Ownership Patterns and Control in Turkish Listed Companies

The purpose of this paper is to document the prevalent ownership concentration, structure and control in the top 100 companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. The results are discussed in the context of emerging corporate governance trends in Turkey. Where appropriate, comparisons with other countries are provided. The results of the study indicate that ownership of Turkish companies is highly concentrated, families being the dominant shareholders. The separation of ownership and control among Turkish companies is mainly achieved through pyramidal ownership structures and the presence of big business groups. However, the cash flow and voting rights in Turkish companies are relatively more aligned compared to other family–ownership–dominated insider–system countries.

The design of a navigation guidance and control system for an unmanned surface vehicle for environmental monitoring

Maintaining the ecosystem is one of the main concerns in this modern age. With the fear of ever-increasing global warming, the UK is one of the key players to participate actively in taking measures to slow down at least its phenomenal rate. As an ingredient to this process, the Springer vehicle was designed and developed for environmental monitoring and pollutant tracking. This special issue paper highlighted the Springer hardware and software architecture including various navigational sensors, a speed controller, and an environmental monitoring unit. In addition, details regarding the modelling of the vessel were outlined based mainly on experimental data. The formulation of a fault tolerant multi-sensor data fusion technique was also presented. Moreover, control strategy based on a linear quadratic Gaussian controller was developed and simulated on the Springer model.
Gaussian controller is developed and simulated on the Springer model.

Wider share ownership?: investors in English and Welsh Bank shares in the nineteenth century

The joint-stock banks that established after the liberalizing legislation of 1826 were periodically criticized during the nineteenth century for their low-quality and rapidly deteriorating shareholder constituencies. The quality of a bank's shareholding constituency was of paramount importance because of unlimited shareholder liability. Using archival records, this article examines the quality of bank shareholder constituencies over the nineteenth century. The main finding is that shareholder constituencies did not deteriorate in quality until the introduction of limited liability. The non-deterioration of constituencies is attributed to bank deeds which locked in the aggregate quality of shareholder constituencies by empowering directors to vet all share transfers.