Multi-Party Negotiation When Agents Have Subjective Estimates of Bargaining Powers

This paper presents a method for generating Pareto-optimal solutions in multi-party negotiations. In this iterative method, decision makers (DMs) formulate proposals that yield a minimum payoff to their opponents. Each proposal belongs to the efficient frontier, DMs try to adjust to a common one. In this setting, each DM is supposed to have a given bargaining power. More precisely each DM is supposed to have a subjective estimate of the power of the different parties. We study the convergence of the method, and provide examples where there is no possible agreement resulting from it.

Bilateral Bargaining in Networks

Each connected pair of nodes in a network can jointly produce one unit of surplus. A maximum number of linked nodes is selected in every period to bargain bilaterally over the division of the surplus, according to the protocol proposed by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (Econometrica 53 (1985), 1133-1150). All pairs, that reach an agreement, obtain the (discounted) payoffs and are removed from the network. This bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that induces the Dulmage-Mendelsohn decomposition (partition) of the bipartite network (of the set of nodes in this network).

A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability

A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current bargaining sets. For the class of monotonic proper simple games, the outcomes in the bargaining set are characterized. Furthermore, it is shown that the bargaining set of any homogeneous weighted majority game contains an outcome for which the underlying coalition structure consists of a minimal winning coalition and its complement.

Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games

In this paper we examine the properties of stable coalitions under sequential and simultaneous bargaining by competing labor unions. We do this using the Nash bargaining solution and various notions of stability, namely, Nash, coalitional, contractual and core stability. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,

Heterogeneity assumptions in the specification of bargaining models: a study of household level trade-offs between commuting time and salary

With many real world decisions being made in conjunction with other decision makers, or single agent decisions having an influence on other members of the decision maker's immediate entourage, there is strong interest in studying the relative weight assigned to different agents in such contexts. In the present paper, we focus on the case of one member of a two person household being asked to make choices affecting the travel time and salary of both members. We highlight the presence of significant heterogeneity across individuals not just in their underlying sensitivities, but also in the relative weight they assign to their partner, and show how this weight varies across attributes. This is in contrast to existing work which uses weights assigned to individual agents at the level of the overall utility rather than for individual attributes. We also show clear evidence of a risk of confounding between heterogeneity in marginal sensitivities and heterogeneity in the weights assigned to each member. We show how this can lead to misleading model results, and argue that this may also explain past results showing bargaining or weight parameters outside the usual [0,1] range in more traditional joint decision making contexts. In terms of substantive results, we find that male respondents place more weight on their partner's travel time, while female respondents place more weight on their partner's salary.

Replacing the ASBO with the injunction to prevent nuisance and annoyance: a plea for legislative scrutiny and amendment

In May 2013, the Coalition Government introduced a Bill which if passed will streamline the tools available to tackle anti-social behaviour. One of their proposals is to replace the controversial anti-social behaviour order (ASBO) with what is termed an Injunction to Prevent Nuisance and Annoyance (IPNA). Although designed to tackle criminal and sub-criminal behaviour, this new intervention will be a purely civil order replacing the civil-criminal hybrid ASBO. This article explores some of the more troubling aspects of this part of the Bill including its expansive definition of anti-social behaviour, the avoidance of due process protections, the extensive restrictions that respondents may face and the likely impact of its use on young people. With legislation presently under Parliamentary scrutiny, this article calls for amendments to avoid the most problematic aspects of the ASBO being not just replicated but amplified.

Employers, trade unions and concession bargaining in the Irish recession

The issue of concession bargaining between employers and unions during the Great Recession has received little attention in the research literature. This article presents a systematic analysis of the conduct of concession bargaining during the recession in Ireland in the context of three forms of concession bargaining identified in the international literature: integrative concession bargaining, distributive concession bargaining and ultra concession bargaining – each with different but overlapping sets of institutional foundations and implications for employers and trade unions. Drawing on focus groups of managers and union officials and a representative survey of employers, the article shows that distributive concession bargaining has been the predominant form in the Irish recession. This form of concession bargaining is likely to have few lasting direct effects on employer or union roles in collective bargaining but nevertheless appears to have significant indirect implications for the silent marginalization of unions in workplaces.

Antecedents of Concession Bargaining in the Great Recession: Evidence from Ireland

Concession or ‘give back’ bargaining involves firms seeking changes in pay and conditions of employment from trade unions in return for pledges of enhanced job security and sometimes other forms of reciprocation. Several distinct modes of concession bargaining are distinguishable in the literature, and three modes of concession bargaining have been identified in Ireland during the Great Recession: integrative, distributive and minimal engagement. Deploying qualitatively informed quantitative data on the conduct of collective bargaining during the Great Recession, this article examines a series of antecedent influences on the choices firms make in conducting concession bargaining with unions.

A Triumph of Voluntarism? Industrial Relations and Strikes in Northern Ireland During World War Two

Flanders (1974) considered the Second World War to be the great social triumph and vindication of voluntarism in British industrial relations. This paper considers the experience of one region, Northern Ireland, functioning in a unique social and political context and considers the experience of its wartime industrial relations system. The political framework, trade union growth and representation, collective bargaining, strike activity including the major munitions strike of 1944 which may have provoked Defence Regulations Order 1AA, labour management and Joint Production Committees are all examined. The paper gives qualified support to Flanders’ conclusion.

A decentralized model of information pricing in networks

We propose a recursive method of pricing an information good in a network of holders and demanders of this good. The prices are determined via a unique equilibrium outcome in a sequence of bilateral bargaining games that are played by connected agents. If the information is an homogenous, non-depreciating good without network effects we derive explicit formulae which elucidate the role of the link pattern among the players. Particularly, we find out that the equilibrium price is intimately related to the existence of cycles in the network: It is zero if a cycle covers the trading pair and it is proportional to the direct and indirect utility that the good generates otherwise.

National and Provincial Influences on Public Sector Pay: Northern Ireland after 1945

This article examines the national and regional pressures in Northern Ireland in the post-war period for parity in public sector pay with the rest of the UK. Northern Ireland had a devolved legislature and government within the UK from 192 1 and was constitutionality in all essentially federal relationship with the rest of the UK. However, the Stormont Government chose to use legislative devolution to minimize policy differences with the rest of the UK. The article highlights the national industrial relations environment as the backdrop for provincial developments in pay setting. It establishes the important role Played by the Social Services Agreement negotiated with the Labour Government at Westminster in triggering the principle of parity in public sector pay in the early post-war years. The principle of pay parity subsequently became a benchmark for regional trade union coercive comparisons in collective bargaining across the devolved public sector. The article highlights the Policy relevance of these developments both to the UK Treasury and to devolved Governments in the UK, as they address the issue of regional public sector pay.