Trends in the use of psychotropic medications among adolescents, 1994 to 2001

Objectives: Few psychotropic medications are approved for use among children younger than 18 years. Yet previous studies have shown an increase in the use of psychotropic medications among school-age children and adolescents. Most previous studies examined data only up to 1997; therefore, the results predate any impact of changing federal policies and newly marketed medications. This study examined trends in the prescription of psychotropic medications to adolescents aged 14 to 18 years in office-based care in the United States from 1994 to 2001. Methods: Data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) were used to determine visit rates and prescribing patterns from 1994 to 2001 for psychotropics that were prescribed in office-based treatment settings to adolescents aged 14 to 18 years. Rates of visits that resulted in a prescription for psychotropic medication were calculated for two-year periods. Analyses were conducted by type of medication, gender, and the prescribing physician's specialty. Results: Rates of visits that resulted in a psychotropic prescription increased from 3.4 percent in 1994-1995 to 8.3 percent in 2000-2001. These trends were evident for males and females. The average annual growth rates for psychotropic prescriptions were much higher after 1999. Trends were also significant across drug classes. By 2001, one out of ten office visits by adolescent males resulted in a prescription for a psychotropic medication. Conclusions: Average annual growth rates for the prescription of psychotropics to adolescents increased from 1994 to 2001, with especially rapid acceleration after 1999. This increase may be associated with changing thresholds of diagnosis and treatment, availability of new medications, and changes in federal regulatory policies concerning promotion of medications by the pharmaceutical industry.

Evolution of Organisational Structure and Capabilities in Internationalising Banks: The CEE Operations of UniCredit's Vienna Office

Cross-border integration is the central management issue for banks that expand internationally, and this is especially true in Central and Eastern Europe, where the pace of internationalisation through mergers and acquisitions has been rapid. A critical challenge in cross-border integration is aligning a multinational company's formal organizational structure with the distribution of capabilities across its subsidiary units, and this issue is explored by tracking the co-evolution of organizational structure and capabilities during the internationalisation of a large banking network into this region. Our focus is the Vienna head office of Bank Austria Creditanstalt, which was acquired first by HypoVereinsbank (Germany) and then UniCredit (Italy). Despite its formal role being downgraded during these changes, the unit continued to develop its distinctive capabilities. The key insight our article offers is that managing cross-border integration is not simply about recognizing the value of the distinctive capabilities of individual units and designing formal structures that successfully align with them. It is also about understanding the need for dynamic interaction between formal corporate structure and individual units' desires to retain power and influence, which have significant implications for the development of their organizational capabilities.

The role of the National Audit Office in Private Finance Initiative endurance

The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) has become one of the UK’s most contentious public policies. Despite New Labour’s advocacy of PFI as a means of achieving better value for money, criticisms of PFI have centred on key issues such as a lack of cost effectiveness, exaggerated pricing of risk transfers, excessive private sector profits, inflexibility and cumbersome administrative arrangements. Nevertheless, PFI has persisted as a key
infrastructure procurement method in the UK and has been supported as such by successive governments, as well as influencing policy in the Republic of Ireland and other European Nations. This paper explores this paradoxical outcome in relation to the role played in the UK by the National Audit Office (NAO). Under pressure to justify its support for PFI, the Blair government sought support for its policies by encouraging the NAO to investigate issues relating to PFI as well as specific PFI projects. It would have been expected that in fulfilling its role as independent auditor, the NAO would have examined whether PFI projects could have been delivered more efficiently, effectively or economically through other means. Yet, in line with earlier research, we find evidence that the NAO failed to comprehensively assess
key issues such as the value for money of PFI projects, and in so doing effectively acted as a legitimator of PFI policy. Using concepts relating to legitimacy theory and the idea of framing, our paper looks into 67 NAO private finance reports published between 1997 and 2011, with the goal of identifying the preferences, values and ideology underpinning the
NAO’s view on PFI during this period. Our analysis suggests that the NAO sought to legitimise existing PFI practices via a selective framing of problems and questions. Utilising a longitudinal approach, our analysis further suggests that this patterns of selective framing persisted over an extended time period during which fundamental parameters of the policy (such as contract length, to name one of the most important issues) were rarely addressed.
Overall the NAO’ supportive stance toward PFI seems to have relied on 1) a focused on positive aspects of PFI, such as on time delivery or lessons learned, and 2) positive comments on aspects of PFI that were criticised elsewhere, such as the lack of flexibility of underlying contractual arrangements. Our paper highlights the possibility that, rather than providing for a critical assessment of existing policies, national auditing bodies can
contribute to the creation of legitimatory environments. In terms of accounting research we would suggests that the objectivity and independence of accounting watchdogs should not be taken for granted, and that instead a critical investigation of the biases which can characterise these bodies can contribute to a deeper understanding of the nature of lobbying networks in the modern state.