Information Disclosure, Market Discipline and the Management of Bank Capital: Evidence from the Chinese Financial Sector

Is there evidence that market forces effectively discipline risk management behaviour within Chinese financial institutions? This study analyses information from a comprehensive sample of Chinese banks over the 1998-2008 period. Market discipline is captured through the impact of four sets of factors namely, market concentration, interbank deposits, information disclosure, and ownership structure. We find some evidence of a market disciplining effect in that: (i) higher (lower) levels of market concentration lead banks to operate with a lower (higher) capital buffer; (ii) joint-equity banks that disclose more information to the public maintain larger capital ratios; (iii) full state ownership reduces the sensitivity of changes in a bank's capital buffer to its level of risk;(iv) banks that release more transparent financial information hold more capital against their non-performing loans. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

Information disclosure and depositor discipline in the Chinese banking sector

We investigate the relationship between information disclosure and depositor behaviour in the Chinese banking sector. Specifically, we enquire whether enhanced information disclosure enables investors to more effectively infer a banking institution's risk profile, thereby influencing their deposit decisions. Utilising an unbalanced panel, incorporating financial data from 169 Chinese banks over the 1998–2009 period, we employ generalised-method-of-moments (GMM) estimation procedures to control for potential endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, and persistence in the dependent variable. We uncover evidence that: (i) the growth rate of deposits is sensitive to bank fundamentals after controlling for macroeconomic factors, diversity in ownership structure, and government intervention; (ii) a bank publicly disclosing more transparent information in its financial reports, is more likely to experience growth in its deposit base; and (iii) banks characterised by high information transparency, well-capitalised and adopted international accounting standards, are more able to attract funds by offering higher interest rates.

Understanding Accountability in Social Enterprise Organisations: A Framework

Purpose: Social enterprise organisations (SEOs) operate across the boundaries of the public, private and not‐for‐profit (NFP) sectors in delivering public services and competing for resources and legitimacy. While there is a rich literature on accountability in the private and public sectors, together with the wider NFP sector, SEOs have received comparatively little attention and remain a relatively under‐researched organisational form. Drawing on accountability, legitimacy and user‐needs theories, the purpose of this paper is to develop a practical framework which can be used to explore how accountability within SEOs is constructed and discharged.

Design/methodology/approach: This paper draws on user‐needs, accountability, legitimacy and impression management theories expounded in relation to the private, public and NFP sectors.

Findings: A framework to better understand how accountability can be discharged by SEOs is developed and discussed.

Research limitations/implications: While a framework for better understanding SEO accountability is presented, it is not empirically tested. However, the framework has the potential to facilitate a deeper appreciation of the theory and practice of accountability within SEOs and, notwithstanding the inherent difficulties in measuring and managing accountability, could be used to stimulate practitioner involvement.

Practical implications
– As little is known about the current extent of SEO information disclosure or accountability relationships, the framework could be used to assess the discharge of accountability by SEOs, with the findings informing future developments. This should provide useful insights into internal processes and organisational views on accountability bases and mechanisms and can then be used to inform the debate on how SEOs can best discharge their duty to account.

Social implications
– Understanding the nature of SEO accountability reporting has important implications for those involved in advancing the SEO agenda. At a time of public sector cutbacks, and with the government searching for new and more effective ways of delivering services, the role of SEOs in this process is likely to receive greater attention and scrutiny.

Originality/value
– SEOs have grown extensively in size and prominence in recent years and policymakers have come to embrace the role that they play in societal development. This paper responds to a gap in the theoretical literature and contributes to the debate by developing a framework which can be empirically tested. Moreover, it can be used to prompt practitioner involvement and facilitate a better understanding of the complex issues surrounding accounting and accountability in this under‐researched area.

Self-disclosure decision making based on intimacy and privacy

Autonomous agents may encapsulate their principals' personal data attributes. These attributes may be disclosed to other agents during agent interactions, producing a loss of privacy. Thus, agents need self-disclosure decision-making mechanisms to autonomously decide whether disclosing personal data attributes to other agents is acceptable or not. Current self-disclosure decision-making mechanisms consider the direct benefit and the privacy loss of disclosing an attribute. However, there are many situations in which the direct benefit of disclosing an attribute is a priori unknown. This is the case in human relationships, where the disclosure of personal data attributes plays a crucial role in their development. In this paper, we present self-disclosure decision-making mechanisms based on psychological findings regarding how humans disclose personal information in the building of their relationships. We experimentally demonstrate that, in most situations, agents following these decision-making mechanisms lose less privacy than agents that do not use them. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.