4-year-olds selected the correct tool at above chance levels (Table 1 shows the mean number of correct answers out of three). However, the children could see the apparatus when they answered the test questions and so perhaps answered them correctly without imagining the future. Experiment 2: Twenty-four 4-year-olds (M = 53.7, SD = 3.1) participated. Pre-schoolers in this study experienced one condition: future-self looking-away. In this condition children were asked to turn their backs to the games when answering the test questions, which were in the future tense. Children again performed above chance levels on all three games.Contrary to the findings of Russell et al. (2010), our results suggest that episodic future thinking skills could be present in 4-year-olds, assuming that this is what is measured by the tasks. Table 1. Mean number of correct answers across the three games in Experiments 1 and 2Experimental Conditions (N=24 in each condition)Mean CorrectStandardDeviationStatistical SignificanceExp. 1 (present-self, look) – 2 items2.750.68p < 0.001Exp. 1 (future-self, look) – 2 items 2.790.42p < 0.001Exp. 2 (future-self, away) – 2 items 2.330.64p < 0.001Exp. 3 (future-self away) – 3 items1.210.98p = 0.157

Functional management of ankle sprains: what volume and intensity of walking is undertaken in the first week

BACKGROUND:
Acute ankle sprains are usually managed functionally, with advice to undertake progressive weight-bearing and walking. Mechanical loading is an important modular of tissue repair; therefore, the clinical effectiveness of walking after ankle sprain may be dose dependent. The intensity, magnitude and duration of load associated with current functional treatments for ankle sprain are unclear.
AIM:
To describe physical activity (PA) in the first week after ankle sprain and to compare results with a healthy control group.
METHODS:
Participants (16-65 years) with an acute ankle sprain were randomised into two groups (standard or exercise). Both groups were advised to apply ice and compression, and walk within the limits of pain. The exercise group undertook additional therapeutic exercises. PA was measured using an activPAL accelerometer, worn for 7 days after injury. Comparisons were made with a non-injured control group.
RESULTS:
The standard group were significantly less active (1.2 ± 0.4 h activity/day; 5621 ± 2294 steps/day) than the exercise (1.7 ± 0 .7 h/day, p=0.04; 7886 ± 3075 steps/day, p=0.03) and non-injured control groups (1.7 ± 0.4 h/day, p=0.02; 8844 ± 2185 steps/day, p=0.002). Also, compared with the non-injured control group, the standard and exercise groups spent less time in moderate (38.3 ± 12.7 min/day vs 14.5 ± 11.4 min/day, p=0.001 and 22.5 ± 15.9 min/day, p=0.003) and high-intensity activity (4.1 ± 6.9 min/day vs 0.1 ± 0.1 min/day, p=0.001 and 0.62 ± 1.0 min/day p=0.005).
CONCLUSION:
PA patterns are reduced in the first week after ankle sprain, which is partly ameliorated with addition of therapeutic exercises. This study represents the first step towards developing evidence-based walking prescription after acute ankle sprain.

In my ‘Mind’s Eye’: introspectionism, detectivism, and the basis of authoritative self-knowledge

It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I argue that there is a fundamental class of cases of authoritative self-knowledge, ones in which subjects are consciously thinking about their current, conscious intentional states, that is best accounted for in terms of a theory that is,
broadly speaking, introspectionist and detectivist. The position developed has an intuitive plausibility that has inspired many who work in the Cartesian tradition, and the potential to yield a single treatment of the basis of authoritative self-knowledge for both intentional states and sensation states.

In My 'Mind's Eye': Introspectionism, Detectivism, and the Basis of Authoritative Self-Knowledge

It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I argue that there is a fundamental class of cases of authoritative self-knowledge, ones in which subjects are consciously thinking about their current, conscious intentional states, that is best accounted for in terms of a theory that is, broadly speaking, introspectionist and detectivist. The position developed has an intuitive plausibility that has inspired many who work in the Cartesian tradition, and the potential to yield a single treatment of the basis of authoritative self-knowledge for both intentional states and sensation states.

Turing's menagerie:Talking lions, virtual bats, electric sheep and analogical peacocks: Common ground and common interest are necessary components of engagement

This theoretical paper attempts to define some of the key components and challenges required to create embodied conversational agents that can be genuinely interesting conversational partners. Wittgenstein's argument concerning talking lions emphasizes the importance of having a shared common ground as a basis for conversational interactions. Virtual bats suggests that-for some people at least-it is important that there be a feeling of authenticity concerning a subjectively experiencing entity that can convey what it is like to be that entity. Electric sheep reminds us of the importance of empathy in human conversational interaction and that we should provide a full communicative repertoire of both verbal and non-verbal components if we are to create genuinely engaging interactions. Also we may be making the task more difficult rather than easy if we leave out non-verbal aspects of communication. Finally, analogical peacocks highlights the importance of between minds alignment and establishes a longer term goal of being interesting, creative, and humorous if an embodied conversational agent is to be truly an engaging conversational partner. Some potential directions and solutions to addressing these issues are suggested.

How much is '5-a-day'? A qualitative investigation into consumer understanding of fruit and vegetable intake guidelines

BACKGROUND: Despite the known health benefits of fruit and vegetables (FV), population intakes remain low. One potential contributing factor may be a lack of understanding surrounding recommended intakes. The present study aimed to explore the understanding of FV intake guidelines among a sample of low FV consumers.

METHODS: Six semi-structured focus groups were held with low FV consumers (n = 28, age range 19-55 years). Focus groups were recorded digitally, transcribed verbatim and analysed thematically using nvivo (QSR International, Melbourne, Australia) to manage the coded data. Participants also completed a short questionnaire assessing knowledge on FV intake guidelines. Descriptive statistics were used to analyse responses.

RESULTS: The discussions highlighted that, although participants were aware of FV intake guidelines, they lacked clarity with regard to the meaning of the '5-a-day' message, including what foods are included in the guideline, as well as what constitutes a portion of FV. There was also a sense of confusion surrounding the concept of achieving variety with regard to FV intake. The sample highlighted a lack of previous education on FV portion sizes and put forward suggestions for improving knowledge, including increased information on food packaging and through health campaigns. Questionnaire findings were generally congruent with the qualitative findings, showing high awareness of the '5-a-day' message but a lack of knowledge surrounding FV portion sizes.

CONCLUSIONS: Future public health campaigns should consider how best to address the gaps in knowledge identified in the present study, and incorporate evaluations that will allow the impact of future initiatives on knowledge, and ultimately behaviour, to be investigated.