In my ‘Mind’s Eye’: introspectionism, detectivism, and the basis of authoritative self-knowledge

It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I argue that there is a fundamental class of cases of authoritative self-knowledge, ones in which subjects are consciously thinking about their current, conscious intentional states, that is best accounted for in terms of a theory that is,
broadly speaking, introspectionist and detectivist. The position developed has an intuitive plausibility that has inspired many who work in the Cartesian tradition, and the potential to yield a single treatment of the basis of authoritative self-knowledge for both intentional states and sensation states.

In My 'Mind's Eye': Introspectionism, Detectivism, and the Basis of Authoritative Self-Knowledge

It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I argue that there is a fundamental class of cases of authoritative self-knowledge, ones in which subjects are consciously thinking about their current, conscious intentional states, that is best accounted for in terms of a theory that is, broadly speaking, introspectionist and detectivist. The position developed has an intuitive plausibility that has inspired many who work in the Cartesian tradition, and the potential to yield a single treatment of the basis of authoritative self-knowledge for both intentional states and sensation states.

The genetic basis of psychological traits in infancy: Implications for understanding the causes of developmental psychopathology

This chapter reviews genetic studies that have aimed to identify genes influencing psychological traits in infancy (from birth to age 12 months), and considers how this research informs us about the causes of developmental psychopathology. Specifically, this chapter systematically reviews findings from studies that associated common genetic variants with individual variation in infants’ attention, temperament and behaviour, and attachment disorganisation. DRD4 and 5-HTTLPR genes were the most frequently studied candidate genes. Possibly the most coherent set of results relates to the L-DRD4 genotype, which is significantly associated with infant attention, temperament, and attachment style. Research in infant genetics has been strengthened by a careful focus on uniform age ranges within studies, by several longitudinal studies, and by exploration of gene-environment interactions between genes and maternal characteristics. However there is also considerable inconsistency in results in this field and possible reasons for this are discussed. The chapter outlines the main genetic methods that have been used and what new genetic approaches such as polygenic risk scoring could offer infant genetics. Recent findings suggest that some traits during infancy predict individual differences in developmental psychopathology in childhood. It is argued that infant genetic research has considerable potential for the identification of populations at risk for psychopathology in later life, and this remains an area open for future research.