The Analogical Peacock Hypothesis: The Sexual Selection of Mind-Reading and Relational Cognition in Human Communication

This integrative review presents a novel hypothesis as a basis for integrating two evolutionary viewpoints on the origins of human cognition and communication, the sexual selection of human mental capacities, and the social brain hypothesis. This new account suggests that mind-reading social skills increased reproductive success and consequently became targets for sexual selection. The hypothesis proposes that human communication has three purposes: displaying mind-reading abilities, aligning and maintaining representational parity between individuals to enable displays, and the exchange of propositional information. Intelligence, creativity, language, and humor are mental fitness indicators that signal an individual’s quality to potential mates, rivals, and allies. Five features central to the proposed display mechanism unify these indicators, the relational combination of concepts, large conceptual knowledge networks, processing speed, contextualization, and receiver knowledge. Sufficient between-mind alignment of conceptual networks allows displays based upon within-mind conceptual mappings. Creative displays communicate previously unnoticed relational connections and novel conceptual combinations demonstrating an ability to read a receiver’s mind. Displays are costly signals of mate quality with costs incurred in the developmental production of the neural apparatus required to engage in complex displays and opportunity costs incurred through time spent acquiring cultural knowledge. Displays that are fast, novel, spontaneous, contextual, topical, and relevant are hard-to-fake for lower quality individuals. Successful displays result in elevated social status and increased mating options. The review addresses literatures on costly signaling, sexual selection, mental fitness indicators, and the social brain hypothesis; drawing implications for nonverbal and verbal communication.

Neurobiological model of visuo-spatial cognition in young Williams Syndrome children: measures of dorsal-stream and frontal function

We examine hypotheses for the neural basis of the profile of visual cognition in young children with Williams syndrome (WS). These are: (a) that it is a consequence of anomalies in sensory visual processing; (b) that it is a deficit of the dorsal relative to the ventral cortical stream; (c) that it reflects deficit of frontal function, in particular of fronto-parietal interaction; (d) that it is related to impaired function in the right hemisphere relative to the left. The tests reported here are particularly relevant to (b) and (c). They form part of a more extensive programme of investigating visual, visuospatial, and cognitive function in large group of children with WS children, aged 8 months to 15 years. To compare performance across tests, avoiding floor and ceiling effects, we have measured performance in children with WS in terms of the ‘age equivalence’ for typically developing children. In this paper the relation between dorsal and ventral function was tested by motion and form coherence thresholds respectively. We confirm the presence of a subgroup of children with WS who perform particularly poorly on the motion (dorsal) task. However, such performance is also characteristic of normally developingchildren up to 5 years: thus the WS performance may reflect an overall persisting immaturity of visuospatial processing which is particularly evident in the dorsal stream. Looking at the performance on the global coherence tasks of the entire WS group, we find that there is also a subgroup who have both high form and motion coherence thresholds, relative to the performance of children of the same chronological age and verbal age on the BPVS, suggesting a more general global processing deficit. Frontal function was tested by a counterpointing task, ability to retrieve a ball from a ‘detour box’, and the Stroop-like ‘day-night’ task, all of which require inhibition of a familiar response. When considered in relation to overall development as indexed by vocabulary, the day-night task shows little specific impairment, the detour box shows a significant delay relative to controls, and the counterpointing task shows a marked and persistent deficit in many children. We conclude that frontal control processes show most impairment in WS when they are associated with spatially directed responses, reflecting a deficit of fronto-parietal processing. However, children with WS may successfully reduce the effect of this impairment by verbally mediated strategies. On all these tasks we find a range of difficulties across individual children and a small subset of WS who show very good performance, equivalent to chronological age norms of typically developing children. Neurobiological models of visuo-spatial cognition in children with WS p.4 Overall, we conclude that children with WS have specific processing difficulties with tasks involving frontoparietal circuits within the spatial domain. However, some children with WS can achieve similar performance to typically developing children on some tasks involving the dorsal stream, although the strategies and processing may be different in the two groups.

Imitation and 'theory of mind' competencies in discrimination of autism from other neurodevelopmental disorders

Several studies have reported imitative deficits in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). However, it is still debated if imitative deficits are specific to ASD or shared with clinical groups with similar mental impairment and motor difficulties. We investigated whether imitative tasks can be used to discriminate ASD children from typically developing children (TD) and children with general developmental delay (GDD). We applied discriminant function analyses to the performance of these groups on three imitation tasks and tests of dexterity, motor planning, verbal skills, theory of mind (ToM). Analyses revealed two significant dimensions. The first represented impairment of dexterity and verbal ability, and discriminated TD from GDD children. Once these differences were accounted for, differences in ToM and the three imitation tasks accounted for a significant proportion of the remaining intergroup variance and discriminated the ASD group from other groups. Further analyses revealed that inclusion of imitative tasks increased the specificity and sensitivity of ASD classification and that imitative tasks considered alone were able to reliably discriminate ASD, TD and GDD. The results suggest that imitation and theory of mind impairment in autism may stem from a common domain of origin separate from general cognitive and motor skill.